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International Arbitration and Procedures to Enforce Awards in
the Relationship between the United States and Germany
(Under the direction of GABRIEL M. WILNER)
This study describes the procedures for the enforcement
of arbitral awards in the relation between the United States
and Germany. By concentrating on the relevant court decisions
a case law approach is chosen.
Because a state party can bar any kind of court
proceedings if it successfully invokes its immunity as a
sovereign state, the foreign sovereign immunity in both
countries has to be discussed in a first chapter.
The multilateral U. N. Convention on the Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards and the bilateral Friendship Treaty
are the most important enforcement mechanisms. To give an
overview the study could not be limited on court decisions
rendered in the bilateral relation. After a description of
the procedure as provided by Convention and national law, the
study scrutinizes the refusal provisions as an obstacle to
the enforcement. The relevant court decisions on every single
defense are summarized, and then the two jurisdictions are
compared. Where appropriate, further theoretical
considerations are added.
The study concludes that the jurisdictions in both
countries apply a very similar standards in the enforcement
procedures
.
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Introduction
From the days of the early English "piepowder" courts,
where the merchants with the dust of the markets still
on their feet stepped into a tribunal of merchants for
swift resolution of their disputes, businessmen have
preferred arbitration, a process which they think
combines finality of decision with speed, low expense,
and flexibility in the selection of principles and
mercantile customs to be used in solving a problem, over
litigation. 1
The dust is gone but the advantages remain: Apart from
speed, lower expenses and higher flexibility by adapting the
procedure to their needs, expertise of the selected
arbitrators 2 typically forms the basis for a just decision of
sophisticated legal disputes. The privacy, confidentiality
and contractual character of arbitration normally helps keep
animosities lower than in litigation without the destruction
of an existing business relation. 3
1 Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to
the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L. J. 104 9
(1961)
2 Ramona Martinez, Recognition and Enforcement of
International Arbitral Awards under the United Nations
Convention of 1958: The "Refusal" Provisions, 24 INT'L LAW.
487 (1990)
3 id.
2In the international cast arbitration proceedings offer
"a neutral forum with expertise in the subject matter." 4 A
businessman may try to avoid litigation in a foreign country
for various reasons: he may be unfamiliar with the
proceedings, he may be afraid to find a "forum hostile"
because of the different legal and cultural background of the
judges in form of an actual bias or unconscious preference
for domestic legal theories. 5 Moreover, arbitration avoids
"considerable uncertainty. . . concerning the law applicable to
the resolution of disputes arising out the contract." 6 The
consequences of a "parochial refusal" to recognize
arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution to
international litigation are emphatically described by the
Supreme Court in Scherk v. Alberto -Culver: it
would invite . . . mutually destructive jockeying by the
parties to secure tactical litigation advantages . . .
[This] dicey atmosphere of such legal no-man's-land
would surely damage the fabric of international commerce
and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of
business to enter into international commercial
agreements
.
7
4 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12
(1972)
5 Quigley, supra note 1, at 1051; Elise P. Wheeless,
Article V (1) (b) of the New York Convention, 7 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 805 (1993); see Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, judgment of
Feb. 17, 1989, English language summary in XV Yearbook of
Commercial Arbitration (ed. Jan Albert van den Berg)
[hereinafter YCA] (1990) 455, 458-461 (discussing broadly
possible disadvantages of an arbitration in one of the
parties' home countries)
6 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974)
7 id. at 517
3Although the advantages of arbitration are generally-
recognized today, U.S. courts had traditionally disfavored
arbitration because it "ousted" the courts from their
jurisdiction. 8 This attitude drastically changed with the
enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act [FAA] 9 in 1925
"reversing centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements, [the Federal Arbitration Act] was designed ... to
place arbitration 'upon the same footing as other
contracts....'" 10 The major accomplishment 11 of the FAA is
its § 2 providing for the validity of a written agreement to
arbitrate, 9 U.S.C. § 2. Contrary to U.S. development,
arbitration agreement - "known from Roman law tradition" 12 -
have been legally recognized for centuries, and the courts
refused to hear a case that had been arbitrated. 13
8 Jill A. Pietrowski, Enforcing International Commercial
Arbitration Agreements - Post-Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 36 AM. U. L. REV. 57, 61-62
(1986)
9 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
10 Scherk, id. at 510-511
11 Donald P. Swisher, International Commercial
Arbitration under the United Nations Convention and the
amended Federal Arbitration Statute, 47 WASH. L. REV. 441, 448
(1972)
12 Otto Sandrock, Arbitration between U.S. and West
German Companies: An Example of effective Dispute Resolution
in International Business Transactions, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L
BUS. L. 27, 32 (1987)
13 id. at 16-17 (mentioning as an early example the
Prussian Code of Civil Procedure) ; DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, §2:03 (Gabriel M. Wilner rev. ed., 1993)
4Arbitration proceedings have been held constitutional by the
Federal Supreme Court. 14 The provisions governing the
arbitration proceedings can be found in the 10th book of the
ZPO 15 in §§ 1025 through 1048.
The value and success of arbitration, however, depend
heavily on the possibility to enforce agreement and award. 16
This is particularly difficult if an award has to be enforced
on assets abroad. 17 Since there are many business
transactions between the United States and Germany this
question concerns a practical interest of businesspeople in
both countries.
Chapter 1 discusses the Foreign Sovereign Immunity,
chapter 2 to 4 the procedure to enforce a foreign arbitral
award under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Chapter 5
scrutinizes other mechanism for the enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award.
14 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of July 3, 1975, 65 BGHZ
59, 61-62
15 Zivilprozessordnung [Code of Civil Procedure]
16 Martinez, supra note 2, at 4 93; J. Stewart McClendon,
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States,
4 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 58, 59 (1982)
17 David West in, Enforcing Foreign Commercial Judgments
and Arbitral Awards in the United States, West Germany, and
England, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 325, 325-326 (1987)
Chapter 1: Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Any kind of court proceedings are barred when a State
can successfully invoke its immunity as a foreign sovereign.
This requires a preliminary discussion of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity.
I. U.S. court decisions
The problems of Foreign Sovereign Immunity are governed
in the United States by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 18 in particular § 1605(a) providing for the "general
exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign
state." 19 The legislative history is ambiguous; it is not
clear whether the implicit waiver of immunity relates only to
an arbitration of a state party in the United States or in
18 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611
19 § 1605 (a) : A foreign state shall not be immune from
the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the
States in any case -
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity
either explicitly or by implication, . .
.
(6) in which the action is brought, either to enforce an
agreement by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a
private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences
. .
.
, or to confirm an award pursuant to such an agreement. . . .
6any other third party foreign jurisdiction. 20 This fact has
to be kept in mind when considering the court decisions in
which the foreign sovereign immunity was litigated.
In the dictum of Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
the court stated that a state does not implicitly waive its
immunity defense in the U.S. courts simply by agreeing to
arbitrate under the law of another (third) country, here the
Netherlands. 21 The prevailing opinion among the courts,
however, is a broad interpretation of the waiver provision.
In Ipi trade International v. Nigeria, Nigeria had
already unsuccessfully invoked its foreign sovereign immunity
before the arbitrator. The District Court, basing its
decision on § 1601(a), supported its reasoning in a way
similar to the opposite Verlinden decision by broadly reading
20 Georges R. Delaume, Sovereign immunity and
transnational arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 313, 315 (Julian D. W. Lew ed.,
1987)
21 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F.Supp.
1284, 1301 (D.D.C. 1980) ; Chicago Bridge Iron Co. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 506 F. Supp . 981, 987 (N.D. 111. 1980) (for
application of national (Iranian) law) ; after an amendment of
the Sovereign Immunities Act, § 1605(a)(6) partly clarifies
the situation: if enforcement of the agreement or award are
governed by a treaty or an international agreement the
foreign state has waived its immunity (see also ALAN REDFERN
& MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 426 (2nd ed. 1991)). Since the U.S.
and Germany are parties to several international treaties
involving arbitration issues, the problem of a case not
governed by any treaty (and not regulated by § 1605(a) (6))
will not occur in this relation.
7the legislative history. 22 In fact, a different finding might
imply the risk of unilateral withdrawal if the winning party
tries to enforce the award in another state than the one
where the proceedings took place. 23 The mere stipulation of
a the law of a third country, where the state defendant has
no assets, would equate an escape from arbitration.
Consequently, the U.S. courts recognized the awards. "This is
clearly the correct solution, since otherwise sovereign
immunity would make a mockery of the arbitration process." 24
The contrary jurisdiction can after the amendment of § 1605
no longer be upheld with regard to countries which have
signed international arbitration agreements with the U.S.
From the agreement to arbitrate and the implied waiver,
the Act of State doctrine has to be distinguished. This
doctrine was introduced by the Supreme Court in Underhill v.
Hernandez and requires respect for acts in the governmental
authority. 25 The District Court in the subsequently vacated
decision in Libyan American Oil apparently failed to draw
this distinction: It relied on the Act of State doctrine
22 Ipitrade Int'l, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
465 F.Supp. 824, 826 (D.D.C. 1978); Libyan American Oil -Co.
v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamarhirya, 428 F.Supp.
1175, 1178 (D.D.C. 1980) ; Birch Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of
the United Republic of Tanzania, 507 F.Supp. 311, 312
(D.D.C. 1980) (for a U.S. award)
23 Ipitrade, id.
24 Delaume, supra note 20, at 317
25 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)
8after having found that Libya had waived its foreign
sovereign immunity. 26 Hereby, the court apparently confused
a State's sovereign right to nationalize with a method of
dispute resolution, and thereby acknowledged a possibility to
unilaterally withdraw from a contractual obligation. 27
II. German court decisions
In its decision of Dec. 2, 1975, the Court of First
Instance in Frankfurt recognized in general a foreign
sovereign immunity according to § 2 GVG28 ; it added two
modifications: first, it distinguished from the state legally
independent entities without immunity. Secondly, the Foreign
State can object to German jurisdiction only to the extent
that acta jure imperii are covered by the proceeding. Acta
gestiones, or commercial acts, are subjected to German
jurisdiction. 29 The Federal Constitutional Court adopted a
similar reasoning recognizing immunity only for acta imperii;
it is not possible to seek execution on assets used for
26 Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan
Arab Jamahirya, 482 F.Supp. 1175, 1178 (D.D.C. 1980)
27 ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION
CONVENTION OF 1958, 372 (1981); the LIAMCO decision has been
vacated after a settlement during the proceedings before the
Court of Appeals on May 6, 1981 (DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, supra note 13 at § 45:02)
28 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [Basic Law for the German
Courts]
29 Landgericht Frankfurt, judgment of Dec. 2, 1975, 2 9
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1044, 1045 (1976)
9public purposes. 30 The immunity can be waived explicitly or
by implication31 and is irrevocable. 32 There is no reason why
German courts should not recognize foreign arbitral awards
under the same aspects.
III. Post-award execution
The post -award execution concerns the question of
immunity of execution. Section 1610 enumerates the
"exceptions to the immunity from attachment or execution."
Its paragraph (a) (2) has the most practical relevance, if the
property was used for commercial activities. 33 According to
the jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court,
commercial activities of a state do not enjoy immunity. 34 For
both jurisdictions the most prudent tactic is to obtain an
explicit waiver. 35
30 Bundesverfassungsgericht
,
judgment of Dec. 13, 1977,
46 BVerfGE 342, 345 (no. 5 and 8)
31 Westin, supra note 17, at 358
32 Bundesverfassungsgericht , id. at 402
33 Birch Shipping Co. v. Embassy of the United Republic
of Tansania, 507 F . Supp . 311, 312-313 (D.D.C. 1980)
(discussing broadly the commmercial activity)
34 Bundesverfassungsgericht, judgment of April 12, 1983,
64 BVerfGE 342, 343 (no. 8)
35 Westin, supra note 17, at 3 5 7;
Bundesverfassungsgericht , judgment of Dec. 13, 1977, 46
BVerfGE 342, 404
Chapter 2: The U.N. Convention and its enforcement procedure
I . Introduction
" [T] he New York Convention can be considered as the most
important Convention in the field of arbitration and as the
cornerstone of current international commercial
arbitration." 36 As mentioned earlier, the value of
arbitration is determined by the possibility of enforcement
of the agreement and the award. The goal of the Convention
was to encourage the recognition and enforcement of
commercial arbitration, that is, "to create a dependable
system of laws in all trading nations under which enforcement
of awards is obtained, regardless of the place of the hearing
or the nationality of the arbitrators." 37 It is a "unified,
efficient and trustworthy method of insuring that the manner
they have chosen to resolve their transnational disputes will
be effective." 38 To underline the advantages of the New York
Convention, it is usually contrasted with the 1927 Geneva
Convention. Generally three problems arising out of the
latter are emphasized which complicated enforcement. It is
36 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 1
37 Martinez, supra note 2, at 4 91
38 Martinez, id. at 488
10
11
submitted that those problems are clearly to be avoided by
the U.N. Convention:
(1) the Geneva Convention placed the burden of proof on the
plaintiff, 39
(2) its applicability depended on a diversity-of -citizenship
requirement involving varying national doctrines on
citizenship, 40
(3) the requirement that an award be "final." 41 In general,
the Convention embodies a "pro-enforcement philosophy." 42
The United States acceded the Convention in 1970 and
implemented it through §§ 201 to 209 as the second chapter of
the Federal Arbitration Act. The Federal Republic of Germany
joined the Treaty in 1961
;
43 since the Convention as an
international treaty has full force of law a special
implementing legislation was not necessary in Germany. 44
This study concentrates on international commercial
arbitration. However, before the details of the enforcement
39 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 9; Paolo Contini,
International Commercial Arbitration - The United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. J. COMP . L. 283, 299 (1959)
40 Quigley, supra note 1, at 1055
41 Pieter Sanders, A Twenty Year's Review of the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 13 INT'L LAW. 269, 273 (1979)
42 Wheeless, supra note 5, at 810
43 1961 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1
.
] II, 121-142
44 Westin, supra note 17, at 353-354
12
and its refusal are scrutinized, a few preliminary remarks
must be made about the requirements of the application of the
Convention; if the Convention is not applicable its
procedures cannot be used. After this the study focusses on
the procedures for enforcement and the refusal provisions.
The study uses a "case law approach" to discuss the single
provisions of the Convention. According to its nature, case
law is not structured, but as a whole, it gives an overview
of the consistent jurisdiction of the courts and their mode
of interpretation of a statute. Despite the title "procedures
for the enforcement of awards," the distinction between the
enforcement of an agreement and the award is not strictly
upheld. Landmark decisions, such as the Supreme Court
Mitsubishi decision on the enforceability of an agreement to
arbitrate an antitrust claim, cannot be disregarded. They
generally employ the same criteria as those in the award
enforcement stage. The discussion of the provisions is
structured as follows: the relevant provision is quoted, then
its application by the national courts in the U.S. and
Germany is described before the two jurisdictions are
compared. In a further step it is - where appropriate - dealt
with more theoretical problems.
Once the applicability of the New York Convention has
been positively determined, two articles directly address the
substantive and formal requirements under which a foreign
13
arbitral award has to be enforced in the signatory states:
Art. Ill and IV.
II. Applicability of the Convention
The U.N. Convention applies to "foreign" arbitral
awards. To determine when an award is "foreign" the
Convention embodies in its Art. 1(1) two different doctrines.
According to the territoriality doctrine an award is foreign
when it is "made in the territory of a State other than the
State where . . . enforcement of such award are sought . . . .
"
Art. 1(1) also recognizes a German specialty. The procedural
doctrine considers an award as foreign when it "was subject
to the arbitration rules of a foreign state." 45 Both
countries made the reservation on commercial matters which
are not defined by the Convention, 46 the U.S. in addition
also made the reciprocity reservation. The latter is
evidently of no importance in the U.S. -German relation. The
same is true of the former because "[t]he interpretation of
commercial matters in the United States as well as in West
45 Otto Sandrock & Matthias K. Hentzen, Enforcing foreign
arbitral awards in the Federal Republic of Germany: The
example of a United States Award, 2 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 49, 53
(1989)
46 not defined by the Convention {see McClendon, supra
note 16, at 62)
14
Germany47 is so broad that it will rarely encroach upon the
application of the New York Convention. 1148
III. The domestic procedure the Convention
A. The substantial requirements under Art. Ill
Art. Ill reads as follows:
Each contracting state shall recognize arbitral awards
as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules
of procedure of the territory where the award is relied
upon, under the conditions laid down in the following
articles. There shall not be imposed substantially
more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the
recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which
this Convention applies than are imposed on the
recognition and enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.
Thereby, Art. Ill describes the basic obligation for all
the signatory states and embodies the purpose of the
Convention. Both countries, the U.S. and Germany, follow the
Convention's directive and equate in principle the procedures
for the confirmation of domestic and international awards.
1 . The procedure in the United States
The procedure for recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards in the U.S. is governed by § 207 of title 9
47 see 9 U.S.C. § 2 and § 343(1) HGB [Handelsgesetzbuch]
[German Commercial Code]
48 Sandrock & Hentzen, id. at 54; see Swisher, supra note
11, at 456 (stating that a commercial relationship within the
meaning of the § 202 is broader than the one provided by the
FAA. § 202 does not limit the applicability of the Convention
to the subject matter of the FAA) ; DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, supra note 13, at § 45:03
15
U.S.C. providing for confirmation of awards under the
Convention. Section 207 reads:
Within three years after an arbitral award has been
falling under the Convention is made, any party to the
arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction
under this chapter for an order confirming the award as
against any other party to the arbitration. The court
shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the
ground for refusal or deferral of recognition or
enforcement of the award specified in the said
Convention.
Most important are three aspects:
1. Section 207 provides for confirmation, i. e. recognition
and enforcement. Only one proceeding is required.
2. A prevailing party has to apply for confirmation within
the time limit of three years. 49
3. The refusal provisions are limited.
U.S. implementing legislation does not add any ground
for refusal. The court can only refuse the confirmation on
Art. V grounds. Despite the express language, the defendant
challenged the confirmation proceedings invoking "aspects
incidental to the enforcement procedure which are not
[explicitly] governed by the Convention." 50 However, U.S.
courts generally have recognized that Art. Ill is not an
49 Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc. 517
F.Supp. 948, 963 (D.S.D. Ohio 1981); Bergesen v. Joseph
Muller Corp., 548 F.Supp. 650, 652 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1982)
50 Albert Jan van den Berg, New York Convention of 1958 -
Commentary Cases Reported in Volume XII (1987), in XII YCA
(1987) 409, 446 [hereinafter van den Berg, commentary]
16
affirmative defense in the sense of Art. V. 51 The grounds on
which the respondents opposed the procedure might be
systematized as follows: "discovery of evidence, estoppel or
waiver, set-off or counterclaim against award, the entry of
judgment clause, interest on the award." 52
Discovery: In Imperial Ethiopian v. Baruch-Foster, the
defendant had found out some time after the award had been
rendered that one of the arbitrators had worked (16 years
before) for one of the parties, 53 and therefore sought to
oppose the enforcement proceedings. To support his allegation
of the arbitrator's disqualification BFC demanded
discovery. 54 Concerned about mere dilatory tactics, the
court declined an unqualified right to pursue discovery
unless there is "any semblance of substance." 55 If it were
held otherwise the losing party could "freeze the
confirmation proceedings . . . and indefinitely postpone
judgment by merely requesting discovery." 56
51 Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 518 (2nd
Cir. 1975); Audi NSU Auto Union v. Overseas Motors, Inc.,
District Court, E.D. Mich., judgment of March 15, 1977,
summary in III YCA (1978), 291, 292
52 van den Berg, id.
53 Imperial Ethiopian Gov't, v. Baruch-Foster Corp. 535
F.2d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1976)
54 id.
55 id. at 337
56 id,
17
Estoppel/Waiver: On the award enforcement stage U.S.
courts usually reject a defendant's attempt to prevent
enforcement by introducing "new" objections against the
award. The courts generally argue that the defendant has
"waived" these objections if he could have presented them to
the panel during the arbitration proceeding, or at least
earlier without inexcusable delay. This estopps him from
invoking these facts now. In particular, pursuing a state
court action instead of participating in the arbitration
proceedings were not excepted as an excuse. 57 Accordingly, it
was held that foreign states had waived their immunity as
foreign sovereigns once they agreed upon arbitration. 58
Set-off /Counterclaim: A set-off, or counterclaim, are
another possibility to oppose enforcement; they have been
judged differently by U.S. courts. In Audi v. Overseas the
court found that "counterclaims are inappropriate in a
confirmation proceeding." 59 The court in Fertilizer v. IDI
57 La Societe Nationale pour la Recherche, la Production,
le Transport, la Transformation et la Commercialisation des
Hydrocarbures v. Shaheen Natural Resources Co., 585 F.Supp.
57, 62 and 65 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1983); Al Haddad Enter, v. M/S
Agapi and Diakan, 635 F.Supp. 205, 209 (D.Del. 1986)
(involving a delay of nearly a year)
58 M.B.L. International Contractors, Inc. v. Republic of
Trinidad and Tobago, 725 F.Supp. 52, 55 (D.D.C. 1989);
Seetransport Wiking Trader Schif fahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co.,
KG v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 793 F.Supp. 444, 446
(D.S.D.N.Y. 1992)
59 Audi NSU Auto Union A.G. v. Overseas Motors, Inc.,
U.S. District Court (E.D. Mich.), judgment of March 15, 1977,
summary in III YCA (1978), 291, 292
18
followed the same line and dismissed IDI' s counterclaim as
time barred. Inspite the fact that the confirmation
proceedings follow the rules for motion practice, the court
distinguished the former as "not an original action" but a
post- judgment enforcement proceeding against which a
counterclaim seems inappropriate. 60 Differently, the District
Court in Jugometal v. Samincorp held that " [i] t would be
inequitable to permit this plaintiff to recover a judgment
here against the defendant on the concededly valid arbitral
award in its favor, and at the same time to withhold
enforcement of the three counterclaims...." 61 A factual
difference between Audi and Fertilizer on the one hand, and
Jugometal on the other is that in Audi and Fertilizer the
defendant had merely claimed its own rights; in Jugometal he
could present evidently valid, undisputed arbitral awards in
its favor. 62 Additionally, all claims were identical in their
nature of motions to enforce foreign arbitral awards. 63
Entry of judgment clause: According to § 9 FAA, a
federal court has jurisdiction only if the parties have
agreed "that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon
60 Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, 517
F.Supp. 948, 963 (D.S.D. Ohio 1981) ; Kwong Kam Tat Trading
Co. v. Comsup Commodities, U.S. District Court (N.J.),
judgment of Dec. 29, 1992, summary in XIX YCA (1994) 797
61 Jugometal v. Samincorp., Inc., 78 F.R.D. 504, 506
(D.S.D.N.Y. 1978)
62 Kwong Kam Tat, id. at 798
63 id.
19
the award . . . . " Chapter 2 implementing the Convention does
not make any express statement with regard to foreign
awards. 64 In absence of any express statement, reference to
the applicable arbitration rule has to be made. 65 If these
rules also lack any statement, a clause in the contract
providing that an award "shall be final" is regarded as
"sufficient to imply consent to entry of judgment of an
arbitration award." 66 An additional hint for the parties'
intention might be their conduct. 67
Interest: In several U.S. decisions the question was
discussed whether U.S. District courts can award a
prejudgment interest. Under domestic law, the award of
prejudgment interest is at the discretion of the District
Courts. 68 In absence of any statement in the U.N. Convention,
the court in Waterside v. International Navigation found that
the same policy considerations apply because it is the only
way "a person wrongfully deprived of his money be made whole
64 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 242
65 In re I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc.
500 F.2d 424, 426 (2nd Cir. 1974)
66 Daihatsu Motor Co. v. Terrain Vehicles, Inc. 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7804, *1, 9 (D.N.D. 111. June 1, 1992); I/S
Stavborg, id. at 427; Audi NSU Union Aktiengesellschaf t v.
Overseas Motors, Inc. 418 F . Supp . 982, 985 (D.E.D. Mich.
1976)
67 I/S Stavborg, id. (parties invoked federal courts)
;
VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 242
68 Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. Int'l Navigation
Ltd., 737 F.2d 150, 153 (2nd Cir. 1984)
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for the loss." 69 Prejudgment interest is only excluded "under
exceptional circumstances, " such as bad faith of the party-
seeking interest. 70
According to § 203 the district courts have original
jurisdiction. Venue is generally determined by the place of
arbitration. Otherwise, any court is competent where an
action with respect to the controversy could have been
brought, § 2 04.
2 . The German procedure
The parties agreement determines the competence of a
court of first instance (Amts- or Landgericht) , §§ 1045(1),
104 6 ZPO. Lacking an agreement, the general rules, §§ 12-37
ZPO (venue), §§ 23, 71 GVG71 (jurisdiction) apply;
subsidiarily, the district of the court where the arbitration
took place determines the venue.
In Germany § 1044 ZPO governs the enforcement procedure
for foreign arbitral awards. The ZPO does not provide for two
different procedures of recognition and enforcement, the
69 id. at 154; Al Haddad Bros. Enter, v. M/S Agapi and
Diakan, 635 F . Supp 205, 210 (D.Del. 1986); Reefer Express
Lines Pty. , Ltd. v. General Authority for Supply Commodities
(GASC) , 714 F.Supp. 699, 700 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1989)
70 Reefer Express, id.
71 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [Basic Law for the German
Courts]
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declaration of enforceability already implies recognition. 72
However, § 1044 ZPO has only a subsidiary function to the
extent that no international treaty provides for a special
proceeding. 73 Enforceability according to German law requires
the following elements:
A "foreign" arbitral award: contrary to the majority of
arbitration laws, the German law adheres to the so-called
procedural doctrine: an arbitral award is foreign if it has
been rendered under the procedural rules of a foreign
state. 74 Where it has been rendered is irrelevant.
Consequently, an arbitral award rendered in New York City
under German procedural rules is not considered foreign.
Binding effect according to the applicable law:
Generally Art. V(l) (e) supersedes § 1044 ZPO. The criteria,
however, for the determination as to when an award is
considered to be binding, are the same: an award is binding
when no more confirming order by the state or another
institution is required and an arbitral judicial appeal is
excluded according to the applicable law. 75
72 MAIER in 3 MUENCHNER KOMMENTAR ZUR
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, § 1044 no. 1 (1st ed. 1992) [hereinafter
MUEKO-MAIER]
73 Oberlandesgericht Hamm, judgment of Nov. 2, 1983, XIV
YCA (1989) 629, 630; ADOLF BAUMBACH ET AL .
,
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, § 1044 no. 5 (53rd ed. 1994)
74 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of Oct. 21, 1965, 21 BGHZ
365, 367; MUEKO-MAIER, id. at no . 2
75 Bundesgerichtshof, judgment of May 10, 1984, 37 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2763, 2764 (1984)
22
No refusal grounds: The application of the refusal
provisions evidences again the subsidiary function of the
German procedural law. The refusal provisions of Art. V
supersede those of § 1044(2), however, according to art. VII
the prevailing party is free to choose the procedure of
§ 1044 (as a whole) if its requirements are lower. 76 The
latter provides mainly for parallel refusal grounds:
- Invalidity of an award under the applicable law (no. 1) . An
award is invalid if it was vacated, if the arbitration
agreement was void or contrary to the foreign legal order,
or the award was beyond the scope of submission to
arbitration. Normally, invalidity can only be invoked if the
defendant is still able to oppose the award under applicable
foreign law. 77
- Public policy (no. 2)
.
- Lacking representation during the proceedings (no. 3).
- Ability to present the case (no. 4) . The latter provisions
are to be determined according to German law. 78
As to mentioned "incidental aspects of an enforcement
procedure" the German courts follow a line similar to the
U.S. courts. The courts held that a defendant is barred to
invoke objections he could have raised before the panel, i.
76 MUEKO-MAIER, id. at no. 18-19
77 BAUMBACH, supra note 73, at § 1044 no. 8
78 BAUMBACH, id. at § 1044 no. 9-13
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e. they also apply the idea of a waiver. 79 In regard to set-
offs, the Court of Appeals in Hamburg generally recognized
the possibilities to consider them in the enforcement
proceeding. 80 The problem of interest rates does not arise in
Germany since according to § 291 BGB 81 a 4% interest rate
(§ 288(1) BGB) is awarded upon pendency; the same is true for
the problem of time limits because according to § 128 BGB the
time limit for application for confirmation is thirty
years
.
82
Compliance with the required procedure: Domestic German
arbitration law requires certain formalities, § 1039 ZPO.
Those do not apply to foreign awards, § 1044(1) ZPO. Art. IV
is lex specialis for an enforcement procedure under the
Convention. If the winning party, however, chooses the
domestic procedure, a request (§ 1042b (1) ZPO) and a
translation (§ 184 GVG) are required.
An oral hearing is not required but generally
recommended because of the lacking familiarity of a court
with foreign law; it is mandatory if a party raises the
79 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of March 6, 1969, English
language summary in II YCA (1977) 235, 236; Oberlandesgericht
Hamm, judgment of Nov. 2, 1983, English language summary in
XIV YCA (1989) 629, 632
80 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, judgment of March 27, 1975,
English language summary in II YCA (1977) 240, 241
81 Buergerliches Gesetzbuch [German Civil Code]
82 Westin, supra note 17, at 354
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defenses in § 1044(2) ZPO. 83 Since the Art. V defenses
replace § 1044 (2) ZPO in the international context, the same
is true when a defendant invokes these defenses.
B. The formal requirements under Article IV
Art. IV regulates the formal requirements for the
enforcement and is rather self explanatory:
(1) To obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned
in the preceding article, the party applying for
recognition and enforcement shall, at the time of the
application, supply:
(a) The duly authenticated original award or duly
certified copy thereof;
(b) The original agreement referred to in art. II or a
duly certified copy thereof.
(2) If the said award or agreement is not made in an
official language of the country in which the award is
relied upon, the party applying for recognition and
enforcement of the award shall produce a translation of
these documents into such language. The translation
shall be certified by an official or sworn translator or
by a diplomatic or consular agent.
The party seeking enforcement of its award has to bring
forward in "duly authenticated" form:
(a) the award, (b) the agreement, (c) a translation of both
if they are written in language different than the official
language of the exequatur state. Although a duly authorized
copy does not prove the due legislation of the original, such
a copy is generally recognized. 84 The court of First Instance
83 KARL -HEINZ SCHWAB & GERHARD WALTER,
SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT, Kap . 30, no. 27 (4th ed. 1990)
84 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, judgment of July 27, 1978,
IV YCA (1979) 258, 259; GOTTWALD in 3 MUENCHNER KOMMENTAR ZUR
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, IZPR, Art. IV no. 4 (1st ed. 1992)
[hereinafter MUEKO- GOTTWALD]
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in Munich did not recognize sales confirmations as a
sufficient agreement in writing. A sales confirmation did not
contain "corresponding declaration" (meeting of the minds) as
expressed in an exchange of letters. 85 Also, a copy-
certifying only the conformity of the signatures but not the
conformity with the original was not held sufficient. 86
Accordingly, an enforcing party is recommended to comply with
the formal requirements as set out by the Convention very
carefully. Since the purpose of the legislation is to obtain
the same probative value, an award obtained in Germany under
foreign law87 does not met this legitimation. 88 Applicable
law is the exequatur state's law. 89 Whose countries
national's shall certify the translation is questioned. To
protect the justified interests of the exequatur state, it
seems preferable to require a certification by the latter
officials. 90
85 Landgericht Muenchen, judgment of June 20, 1978,
English language summary in V (1980) 258, 259
86 Oberlandesgericht Koeln, judgment of June 10, 1976, IV
YCA (1979) 258, 259
87 i. e. a foreign award
88 MUEKO-GOTTWALD, id. at Art. IV no . 5
89 id. at no . 7
90 MUEKO-GOTTWALD, supra note 84, at Art. IV no. 13; but
van den Berg, commentary, supra note 29, at 4 53
Chapter 3: The refusal provisions of the U.N. Convention
The Convention allows only seven defenses against the
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. A court may refuse
the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award for one of the
five enumerated procedural defects in Art. V(l), or for a
jurisdictional problem at the place of enforcement, Art.
V(2) . 91 Furthermore, paragraph (1) and (2) can be
distinguished from a systematic point of view: The first five
defenses have to be invoked by the defendant, whereas the
last two defenses in paragraph (2) can be raised by the
enforcing court ex officio on its own motion.
I. The procedural defenses of Art. V(l)
Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused,
at the request of the party against whom it is invoked,
only if that party furnishes to the competent authority
where recognition and enforcement is sought, proof
that. . .
.
91 McClendon, supra note 16, at 63
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A. Incapacity of the parties or invalidity of the agreement
1 . Introduction
The first ground for which a court may refuse
recognition and enforcement is Art. V (1) (a) . It reads as
follows
:
The parties to the agreement referred to in article II
were, under the law applicable to them under some
incapacity, or said agreement is not valid under the law
to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any
indication thereon, under the law of the country where
the award was made ; . .
.
Art. V (1) (a) acknowledges two grounds upon which a
court may deny enforcement of a foreign arbitral award:
(1) incapacity of a party or
(2) the invalidity of the arbitration agreement itself.
In short: "There should be no enforcement of an award of an
award against a party who had never agreed to arbitrate." 92
92 Quigley, supra note 1, at 1067;
McClendon, supra note 16, at 63 enumerates several
questions concerning the possible invalidity:
- whether there was an agreement;
whether there was an agreement to be bound by an
arbitrator's decision;
- or merely to submit the dispute to an umpire; whether the
dispute was arbitrable;
- whether the agreement was valid (or induced by fraud,
duress?)
;
- whether the invalidity of the agreement can be determined
independently of the main contract?
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2. U.S. court decisions
The defense has been rarely discussed in U.S. courts: In
Audi NSU v. Overseas Motors93 the defendant asserted that the
arbitrators had applied Swiss law instead of German law as
stipulated by the agreement. The court, requiring a causal
connection, rejected Overseas' defense: There was no showing
that the decision would have been different under German
procedural law. 94 Secondly, the court noted that Art. V(l) (a)
"rationally interpreted applies only to substantive and not
procedural law." 95 Two aspects of this decision are
interesting: The first is the applicability of the Art.
V(l) (a) defense only to substantive law. Although this
statement correctly assumes that the validity of an agreement
as a contract is typically determined by substantive and not
procedural law, it appears doubtful. Additionally, the
rationale of this decision itself is surprising: in a
consequent application of its holding the court would have
had to review the merits if a sufficient showing had given
reason to believe that the result would have been different.
This a consequence the court apparently tries to avoid by the
93 Audi NSU Auto Union v. Overseas Motors, U.S. District
Court, E.D. Mich, judgment of March 15, 1977, summary in III
YCA (1977) 291
94 id. at 293
95 id.
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dictum that prohibits further review of the application of
procedural law. 96
Of greater practical importance is the decision Corcoran
v. Ardra. It discussed the impact of bankruptcy proceedings
on the capacity to be a party in arbitration proceedings: 97
The State Superintendent of Insurance in his function as
liquidator of Nassau Insurance sued Ardra for reinsurance
balances. Ardra moved to dismiss the complaint and compel
arbitration under the Convention. Although the Supreme Court
found the inapplicability of the Convention98 , it referred
explicitly to Art. V(l) (a) and adopted the scholarly opinion
stating that Art. V(l) (a) relates to the moment the
arbitration arises with the consequence that an insolvent
party under U.S. law is under some incapacity. 99
96 Geotech Lizenz AG v. Evergreen Systems, 697 F.Supp.
1248, 1253 (1988) (discussing the question whether an alleged
settlement agreement had superseded the arbitration
agreement. As there was no unanimity about the binding effect
of this second agreement it could not render the arbitration
agreement "invalid" within the meaning of this defense)
;
Gould v. Ministry of Defense, 9th Cir., judgment of Oct. 23,
1989, English language summary in XV YCA (1989) 605, at 607
(holding that even though there was never the required
written agreement (Art. V(l) (a) referring back to Art. 11(1))
between an American and Iran party the Algiers Accords
themselves establishing the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
represent this written agreement)
97 Corcoran v. Ardra Ins., 553 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1990)
(App. Div.
)
98 non commercial relation
99 Corcoran v. Ardra Ins., id. at 698 (1990)
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Although it affirmed the decision, the Court of
Appeals 100 did not uphold the latter interpretation and ruled
that a "commercial nature of the relationship is determined
at the inception of the agreement...." 101 It is likely that
the Court of Appeals (implicitly) did not want to adhere to
the District Court's reasoning. The court did not discuss
Art. V(l) (a) at all, but based its affirming decision on Art.
11(3) and V(2) (a) holding the nonarbitrability of the subject
matter. 102 For these reasons the lower court decision is for
the interpretation of Art. V(l) (a) of less precedential
value
.
As its only substantial contribution to the
interpretation of Art. V(l) (a) the U.S. courts state that
"law" within the meaning of Art. V(l) (a) encompasses only
substantive law. Bankruptcy proceedings at least seem to have
no influence on the parties capacity.
The paucity of cases might be a result of the Prima
Paint v. Flood Manufacturer. 103 In this decision - not yet
under the Convention - the Supreme Court followed the
100 Corcoran v. Ardra Ins., 77 N.Y.2d 225 (Ct. App . 1990)
101 id. at 231
102 id. at 231-233
103 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood Manufacturer, 388 U.S. 395,
400 (1967); Philip R. West, The Express Defenses of the N.Y.
Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 5 N. Y. L. SCH. J. INT' L &
COMP. L. 103, 111 (1983); Martinez, supra note 2, at 498
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separability doctrine 104 and limited the review competence
of courts drastically to the extent that they "may consider
only issues relating to the making and performance of the
agreement to arbitrate" and not the contract in general. 105
It is unclear how the invalidity of the arbitration clause
can be separated from the validity of the main contract, i.
e. how the incapacity of a party to conclude a contract can
be without impact on the arbitration agreement. 106 Since an
alleged incapacity of a party therefore would jeopardize the
whole contract, the court's review competence is limited to
the arbitration clause. This fact impliedly might have
discouraged defendants to invoke Art. V(l) (a) . 107
3 . German court decisions
In the first reported German decision the Supreme
Court 108 had to consider, an infringement of § 1025(2)
Z pQio9 invalidated an arbitration agreement. The Supreme
104 this will be discussed broadly under Art. V(l) (c) in
the context of "Kompetenz-Kompetenz"
105 id. at 404
106 West, id. at 110
107 West, id. at 111
108 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of March 6, 1969, English
language summary in II YCA (1977) 235
109 § 1025(2) ZPO provides:
2. The arbitration agreement is not valid if one of the
parties has used any superiority it possesses by virtue of
economic of social position in order to constrain the other
party to make this agreement or to accept conditions therein,
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Court looking at the applicable Czechoslovak law, denied this
question. Since Czechoslovak law did not contain a similar
provision the court rejected the defense. 110 This result is
doubtful because § 1025(2) ZPO is designed to protect a
weaker party who is typically not aware of the risk of a
choice-of-law clause. It may be submitted that in this
particular case the defendants as businessmen were not
regarded as needing this legal protection.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court considered the impact of
time limits on the existence of an arbitration agreement. It
is questioned whether time limits are to be dealt within Art.
V(l) (a) or (d) , as concerning the existence of an agreement
or the composition of the panel and procedure. The court held
in the sense that this had to be "considered by the court on
the basis of the applicable law." 111 The court applied Art.
V(l) (a) and referred to the law governing the arbitration
agreement. 112 In application of this the court has
consistently held that it will respect time limits set by the
domestic law. However, German defendants raised the
resulting in the one party having an advantage over the other
in the procedure, and more especially in regard to the
nomination or the non-acceptance of the arbitrator.
(Translation by XIV YCA (1989) 631)
110 id. at 236
111 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of Feb. 12, 1976, English
language summary in II YCA (1977) 242, 243
112 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 2 90 note 169
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defense 113 several times that the award was not invalid under
the applicable law. The Supreme Court, then, referred to the
law applicable to the award including the domestic procedural
law. 114 Consequently, the court did not permit the defense
to claim that an award would have been invalid under the
applicable law. The defense cannot be raised any more in the
country of issuance because a time limit elapsed and the
defendant failed to act in time. 115 Conversely, the Supreme
Court is very likely not to enforce a foreign arbitral award
if the defendant is enabled to oppose the award under the
applicable (U.S.) law.
The Court of First Instance in Hamburg addressed a
common problem: 116 the form requirement for the authorization
of an agent . The court ruled that apparent authority does not
meet the writing requirement of Art. II: "Since in any case
one cannot speak of an arbitration agreement signed by the
respondent." 117 This lack of form then led to the
inapplicability of the New York Convention. The result
reflects the German domestic law according to which form
113 not always under Art. V(l) (a)
114 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of Oct. 21, 1971, 57 BGHZ
153, 157; judgment of May 5, 1984, 37 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2763, 2764 (1984)
115 id,
116 Landgericht Hamburg, judgments of Dec. 10 and 30,
1985, XII YCA (1987) 487, 488
117 id,
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requirements usually have a protective function. 118 This
decision is the only German decision in which an Art. V
(1) (a) defense has been successfully raised. 119
The court decisions evidence a consequent reference to
the applicable domestic law of the country where the award is
made; this is also true even in cases with backgrounds
touching domestic public policy. 120 The choice of law rule
prevails even over mandatory German procedural law protecting
a weak party.
4. Comparison
The mentioned U.S. and German court decisions can be
substantially distinguished as to the interpretation of the
term "law." According to Audi v. Overseas, Art. V(l) (a) only
applies to substantive law. The German Federal Supreme Court
found that the applicable law also encompasses "procedural
118 Sandrock & Hentzen, supra note 45, at 56 (stating that
"the form requirements are designed to warn the principal for
whom the agent acts, as well as to protect the other party to
the contract relying upon the binding nature of the
agreement . "
)
119 see generally Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, judgment
of March 13, 1973, English language summary in II YCA (1977)
239 (deciding a rather particular case concerning the
determination of the applicable law: a Dutch and a German
party had provided for arbitration by the German-Dutch
Chamber of Commerce without any reference to the applicable
law nor a place of arbitration. An ordinary court designated
by an unsatisfied party should be competent if the decision
is not acceptable to either party. Since the Court failed to
determine any applicable law, it interpreted the clause as an
attempt for conciliation)
120 see under Art. V(2) (b)
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law." Why a limitation to substantive law should be rational
remains unclear. It might be submitted as well that
arbitration itself is a procedural device, the "shell" to
resolve the substantive dispute, and therefore "law" only
refers to the arbitration and not to the contract. Although
the validity of a contract is typically determined by
substantive and not procedural law, the interrelation between
both cannot be denied. When the parties agree upon an
applicable procedural law, this can have a substantial impact
on the existence and validity of the agreement, such as the
ICC rules providing for time limits. The procedural law may
also provide for other specifications, limitations,
requirements. Therefore, the term "law" in Art. V(l) (a)
should be read in a broad sense as encompassing procedural
law as well
.
The previous discussion has to be distinguished from the
question of the choice of law; here, only a possible
defensive effect of procedural provisions was discussed, and
not the question how the procedural law can be determined.
The idea of a causal connection, an impact between the
infringement of the procedure and the award, has been also
employed by German courts. Bankruptcy and its influence on
arbitration were scrutinized in Germany under due process
(Art. V(l)(b)) and public policy aspects (Art. V(2)(b)),
whereas the U.S. jurisdiction focussed on the arbitrability
(Art. V(2)(a)) and public policy defense (Art. V(2)(b)).
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Although § 1025(2) ZPO as a codification of public policy as
a matter of fact influences the validity of an agreement,
public policy and related issues are normally dealt with
under Art. V(2) (b) . Time limits, in particular Art. 18(1) of
the ICC-rules, gave raise to court decisions on almost every
Art. V(l) defense in Germany. In the U.S. Art. 18(1) ICC-
rules has been dealt with only under Art. V(l) (d)
.
Parallel to the strict jurisdiction of the German
Supreme Court, U.S. courts held that once a time-limit for
the motion to vacate has expired, a party is prevented from
raising this motion as a defense. 121 However, a U.S. court
will hardly have to consider German time limits. The domestic
motion to vacate (Aufhebungsklage) in § 1041 ZPO provides for
vacation under a very narrow standard, similar to the Art. V
defenses. The ZPO does not provide for a time limit (30
years) . Contrary to the ZPO, the FAA (§ 12 of title 9 U.S.C.)
provides for a time limit of three months whereas the
prevailing party has one year to get a confirming judgment (9
U.S.C. § 9) . According to the mentioned decision, the German
Supreme Court will not hesitate to enforce an award if this
time limit for the motion to vacate has expired.
121 Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 175 (2nd.
Cir. 1984); Tokura Construction v. Corporacion Raymond, S.A.,
533 F.Supp. 1274, 1278 (D.S.D. Tex. 1982); David M. Kolkey,
Attacking Arbitral Awards: Rights of Appeal and Review in
International Arbitration, 22 INT'L LAW. 693, 695 (1988)
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5. Further theoretical considerations
a) Agreement referred to in article II
Following explicit language, Art. V(l)(a) relates to
"parties to the agreement referred to in article II." Art.
II, therefore, is a requirement for the recognition of an
arbitration agreement. The reference, however, is surprising
within the context of Art. V. It deals with the second stage,
the enforcement, while Art. II concerns itself concerns with
the first stage of an arbitration agreement. Therefore, from
a systematic point of view the reference to art. II is
illogical. 122
The clear and unambiguous wording of article V(l) (a),
however, opposes the mentioned systematic objections. A
strict systematic interpretation 123 would cause another
inconsistency instead: an agreement not satisfying the
writing requirement under Art. 11(2) - and therefore not
122 In fact the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione
(sez. 1), judgment of April 15, 1980, English language
summary in VI YCA (1981) 233, 235) had adopted a similar
reasoning, namely that Art. V "operates on a different
level", i. e. the enforcement level. Underlying rationale for
this decision is supposedly the suspicion of the court that
a defendant participates in the whole arbitration proceeding
without challenging the validity of the agreement before - on
the enforcement stage - he claims its voidness following Art.
V: "he should not be allowed to sit back and wait until the
enforcement stage." (BERG, supra note 27, at 286). Meanwhile
the Court has changed its opinion (Corte di Cassazione,
judgment of March 28, 1991, English language summary in XVII
YCA (1992) 562, 563)
123 into two subdivisions: one dealing with the agreement,
recognition and enforcement, article II, and the other
dealing with the award and its recognition and enforcement,
Art. III-V respectively
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enforceable under the Convention - could be a valid basis of
an enforceable award under the applicable national law. 124
Not only Art. V but also Art. IV (1) (b) refers to Art. II. 125
This underlines that the Convention is not a compilation of
single provisions, each referring to particular recognition
and enforcement problems. Rather, it is one body of
interrelated provisions. 126 It should be regarded as a whole
to serve better the goal of uniformity at all stages. 127
Therefore Art. II is applicable.
b) Incapacity of a party
aa) The applicable law
The incapacity of parties has to be determined "under
the law applicable to them" which makes clear that this law
does not have to be the same governing the agreement. 128
Since the Convention leaves open the question of how to
determine this law, the general conflict of law rules of the
United States and Germany are applicable: 129 in the United
124 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 286
125 How could a prevailing party present a copy if the
agreement was not in writing? (Quigley, supra note 1, at
1067)
126 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 2 86
127 VAN DEN BERG, id.
128 VAN DEN BERG, id. at 2 77
129 PETER SCHLOSSER in: 7/2 STEIN/JONAS, KOMMENTAR ZUR
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG (21st ed . 1992) , Anhang zu § 1044 no. 61
[hereinafter STEIN/JONAS- SCHLOSSER]
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States the capacity of a person is determined either by the
law of the place of conclusion of the agreement or the law
governing the agreement. 130 A particular personal law is
unknown. 131 Since the capacity of a party is a matter closely
related to fundamental fairness, 132 this provision was
apparently included to protect the own nationals. The U.S.,
however, so far did not claim such a necessity. The general
rule can be applied. 133 There is no obligation to create a
personal statute. 134
For Germany, Art. 7(1) of the Introductory Code for the
BGB [EGBGB] provides: "Legal and contractual capacity of a
party are governed by the law of the state whose national the
person is." The capacity of a party to conclude a contract is
governed by §§ 104-113 BGB. 135
bb) The time when a party's capacity is determined
Controversially, the issue has been discussed whether
Art. V(l) (a) provides for non recognition when a party is
under some incapacity at the moment the agreement is made or
130 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 2 77
131 VAN DEN BERG, id.; STEIN/JONAS-SCHLOSSER, id.
132 West, supra note 103, at 112
133 PETER SCHLOSSER, DAS RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN
PRIVATEN SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT, no. 326 (2nd ed. 1989)
134 BERG, supra note 27, at 2 77
135 Buergerliches Gesetzbuch [German Civil Code]
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the arbitration proceedings arise, a problem typically linked
to a bankruptcy proceeding.
It has been argued that Art. V(l) (a) only at a glance
refers to the time when the agreement was made because the
drafters were, in fact, concerned with the proper
representation of both parties. Proper representation is a
problem which apparently arises during the proceedings. 136
It is added that this provision refers to the law of the
party's home, i. e. in case of a (bankrupt) U.S. party, U.S.
(bankruptcy) law would apply. 137 This argument is doubtful
for several reasons: it remains unclear why one has to look
at a historical background in consideration of a clear
language. Using the past tense the provision refers back to
the time of the agreement. 138 It seems unconvincing to invoke
legal history against a clear language; this would mean
giving more weight to the mere point of discussion during the
negotiations than to the final draft upon which the
participants finally agreed. Although proper representation
might have been part of the discussion on (a) , the
legislative history also evidences that the word "proper" was
136 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Coming Encounter.
International Arbitration and Bankruptcy, 67 MINN. L. REV.
595, 614 (1983)
137 id. at 615 Fn. 74
138 Corcoran v. AIG Multi-Line Syndicate, Inc., 143
Misc. 2d 62, 71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct . 1989) (referring to "... the
parties were . . . "
)
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included in ground (b) just for the case of
misrepresentation
.
139
Since misrepresentation appears to be more a matter of
the procedure itself rather than a prerequisite (such as
capacity) for the procedure, the latter interpretation is
preferable for systematical reasons. If a party was not
"under some incapacity" at the time of the agreement, an
incapacity occurring under the applicable law after this
moment is irrelevant for the arbitration proceedings.
c) The applicable law to the agreement
Art. V(l) (a) makes reference to two laws applicable for
the determination of the validity of an agreement: the law to
which the parties have subjected it or the law of the country
where the award was made. The language ("...failing...")
clearly indicates the subsidiary role of the law of the
country where the award was made. Therefore, one has to look
primarily at the choice-of-law expressed by the parties in
the agreement. Difficulty may, however, arise if the parties
do not make express reference to a law governing the
arbitration agreement.
139 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 276
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aa) Express choice of substantive law and implied choice of
procedural law
At a glance, this statement may be surprising if the
parties agreed upon the applicable law for the main contract.
One could argue that the choice of law for the main contract
implies the parties' will that the arbitration dealing with
this contract shall be governed by the same rules. It
strikes, however, that the language in (a) and (d) clearly
refers to procedural questions. 140 The principal distinction
between the law applicable to the contract and the agreement
is underlined by the different objects of the two choices of
law:
the main contract concerns the relationship between the
parties as to the substance; the arbitral clause is
concerned with the procedure for settling disputes
arising out of the main contract. 141
Due to these two different purposes, a choice of law for the
main contract cannot be deemed to be the same for the
arbitration agreement. The distinction precludes an
application of the general choice of law. 142 Even though a
different choice of law is possible, it will occur rarely in
practice
.
143
140 SCHLOSSER, supra note 132, at no. 216
141 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 2 93
142 id.
143 VAN DEN BERG, id. at 291
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bb) Implied choice of procedural law
If there is no explicit choice of law, it is questioned
whether a possible implied consent of the parties would meet
the requirements of the first conflict rule. With respect to
the importance attributed to the parties' agreement with Art.
V (evidenced by the conflict of law rules) , such an implied
consent should be permitted. 144 Its practical relevance,
however, is little as there is hardly any convincing
indication of the parties' will in spite of the determination
of the seat of the arbitration panel and the applicable law:
for example, common residence, nationality of the parties or
the arbitrators. 145 Consequently, the primary indication, in
fact only the location where the arbitration takes place, 146
should be subsumed systematic preferably under the subsidiary
conflict of law rule expressly referring to this (as an
indication of the parties' will) . Since it could be as well
treated as the implied will of the parties, the choice of the
location should not be treated only subsidiary to an implied
will. 147
144 SCHLOSSER, supra note 132, at no. 236; MUEKO-GOTTWALD,
supra note 84, at Art. V no. 9; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note
21, at 123; but see VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 293
145 SCHLOSSER, supra note 132, at no. 243
146 SCHLOSSER, id. at 239
147 SCHLOSSER, id. at 241; finally this problem is only
a "theoretical nicety" (BERG, supra note 27, at 294)
.
If there is more than one location where the proceedings
took place, a "main" location has to be determined
(SCHLOSSER, id. at 242)
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B. Due process requirements
Art. V(l) (b) reads:
The party against whom the award is invoked was not
given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator
or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present the case;
. .
.
1. Introduction
The second defense provides for two defenses:
(a) missing proper notice of the appointment of the
arbitrators or the arbitration proceedings, or
(b) inadequate opportunity to present the case.
The second alternative was introduced to deal with force
majeure and similar events. 148 Contrary to Art. V (1) (a) the
present defense has been invoked many times and has met some
success as the decisions discussed below will evidence.
Proper notice and the ability to present the case are
essential, interconnected parts of due process; this defense
is similar to that one of § 10(c) FAA. 149
2. U.S. court decisions
The first reported decision dealing with the Art. V
(1) (b) defense is Parsons and Whittemore Overseas v. Societe
148 Quigley, supra note 1, at 1067
149 McClendon, supra note 16, at 64
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Generale de 1' Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) . 150 The arbitration
court had refused to postpone a hearing for one the Parsons
witnesses who had a speaking engagement at an American
university at the same time. For that reason the defendant
claimed he was "not given proper notice... or was otherwise
unable to present his case."
The Second Circuit did not follow this line of reasoning
and argued instead that first "the inability to produce one's
witnesses before an arbitration tribunal is a risk inherent
in an agreement to submit to arbitration." 151 By agreeing
upon arbitration, the defendant had - according to the court
-given up some litigation advantages such as subpoena
power; 152 secondly the court turned to
the logistical problems of scheduling hearing dates
convenient to parties, counsel and arbitrator scattered
around the globe argues against deviating form an
initially mutually agreeable time plan unless a
scheduling change is truly unavoidable. 153
150 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe
Generale de 1' Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2nd
Cir. 1974) (Parson, a U.S. company, and the Egyptian RAKTA
had an agreement according to which Parsons had to construct
and manage a papermill in Egypt. In 1967 Egypt broke
diplomatic ties with the U.S. and required for all Americans
a special visa. Parsons abandoned the project and invoked
force majeure for its excuse; RAKTA sought damages. A three
-
man panel awarded RAKTA three -forth of the alleged sum. (id.
at 972)
)
151 id. at 975
152 id.
153 id,
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The court did not regard a prior commitment to a lecture as
important enough that it would have obliged the arbitrators
under the notion of fundamental fairness to postpone the
hearing. 154 Thirdly, the witness had provided the court with
an affidavit of "...the information to which I would have
testified." 155 That cuts the ground for the complaint that
the arbitrators did not consider critical evidence and
moderates the complaint to the extent that only a personal
questioning did not take place. 156 Therefore, the court
concluded that due process rights were not infringed by the
denial to postpone the hearing.
In Biotronik v. Medford157 Medford had based its defense
partially on Art. V (I) (b) claiming not a direct or formal
but a substantive infringement of its due process rights, in
particular of notice and ability to present its case. Medford
argued that it was
unable to present its case within the meaning of Art.
V(l) (b) because its rights and liabilities did not
mature
.
158
Following Medford, an alleged 3% commission could not be
calculated until the end of 1973 while the arbitration
154 id.
155 id.
156 Martinez, supra note 2, at 500
157 Biotronik Mess- und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v.
Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415 F.Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976)
158 id. at 140
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proceedings had already begun in February 1973. 159 The
District Court did not apply this interpretation emphasizing
that due process primarily requires notice of the proceedings
and the opportunity to be heard, i. e. merely formal notice
of the proceedings and the opportunity to be heard. 160
Consequently, this does not substantively have to be the best
opportunity to present the case. Furthermore, the court added
that Medford could have made this fact known already during
the proceeding. So Medford' s ability to present the case was
not limited.
The idea behind this decision seems to be clear: the
parties must fully participate in the arbitration
proceedings. The result of a different decision could provoke
a defendant to retain information which he, eventually,
discloses at the enforcement stage - a certainly
contraproductive effect.
The judgment in Geotech v. Evergreen fits systematically
in the same category. 161 Evergreen challenged the award on
ground of an Art. V (1) (b) violation. Although fully informed
about the proceedings, given requested time extension and
every opportunity to present its case, it preferred to pursue
a state court action to stay arbitration and refused to
159 id.
160 id.
161 Geotech Lizenz AG v. Evergreen Systems, Inc., 697
F.Supp. 1248 (D.E.D.N.Y. 1988)
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participate in the arbitration proceedings. 162 Since it was
given ample notice of the arbitration, it had sufficient
opportunity to present its case and therewith full knowledge
of the risk of its (non) action. 163 Consequently, the court
could not find a lack of notice required by Art. V (I) (b) . 164
Contrary to Biotronik and Geotech Art. V (1) (b) was
successfully invoked in Sesostris v. Transportes Navales165
in which BCI was involved as a third party, a mortgagee of
the cargo ship Unamuno. In Dec. 1988 BCI had requested
"notice of when and where the proceedings" would be held.
Sesostris replied only that "it is our understanding that
arbitration proceedings are presently being pursued in
Madrid, Spain." 166 They neither stated that the arbitration
procedures were currently being negotiated, nor disclosed
that a counsel would represent, nor gave any information
about the schedule of the proceedings beginning the same
week. 167 A month later BCI was informed that the arbitration
was complete. Since BCI, as depositor, was the party against
whom the awards were invoked, the District Court held that
162 id. at 1253
163 id.
164 id,
165 Sesostris, S. A. E. v. Transportes Navales, S. A., 727
F. Supp. 737 (D.Mass. 1989)
166 id. at 742
167 id.
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BCI did not receive proper notice within the meaning of Art.
V (1) (b) . The court did not accept Sesostris' defense that
BCI as a third party was not the one "against whom the award
is invoked because Sesostris clearly knew that BCI as a
depositor of a security had moved for the stay to
arbitration. " 168
BCI, as a third party, had a justified interest in
participating in the proceedings. This decision makes the
borderline evident and contributes substantially to the more
formal interpretation in Biotronik: Proper notice requires
information in the sense that a party can determine the time
and location of the proceedings in order to be able to
present the case and participate in the proceedings. 169
Because the case Laminoirs v. Southwire110 takes place
in an international surrounding it is frequently named as an
example for the "ability to present a case" standard although
the defendant did not explicitly rely upon the U.N.
168 id. at 742 note 7
169 Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Hammermills, Inc.,
No. 90-0169 (JGP) , 1992 U.S. Dist . LEXIS 8046 (D.D.C. 1992),
*1, 10-15 (discussing a defendant's argument that he had no
proper notice that the legal costs were an issue of the
proceedings because those costs were not incurred by
Hammermills but its insurer, i. e. there were no costs for
the party. Referring to the ICC-Rules and the Terms of
Reference both by making express reference to the "costs of
arbitration, " and to the fact that CGB could have raised this
issue during arbitration, the court rejected this argument as
dubious
.
)
170 Laminoirs-Tref ileries-Cableries de Lens, S. A. v.
Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063 (D.N.D. Ga 1980)
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Convention. Since the arbitrators were afraid that Southwire
would use the questioning for inappropriate purposes, 171 they
limited it to "matters of fact albeit recent matters of fact
which might conceivably have some bearing on what was the
intent of the several parties several years ago." 172
Southwire contended that this was a violation of § 10(c) FAA
which similarly to paragraph (1) (b) provides for a vacation
of the award "where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct
... in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to
the controversy." The District Court, however, held that
"arbitrators are charged with the duty of determination what
evidence is relevant and what is irrelevant." 173 As long as
the defendant cannot show a clear abuse of the arbitrators'
discretion, the court will not vacate an award. 174
The second successful decision on the Art. V (1) (b)
defense - this time, however, under the aspect of "present a
case" - is Iran Aircraft Industries v. AVCO. 115 The Court of
Appeals refused to enforce a foreign arbitral award on
grounds of Art. V (1) (b) . During the pretrial hearing the
171 eliciting admissions from the witness as to the future
course of conduct which was without any relation to the
proceedings, id. at 1067
172 id.
173 id.
174 id. at 1067
175 Iran Aircraft Industries v. AVCO Corp., 980 F.2d 141
(2nd Cir. 1992)
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Arbitration Tribunal had suggested to AVCO a certain method
of presenting evidence 176 which AVCO later on used in the
hearing. In the final award the Tribunal refused to grant
AVCO' s claim because AVCO had failed to bring pertinent
evidence in the form of the invoices, i. e. the originally
manner that AVCO had proposed to present evidence. 177
Referring to the due process standard that
fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard an a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner178
the court held that the Tribunal denied AVCO the possibility
to present its case in a meaningful manner because AVCO was
not aware, that contrary to an earlier understanding, the
Tribunal now required the original invoices as evidence. 179
Therefore, the court denied enforcement on the base of Art.
V(l) (b)
.
In International Standard Electric v. Bridas, 180 Bridas
asserted that it was unable to present its case because of a
secret expert. 181 The court did not discuss the material
176 to avoid "kilos and kilos of invoices" an
internationally recognized public accountant should prepare
an affidavit, id. at 143
177 id. at 144
178 id. at 146
179 id. at 146
180 International Standard Electric Corp. v. Bridas
Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial y Comercial, 745
F.Supp. 172 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1990)
181 id. at 178
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influence that a secret witness may have on due process
rights; it started from a more formal point of view that ISEC
did not express any concern about the witness during the
proceedings, and therefore had waived any objections. 182 The
court supports his holding using two arguments: "A party
cannot remain silent, raising no objection during the
arbitration proceeding, and when an award adverse to him has
been handed down complain of the situation of which he had
knowledge from the first." 183 And secondly, at the
enforcement stage this means a violation of the goal of the
Convention "to expedite the recognition and enforcement of
arbitration awards." 184 However, even if the defendant had
raised these objections earlier, a substantive discussion
seems not very likely, since the court then might have argued
that the arbitrators had already dealt with this issue.
This pro-enforcement bias was also the basis for the
standard of "a substantial prejudice" used by the District
Court in P.T. Reansuransi v. Evanston18S to define a (narrow)
due process infringement . PTR was duly informed about the
182 id. at 180
183 id. quoting Cook Indus, v. Itoh & Co. 449 F.2d 106,
107-108 (2nd Cir. 1971)
184 id. quoting Imperial Ethiopian Govt. v. Baruch-Foster
Corp. 535 F.2d 334, 335 (5th Cir. 1976)
185 P.T. Reansuransi Umum Indonesia v. Evanston Insurance
Co., No. 92 Civ. 4623 (MGC) , 1992 WL 400733 (D.S.D.N.Y.
1992), *1, 2 (referring to Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee
v. Hammermills, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist . LEXIS *1, 16 (D.D.C.
1992)
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demand to arbitrate and the selection of the other party's
arbitrator. However, it was not informed about the
commencement of the arbitration proceedings. Nevertheless,
the court held that PTR was sufficiently notified. 186
All in all, the U.S. jurisdiction is very reluctant to
vacate an award for a due process violation unless the award
is a result of a "manifest injustice." 187
3 . German court decisions
A 1990 Federal Supreme Court 188 decision gives a brief
summary of the "right to present a case" positively stating
its requirements:
The parties' right to present their case before the
arbitral tribunal complies in any case that the tribunal
must take into consideration the parties' arguments; the
award must contain the tribunal's position toward the
key arguments. The parties must be given the opportunity
to discuss all facts that will underlie the tribunal's
decision. In this respect domestic and foreign
arbitration are governed by the same rules. 189
Similar to International Standard Electric, the first
reported German case deals with a related aspect of secrecy,
186 Rather special circumstances in National Development
Company v. Kashoggi, 781 F.Supp. 959, 960 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1992)
were rejected as "frivolous": the concern of being taken into
custody for extradition to face criminal charges in the U.S.
as reason not to attend the arbitration.
187 Wheeless, supra note 5, at 82
188 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of Jan. 18, 1990, English
language summary in XVII YCA (1992) 503
189 id. at 508
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a secret panel. 190 The German defendant successfully invoked
the Art. V(l) (b) defense against a Danish arbitral award on
the ground that he had never been given notice of the
appointment of the arbitrators and had never been informed
about their names - except for the President's. 191 The court
argued that by withholding the names of the panel members,
the defendant could not control their impartiality or the
exclusion of members challenged by him what caused an
infringement of Art. V(l) (b) . 192
Not successful, however, was a German defendant who
refused expressly to participate in the arbitration
proceedings because of an allegedly invalid arbitration
agreement. 193 Nevertheless, he was still asked three times
to appoint his arbitrator. The court held that he was duly
notified of the proceedings and complied with due process
standards
.
194
As shown by the following cases time limits provided by
the arbitral rules cannot only have an impact on the validity
of an arbitration agreement but also on due process rights:
In a case before the Federal Supreme Court the defendant
190 Oberlandesgericht Koeln, judgment of June 10, 1976,
English language summary in IV YCA (1979) 258
191 id.
192 id. at 259
193 Landgericht Zweibruecken, judgment of Jan. 11, 1978,
English language summary in IV YCA (1979) 262
194 id. at 263
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claimed that his due process rights were violated because the
time limits for a decision had expired, Art. 18(1) ICC
Arbitration rules. 195 Paragraph (2) the Rules allows the
Court of Arbitration to extent the arbitrator's mandate, but
does not provide for an automatic extinction of his
mandate. 196 Regarding to the personal continuity in the panel
- the mandate had been extended several times - the court
could not find an infringement of due process rights because
the defendant had been duly informed about the original
appointment; 197 a mere extension did not equate the
appointment of a new arbitrator. 198
Time limits under the aspect of the "opportunity to
present the case" were the issue before the Hanseatic Court
of Appeals. 199 Although the defendant had been notified about
the hearing and had been asked to give the names of the
witnesses one month in advance, the defendant informed the
panel only three days before the hearing that one of the
witnesses was prevented to come because of a business trip.
Immediately the panel responded that he could present an
195 Art. 18 of the 1975 ICC Rules of Arbitration reads
1. The arbitrator shall make his award within six months ..
(as quoted by XV YCA (1990) 453)
196 id. at 453
197 id. at 454
198 id,
199 Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht
,
judgment of July 27,
1978, IV YCA (1979) 266
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affidavit instead. The court found that this procedure
sufficiently guaranteed an opportunity to present the
case. 200 Another question was whether the fact the defendant
had received documents only the evening before the hearings
was sufficient to meet due process requirements. 201 The court
underlined that due process rights also require active
participation. 202 The defendant, however, did willingly not
take notice; therefore, despite the short period of time, due
process rights were not regarded as violated. 203 The court's
reasoning reveals that it had the impression of dilatory
tactic even though it could neither verify their importance
for the decision nor whether they were already known to the
defendant. 204 The decision should be considered against this
background - otherwise an evening before the oral hearings
seems to be a very short time limit. It could provoke the
opposing party to delay documents until the last minute to
prevent that the other party be well prepared for the oral
argument. Arbitration should be fast, but not at any price.
A rather extreme example of due process violation is
another decision of the Hanseatic Court of Appeals, the only
200 id. at 267
201 id.
202 id.
203 id.
204 id.
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case enforcement was stayed in the U.S. German relation. 205
Even though the case was not yet decided under the
Convention, it referred to the ability to present a case in
an international cast and it is likely that a similar
standard would have been applied under Art. V(l) (b) . Starting
from the distinction between domestic and international
public policy the court stated that not every violation, but
rather only extreme cases infringe German public policy. 206
In the present case, a single arbitrator did not permit an
oral hearing, did not forward a letter of the U.S. party to
the German defendant who consequently had no knowledge about
its content, and did not take into account another letter
submitted by the defendant. 207 Requiring a causal connection
the court found that it could not be excluded that without
this violation a fair hearing could have led to another
decision. The court denied enforcement. 208
205 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, judgment of April 3, 1975,
English language summary in II YCA (1977) 241; Peter
Schlosser, Verfahrensintegritaet und Anerkennung von
Schiedsspruechen im deutsch-amerikanischen Verhaeltnis , 31
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 455, 457 (1978) (stating
that the due process violation probably was caused by mere
negligence of the AAA) [hereinafter Schlosser,
Verfahrensintegri taet]
206 id. at 241
207 id.
208 id,
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In a case before the Court of First Instance Bremen, 209
the court had to deal with the influence of bankruptcy
proceedings on the enforcement of an arbitral award: A
Portuguese company sought enforcement of an arbitral award
rendered by the Grain and Feed Trade Association in London
against a German company. Meanwhile, however, bankruptcy
proceedings against the German defendant had started whereon
the trustee based its first objection. Since the proceedings
had been initiated before the bankruptcy proceedings, the
court could not find any effect of the bankruptcy on the
arbitration proceedings despite the fact that the trustee had
no knowledge of the proceedings. 210 The court, however,
adopted the defendant's second objection211 holding that the
German party's due process rights were violated because it
could not properly present its case without being informed
about the opponent's arguments. 212 Its due process rights
were violated. The request had to be dismissed unter Art. V
(1) (b) , 213
209 Landgericht Bremen, judgment of Jan. 20, 1983, English
language summary in XII YCA (198 7) 486
210 id.
211 the company could only turn in documents concerning
the disputed contract and give its view without knowing the
arguments of the Portuguese company, id. at 487
212 id.
213 id.
59
4 . Comparison
These court decisions show a certain reluctance to
accept the Art. V(l) (b) defense. Unanimously the U.S. and
German courts apply a narrow standard of a due process
violation emphasizing that "a party cannot remain silent" 214
or that an "active participation" 215 is required; the same
reasoning is followed concerning parallel state court
litigation which does not exempt a party from participation
in the arbitration proceedings. 216 The idea behind is to
prevent a dilatory tactics. A party may not withhold
arguments until the enforcement stage. It seems that the
"United States courts generally look at the overall
result." 217 The same seems to be true for the German courts.
A certain tension might be located in two areas: the
"secrecy-decisions" and the decision concerning the
arbitrator's power to determine the relevant evidence.
In two of the discussed decisions the non-disclosure of
names (witness/arbitrator) was a main issue. In the U.S. case
the defendant's non-participation overlapped this question
214 International Standard Electric Corp. v. Bridas
Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial y Comercial, 745 F.
Supp. 172, 180 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1990)
215 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, judgment of April 3, 1975,
II YCA (1977) 241
"
216 Geotech Lizenz AG v. Evergreen Systems, Inc. 697
F.Supp. 1248 (D.E.D.N.Y. 1988) and Landgericht Zweibruecken,
judgment of Jan. 11, 1978, IV YCA (1979) 262
217 McClendon, supra note 16, at 64; Martinez, supra note
2, at 500
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and prevented a material discussion of it. A different result
could hardly be justified: a similar line of reasoning (as in
the German secret panel case) can be applied to witnesses. If
the witness's identity is unknown it is impossible for a
party to challenge the credibility of a witness and to
disclose possible connections of a party with a witness. The
witness's identity should be regarded as so essential as to
make it to make it to a due process requirement
.
In spite of the relatively broad scope of the
arbitrators to determine what evidence is relevant and how it
has to be presented, due process sets a certain limit.
Laminoirs, Sesostris and the OLG Hamburg and Bremen decisions
shed some light upon this aspect. Laminoirs, on the one hand,
stands for a minor violation of the right to be heard. It is
justified by reasonable considerations to prevent misuse of
the hearing, and therefore does not reach the standard of a
due process violation. The three other decisions indicate
when the threshold line has been crossed:
- when an arbitrator literally does not hear evidence because
he refuses to hold an oral hearing;
when parties are not informed about the opponent's
arguments;
- when the panel refuses a manner of presenting evidence it
had approved before.
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5. Further theoretical considerations
a) The applicable law
Art. V (1) (b) does not refer to any law. U.S. and German
courts consistently apply the enforcing state's due process
standard: "This provision essentially sanctions the forum
state's standards of due process." 218 This "does not require
that the underlying activity occur in the enforcing
state." 219 There are several theoretical possibilities
discussed concerning which law has to be applied:
To avoid an undue influence of a possibly parochial
national law, Art. V (1) (b) could be regarded as an intent
"to fix an international standard." 220 Consequently, a
recourse to a national law is not possible. This
interpretation bears two major problems: since there is no
international standard of due process, a court will have to
"find inspirations in the municipal rules of the forum
state," 221 i. e. through the backdoor is introduced what was
218 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe
Generale de 1' Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) , 508 F.Supp. 969,
975 (2nd Cir. 1974) ; Biotronik Mess- und Therapiegeraete GmbH
& Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415 F.Supp. 133, 140
(D. N.J. 1976) ; Geotech Lizenz AG v. Evergreen Systems, 697
F.Supp. 1248, 1253 (D. E.D.N.Y. 1988); Oberlandesgericht
Hamburg, judgment of July 27, 1988, English language summary
in IV YCA (1979) 266, 267
219 Seetransport Wiking Trader Schif fahrtsgesellschaf t mbH
& Co. KG v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 793 F.Supp. 444, 44 8
(D. S.D.N.Y. 1992)
220 GEORGIO GAJA, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION NEW
YORK CONVENTION, I.C.3
221 id,
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just excluded explicitly, namely the reference to a national
law. 222 A genuinely autonomous interpretation in addition may
not give sufficient weight to a parties' agreement modifying
procedural questions such as service or summons to appear
(short time limits to guarantee fast proceedings). 223
As the due process rights are closely linked with the
procedure itself, the applicable law could be determined in
analogy to Art. V(l) (d) . This must lead to the conclusion
that Art. V (1) (b) is superfluous because every alleged due
process infringement would have to be considered under
exactly the same law as the arbitral procedure. The broader
term of "procedure" logically covers every due process
violation as part of the whole procedure. 224 For systematic
reasons an analogous application of Art. V (1) (d) is
excluded. A combination of both doctrines does not offer a
real alternative as it is subjected to the same doubts.
Therefore, with the consistent jurisdiction of the courts the
latter doctrine, i. e. application of the forum state's due
process standard, is preferable. The courts in both countries
consistently hold that the exequatur state's law has to be
applied. This indicates, however, that the due process
standard in an international context is less stringent than
222 see also VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 2 98
223 MUEKO-GOTTWALD, supra note 84, at Art. V no . 14
224 id.
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in a domestic context. It is limited on serious
violations. 225
b) The relation between Art. V(l) (b) and (2) (b)
Similar to the mentioned problem of the relation to
sec.(d) as a broader, more general provision toward a more
specific provision, a line has to be drawn between para.
(1) (b) and (2) (b) . This distinction is of importance for a
systematic reason with practical consequences: the paragraph
1 defenses, like (b) , are only to be taken into account, at
the request of a party, whereas the court has to consider ex
officio the paragraph 2 defenses. One could argue that the
express language in (b) excludes any reference to due process
requirements within the field of application of the public
policy defense. This idea would ground on the doubtful
presumption that amounts to the assertion that due process
does not appear as part of a country's due process.
Another interpretation is preferable: to underline the
importance of the due process rights they are explicitly
mentioned in Art. V(l) (b) . This, however, does not exclude
the due process rights from the Art. V(2) (b) protection. 226
Art. V(l) (b) compared to Art. V(2) (b) should only be applied
225 Mitsubishi v. Chrysler Soler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614,
629 (1985); Bundesgerichtshof , judgment of Jan. 18, 1990,
English language summary in XVII YCA (1982) 503, 504; VAN DEN
BERG, supra note 27, at 2 97; Sandrock & Hentzen, supra note
45, at 58
226 VAN DEN BERG, id. at 3 00
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subsidiarily. 227 As a defendant has a very high interest in
raising all possible defenses, it is very likely that he will
challenge any due process violation. Therefore, this question
is of a less practical interest. 228
c) The question of a causal connection
Finally, the question has to be discussed as to whether
every infringement of due process rights meets the
requirements of the Art. V(l) (b) standard. The pro-
enforcement bias of the Convention could be circumvented if
every (minor) infringement would bring about a violation of
due process. Therefore, it requiring a causal connection
between the violation and the final decision is generally
accepted. 229 The test is whether it is possible that the
decision would have been different if the due process rights
had not been violated. 230 A legal justification can be found
in the wording of Art. V stating that enforcement "may" be
refused. 231 However, this test has to be applied narrowly by
the courts: if a court engages too deeply in the question of
227 SCHLOSSER, supra note 132, at no 823
228 VAN DEN BERG, id. at 299; SCHLOSSER, id. at no. 827
229 MUEKO-GOTTWALD, supra note 84, at Art. V no . 16
230 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, judgment of Apr. 3, 1975,
English language summary in II YCA (1977) 241
231 VAN DEN BERG, id. at 3 02
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how different an arbitrator's decision could have been, this
would amount to a review on the merits. 232
C. Award is beyond scope of submission to arbitration
1. Introduction
Art. V(l) (c) provides:
The text deals with a difference not contemplated by or
not falling within the terms of submission to
arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond
the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided
that, if the two decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration can be separated from those not so
submitted, that part of the award which contain
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be
recognized and enforced; . .
.
The Art. V (1) (c) defense consists of two parts. In a
strict sense, only its first part represents a defense
whereas the second part - following the pro-enforcement bias
- immediately sets a limit to a refusal of the enforcement.
Therefore, enforcement can be refused if the award exceeds
the arbitrator's authority but only to the extent to which no
part of the award correctly based on the arbitrator's
authority, i. e. within the scope of submission to
arbitration, can be separated. The second half has never been
applied by a U.S. or a German court.
232 id.
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2. U.S. court decisions
The leading U.S. case for the interpretation of this
defense is again the Parsons & Whittemore decision. 233
Parsons challenged the award on Art. V(l) (c) grounds because
it included an amount of $ 185,000 for loss of production
despite a provision in the contract that "neither party shall
have any liability for loss of production." 234 Referring to
its own interpretation of other Art. V refusal provisions,
the court stated that "once again a narrow construction would
comport with the enforcement-facilitation thrust of the
Convention." 235 Therefore, "a powerful presumption has to be
overcome to prove that the arbitration court had not acted
within its powers." 236 In applying this test the court held
that the scope of submission to arbitration had not been
exceeded. The presumption had not been overcome. The court
did not regard the panel's decision as a mere non-
consideration of the clause but an interpretation of the said
clause "not to preclude its jurisdiction on the subject
matter." 237 As long as the arbitrators base their award on
(their interpretation of) the contract, it is "not apparent
233 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe
Generale de 1' Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) , 508 F.2d 969 (2nd
Cir. 1974)
234 id. at 976
235 id.
236 id.
237 id.
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that the scope of submission to arbitration has been
exceeded." 238 The use of the word "apparent" stands for a
very low standard of control . Only in cases where the
excession of the scope by "simply ignoring" 239 a contractual
limitation is it obvious that the enforcement might be
refused. In the following paragraph the court reveals the
underlying rationale: it was concerned that Overseas might
otherwise try to "secure a reconstruction of the contract in
the court - an activity wholly inconsistent with the
deference due arbitral decisions on the law and the fact." 240
The Convention "does not sanction second-guessing the
arbitrator's construction of the parties' agreement." 241
The court did not want to engage in any review on the merits
by interpreting the arbitrator's interpretation.
The court's narrow standard is understandable. The
decision's rationale, however, is unconvincing in its last
consequence. The court recognized "that an award may not be
238 id. at 976
239 id. at 976
240 id,
241 id. at 976; if this presumption has to be understood
as a general review standard it differs significantly from
the German jurisdiction. In the context of public policy, the
German Federal Supreme Court consistently holds that a court
is not bound by the factual and legal findings of the
arbitrators on public policy; it has to consider public
policy independently (Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of May 5,
1972, 25 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2180, 2181
(1972) ; see Schlosser, Verfahrensintegritaet, supra note 205,
at 456)
68
enforced where predicated on a subject matter outside the
arbitrator's jurisdiction." 242 However, it objected "a
second-guessing of the arbitrator's construction of the
parties' agreement." 243 The standard of control the court
wanted to apply remained unclear. The court did not state
under which conditions or circumstances a refusal under Art.
V(l) (c) could be affirmed. For the determination of the
applicability of one of the defenses, it has to engage
somehow in an interpretation. The court's interpretation of
its own rule in controlling arbitration is so narrow that it
amounts to zero. Applying its own standard of an "apparent
excession" of the arbitral powers, the court could have
denied enforcement just by using the plain meaning of the
wording and without a review on the merits: the contract
provided for no liability for loss; the panel awarded for
loss of production. A submission agreement would be useless
if the arbitrator can "interpret away" any limitation of the
scope. A different result might be justifiable in the case of
a panel empowered to act as "amiable compositeur."
The Fertilizer v. IDI2 * 4 case was decided against a very
similar background: the contract between the two parties had
242 id. at 976
243 id. at 977
244 Fertilizer of India v. IDI Management, Inc. 517
F.Supp. 948 (D.S.D. Ohio 1981)
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clearly excluded consequential damages. 245 The arbitrators,
however, rendered a large award, "based almost exclusively on
consequential damages" 246 by using the concept of
"fundamental breach." 247 This theory opened the possibility
to pass over the limitation of a damages clause and to award
damages contrary to a contractual written provision. 248
Relying expressly on Parsons, the court emphasized the narrow
standard of judicial review and refused in a consequent
application of this standard to engage in an in-depth
analysis to avoid the usurpation of an arbitrator's role. 249
Since the award was the result of a thorough decision-making
process and gives "colorable justification, " the court held
that the arbitrators did not exceed their authority. 250 Here,
already a criticism appears more difficult because the
arbitrators had applied a legal theory to justify their
damage award. The result remains, nevertheless, doubtful: The
court stopped its analysis with the finding that the
fundamental breach doctrine is a "viable theory of law." 251
An arbitrator's competence, first of all, is derived from the
245 id. at 958
246 id.
247 id. at 959
248 id.
249 id.
250 id.
251 id.
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parties' agreement to arbitrate. The mere fact that a certain
theory is "viable" does not give it further authority. Only
a correct application of the theory may enable an arbitrator
to award "consequential damages" in contrary to a party's
agreement because it otherwise lacks competence. 252 Because
a review of the application of this theory by the arbitrators
would amount to a review on the merits, the court avoids this
consequence by simply stating that it offers "colorable
justification.
"
The following decisions mainly deal with the same issue:
an additional compensation - allegedly beyond the
arbitration's scope. This was also subject to review in
Management & Technical v. Parsons -Jurden. 253 The court
interpreted the agreement with the presumption of federal
policy in favor of arbitration in mind, in particular the
term "any dispute" should be resolved by arbitration. 254 As
there was no limitation or exception mentioned in the
language of the agreement the court chose a "broad
construction" of the word "any, " finding that it "logically
includes not only the dispute, but the consequences naturally
flowing from it - here the amount of additional
252 STEIN/JONAS -SCHLOSSER, supra note 129, at no. 70
253 Management & Technical Consultants S.A. v. Parsons-
Jurden International Corp., 820 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1987)
254 id. at 1534
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compensation." 255 Therefore, a refusal of enforcement would
not have been justified following Art. V(l) (c)
.
In National Oil v. Libyan Sun Oil 256 the defendant
challenged the arbitral award claiming a violation of Art.
V(l) (c) . He alleged that the arbitrators had exceeded the
submission to arbitration acting as "amiable compositeur."
They had not based the damage award on the evidence presented
to reach a legal result. 257 Again, the District Court relied
on a narrow construction of the refusal provisions allowing
only very limited court review of "completely irrational"
awards. 258 To control the rationality of the decision the
court reviewed (a) jurisdiction and (b) rationale for
damages. The arbitration clause was very broad, containing
one provision dealing with the question to what relief, if
any, each party is entitled. 259 Therefore, the issue of
damages was properly before the arbitrators. Since there is
only a limited review and no reexamination of an arbitral
award, the court examined only the tribunal's method of
finding a damage award for National Oil. It concludes that
the tribunal "carefully considered the applicable law and the
255 id.
256 National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F.Supp
800 (D.Del. 1990)
257 id. at 816
258 id. at 817
259 id.
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parties' arguments. 260 Therefore the award was not
"irrational," Art. V(l)(c) not applicable. 261 The court did
not make any statement about the theoretical problem as to
how it would have decided in case of an equity decision.
Art. V (1) (c) was discussed against a similar background
in International Standard Electric. 262 The arbitrators had
allegedly awarded damages based more on equity than on law,
in other words outside the scope of submission to arbitration
as they acted rather as amiable compositeurs. 263 ISEC claimed
that the damages were awarded on factual findings which were
only possible if the arbitrators understood their function as
amiable compositeur. 264 A review of this allegation, however,
would have required a reconsideration of the factual findings
of the arbitral panel. The court regarded itself as
"forbidden" to do so265 and refused to follow the Art.
V(l) (c) argument. 266
260 id. at 818
261 id. at 819
262 International Standard Electric Corp. v. Bridas
Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial y Comercial, 745
F.Supp. 172 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1990)
263 id. at 178
264 id. at 181
265 id.
266 for completeness' sake two decisions might be worth
mentioning: Corcoran v. Ardra Insurance Co., Ltd., 53 3 N.Y.S.
2d 695, 698 (App. Div. 1990) (finding that a legal dispute
with the Liquidator is a difference not contemplated within
the submission to arbitration) ; Ministry of Defense of the
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The threshold issue in these decisions is the scope of
an arbitration agreement which is closely linked with the
definition of the function of an arbitrator. An arbitrator
has to find the "right" balance between the parties'
interests. 267 The problem, however, is determining which
rules are "right": since the arbitration panel's authority
derives from the parties' agreement, an arbitrator has to
look at the agreement first. This would parallel the
structure of the U.N. Convention that in the choice of law
clauses in paragraph (a) and (d) focussing on the parties
agreement. Therefore, a conflict between the applicable law
and provisions in the agreement have to be resolved in favor
of the more specific agreement, the express will of the
parties. From this point of view the Parsons and Fertilizer
decisions are beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration as in both cases the award provided for damages
clearly excluded by the agreement. The explanation that the
arbitrators "interpreted" the clauses seems rather complex
and artificial. The remaining decisions interpret the
arbitrator's role out of broad arbitration clauses and do not
have to overcome a clear wording. Therefore, these clauses
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, 969 F.2d 764, 770 (9th
Cir. 1992) (affirming a prior decision holding that the
Algiers accord between Iran and the United States formed the
required submission to arbitration)
267 STEIN/JONAS -SCHLOSSER, supra note 12 9, at no. 70
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can be interpreted as giving the arbitrator the competence to
find a final balance of interests.
3 . German court decisions
Contrary to the United States, there is only one
reported case dealing expressly with Art. V(l) (c) . Most of
the German decisions quoted in the Art. V(l) (c) context deal
with the problem of "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" in purely national
cases
.
In one case before the Federal Supreme Court 268 a
Rumanian and a German firm had agreed upon arbitration and
added the following clause to the contract: "Any claim for
arbitration formulated after 6 months from the date of
arrival of the goods at the final station ... is null." 269
A dispute arose and the Rumanian party referred to
arbitration. The Court of First Instance and the Court of
Appeals refused to enforce the award because after the six-
month period the tribunal no longer had competence, and
therefore the arbitrators exceeded the terms of the
arbitration agreement (Art. V(l) (c) ) . The Supreme Court did
not follow this reasoning arguing that the six month clause
was ambiguous. 270 The clause only dealt with the legal
268 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of Feb. 12, 1976, 30
MONATSSCHRIFT DES DEUTSCHEN RECHTS [MDR] 64 9 (1976) , English
language summary in II YCA (1977) 242
269 id.
270 id. at 649
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effect, i. e. the voidness of an award formulated after the
six month period, and not with a temporary limited competence
of the arbitrators. Consequently, the Supreme Court did not
interpret the clause in a procedural sense of a derogation
and prorogation clause: after six months an arbitration
tribunal would loose its competence in favor of a state
court. The court found that the word "claim" in the German
translation was also ambiguous as to the exclusion only of
the procedural means or the contractual claim (substantive
law) . 271 The court granted the arbitrators the competence
to interpret this clause even with the risk of an incorrect
decision. 272 As a time limit typically influences the
validity of an agreement the court should not have referred
to paragraph (c) . In such a case dealing with the
incompetence of the arbitrators due to the expiration of a
time limit, paragraph (a) forms the more specific rule
according to which the arbitrator's competence should have
been decided. 273
Under domestic law, the Court of Appeals in Celle 274
broadly interpreted the clause "any dispute arising out of
271 id.
272 id.
273 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 318; but MUEKO-
GOTTWALD, supra note 84, at Art. no. 27
274 Oberlandesgericht Celle, judgment of Nov. 1, 1957, 12
MONATSSCHRIFT DES DEUTSCHEN RECHTS [MDR] 172 (1958)
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this contract", 275 finding that usually such a clause
indicates the parties' will to submit not only the contents
of contracts but also the validity of the contract itself to
arbitration. 276 The court argued that the latter
interpretation meets the requirement of a greater
practicability because the arbitral decision would otherwise
be only temporary subject to extensive (delaying) judicial
review. 277 This would contravene the parties' intent for a
fast and final dispute resolution. 278 Therefore, the court
concluded that in absence of other intentions the arbitrators
can decide over the validity of the contract as a whole. 279
The Supreme Court 280 adopted the same line of reasoning
explaining first of all the negative consequences of an
opposing attitude against broad competence of arbitrators.
Very often one party of an agreement will claim the voidness
of the contract. 281 Consequence of a narrow interpretation
would either be that
275
"alle Streitfragen aus dieser Vereinbarung" , id,
276 id. at 173
277 id.
278 id.
279 id,
280 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of Feb. 27, 1970, 53 BGHZ
315, 320
281 id. at 322
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(a) the arbitrator has to submit the dispute to a state court
and the arbitration proceeding can continue only after a
favorable decision of the court or
(b) the arbitration proceeds under the risk that a state
court later on holds that the contract was void and sets the
award aside. 282
In 1986 the Court 283 had to decide a similar case like
National Oil dealing with an alleged equity award. The court
held that an equity decision is only possible if the
arbitration clause provides for it. 284 The incorrect
application of the stipulated (correctly) applicable law,
however, is no basis for the vacation of an award. 285
4 . Comparison
The court decisions on Art. V(l) (c) are difficult to
compare as they deal mainly with different aspects of the
scope of submission. With regard to the broad interpretation
of the panel's competence by German courts great differences
unlikely. As to the allegation that the arbitrators acted as
282 id. at 323/ similar Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of May
5, 1977, 68 BGHZ 356, 367 (holding a "Kompetenz-Kompetenz"
clause valid if the parties have the power to enter into
amicable settlement within the meaning of § 1025 ZPO)
283 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of Sept . 26, 1985, 39 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1436 (1986)
284 id. at 1437
285 id.; see also MUEKO-GOTTWALD, supra note 84, at Art.
V no. 22
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"amiable compositeur" only the German jurisdiction positively-
stated that such a status needs to be stipulated. However,
like the U.S. decision, the court avoided to apply this
standard and circumvented it on factual grounds. In addition
to the similar jurisdiction on equity, a further possible
excess of the arbitrator's competence should be mentioned:
the case that the arbitrator decides a dispute relying upon
another law than the one the parties had agreed upon. Here,
a distinction has to be drawn: If the panel by mistake
applies a law other than the stipulated law, this choice of
law is not the result not of a misapplication of procedural
but substantive law. Such a misapplication is not reviewable
by a state court. 286 Only an arbitrary decision of a panel
to apply the incorrect substantive law may result in a
refusal of enforcement. 287 A domestic award can be vacated
whereas a foreign award can be recognized although the
arbitrators based their decision on equity rather than on
law. 288
286 MUEKO-GOTTWALD, supra note 84, at Art. V no. 24
287 MUEKO-GOTTWALD, id.; SCHLOSSER, supra note 132, at no.
863
288 SCHLOSSER, id.
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5. Further theoretical considerations
a) The applicable law
Art. V (1) (c) does not make any reference to the
applicable law. For its determination, two other subsections
- (a) and (d) - refer to the parties' agreement or the law of
the country where the award was made. None of the provisions
in paragraph (1) refers - contrary to paragraph (2) - to the
law of the country where recognition and enforcement is
sought. From a systematic point of view, the most homogenous
approach, therefore, is to apply the law chosen by the
parties or the one of the country where the award was
made. 289 Contrary to Art. V (1) (a) paragraph (c) requires a
(valid) agreement, the problem dealt with is its scope. A
parallelism to Art. V (1) (a) arises when the arbitrator
decides a dispute outside the scope of submission. One might
argue that for such a subject matter no valid agreement
exists and Art. V (1) (a) is applicable. Art. V (1) (a) as the
more specific provision should be, nevertheless, applied.
b) The problem of Separability and "Kompetenz-Kompetenz"
The issue of "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" 290 is frequently
mentioned as a main difference between the U.S. and German
289 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 312; MUEKO-GOTTWALD,
supra note 84, at no . 21; Sanders, supra note 41, at 2 74
290 the literal translation of "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" would
be "competence -competence" which is irritating because of the
different meaning in both legal systems
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jurisdiction. Although apparently the same term is used in
both legal systems it has to be noted that the legal meaning
is not exactly congruent. 291 Instead of creating more
confusion by trying to define "separability", "competence
competence" (within the U.S. meaning) and "Kompetenz-
Kompetenz" (within the German meaning) , this discussion will
be limited to an abstract description of the involved
problems
.
The first problem to address arises out of the situation
that a defendant might try to escape from enforcement by
claiming the invalidity of the contract. Assuming that the
arbitration clause is only a paragraph within the whole
(main) contract, its invalidity would include a consequent
and invalid arbitration award.
However, it has been unanimously recognized that an
arbitrator has at least the competence of a preliminary
ruling on his own competence,- 292 otherwise mere dilatory
tactics would be supported. 293 The nature of such a
"preliminary ruling" implies the temporary effect and the
risk of long litigation to find out whether the arbitration
panel or a state court was competent . This would contravene
291 SCHLOSSER, supra note 132, at no. 553; but see REDFERN
& HUNTER, supra note 144, at 276 note 76 (for an example of
a misunderstanding of "Kompetenz-Kompetenz"
)
292 SCHLOSSER, id. at no. 546, REDFERN & HUNTER, id. at
177 and 275
293 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 312
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the arbitration's goal of speed and simplicity. 294 Typically,
parties refer "any" claim arising out of a contractual
relation to arbitration, i. e. they (usually) do not want to
exclude disputes about the validity of the agreement
itself. 295 In addition to that, a court might be easily
involved in a review on the merits by reviewing the
arbitrator's holding on the validity of the (whole)
contract . 296
Against this background, U.S. and German courts adhere
to the idea of a separate arbitration agreement. By agreeing
upon a contract containing an arbitral clause,
they conclude not one but two agreements, the arbitral
twin of which survives any birth defect or acquired
disability of the principal agreement. 297
In the leading U.S. case, Prima Paint
,
298 the Supreme
Court affirmed the Second Circuit's view that "arbitration
clause [...] are 'separable' from the contracts in which they
are embedded, " 299 by holding that "a federal court may
consider only issues relating to the making and the
294 STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, The Severability of the
Arbitration Agreement, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE
SALIENT PROBLEMS, 1, 4 (1987) ; but see REDFERN & HUNTER, id.
at 281 (stating that this has the advantage of an early final
decision)
295 id. at 3
296 SCHWEBEL, supra note 2 94, at 6
297 id. at 5
298 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)
299 id. at 404
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performance of the agreement to arbitrate." 300 The German
Federal Supreme Court referred to similar arguments as
mentioned above (broad arbitration clause - obstructing
effects) 301 distinguishing between main contract and
arbitration clause.
The second problem might be briefly described by the
term "Kompetenz-Kompetenz . " Particularly in the relationship
with Germany, the use of this term can - as already mentioned
- cause confusion. In the U.S. what is termed " competence
-
competence" is regarded as the corollary to the separability
doctrine, described above. 302 As such this doctrine only
recognizes one contract and the competence of the arbitrator
to determine the existence and scope of the arbitration
clause, its validity..., 303 however, is fully reviewable by
a court. This competence has only a preliminary effect; 304
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Prima Paint apparently
300 id.
301 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of Feb. 27, 1970, 53 BGHZ
315, 323
Janet A. Rosen, Arbitration under Private
International Law: The doctrines of Separability and
Competence de la Competence, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 599, 606
(1994)
303 id. at 608
304 SCHLOSSER, supra note 132, at 553/ KLAUS PETER BERGER,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION, 3 58 (1993) ; MAURO RUBINO-
SAMARTANO, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW, 329 (1990)
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assumes this. 305 Very recently, the Supreme Court scrutinized
again the scope of an arbitration agreement (arbitrability of
a dispute) and the review standard of courts in the decision
First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan. 306 In general the Court
acknowledged the power of a panel to decide arbitrability if
the parties [explicitly] agreed to submit also arbitrability
questions to arbitration. 307 However, if such a clear and
unmistakable agreement was lacking " [c] ourts should not
assume that parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability." 308
The German understanding of "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" as
embodied in the doctrine of "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" allows the
parties to extent the arbitration agreement and leave it to
the arbitrators to decide with a binding effect on the
existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. 309 The
jurisdictional control is then limited to the review of the
validity of the agreement to include "Kompetenz-Kompetenz"
305 Prima Paint, id. at 404; see also REDFERN & HUNTER,
supra note 144, at 281 (stating that " [a] ny decision given by
an arbitral tribunal as to its jurisdiction is subject to
control by the courts of law.")
306 pi rs t Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan and MK
Investments, 115 S . Ct . 1920 (1995)
307 id. at 1923
308 id. at 1924
309 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of May 5, 1977, 68 BGHZ
356, 367; BERGER, id. at 359 (stating that a "Kompetenz-
Kompetenz" clause precludes the courts from examining the
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal)
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into the arbitration agreement, i. e. the parties submitted
to arbitration disputes arising out of
- the contract and
- the arbitration clause. 310 The German approach bases on the
parties' contractual autonomy: The idea behind the
"Kompetenz-Kompetenz" doctrine is easily understandable in a
two-step explanation:
- First step: the parties enter into an agreement containing
a main contract (describing the purpose of the agreement) and
an arbitration clause.
Second step: the arbitration clause empowers the
arbitrators to judge a dispute on the main contract. If -
some time later - arbitration .proceedings are started and the
question arises as to the validity of the (separate)
arbitration clause, the parties can either create another
panel to decide the (in) validity of the first clause or they
can extend (contractual freedom!) the competence of the
initial panel to this question. 311 Against this background
there is no reason that could justify a prohibition of such
an extension at an earlier moment, i. e. when the first
contract is signed.
As the "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" further limits the state
court's competence, a severe standard of interpretation
310 id. at 366
311 SCHLOSSER, supra note 132, at no . 55 6; BERGER, supra
note 304, at 359
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regarding its clearness/express has to be applied. 312 The
second agreement, the agreement upon Kompetenz-Kompetenz, is
reviewable by a state court. 313 The panel has no final
decision on the interpretation of such a clause. 314
"Kompetenz-Kompetenz" is limited; the parties are not allowed
to agree upon the arbitrability of non-arbitrable subject
matters. 315 It has to be underlined that, in general, the
legal situation will be the same like in the U.S. because a
"Kompetenz-Kompetenz" clause requires the clear and express
intent of the parties. Since the jurisdiction of the German
Supreme Court provides for the "Kompetenz-Kompetenz," German
courts are likely to interpret an arbitration agreement in a
broad sense 316 whereas U.S. courts are prohibited to assume
the intention of parties to include arbitrability of the
dispute in the arbitration clause. Accordingly, the
difference between the U.S. and the German jurisdiction is
that German courts are simply more likely to assume a broad
jurisdiction of the panel including the arbitrability issue.
312 ROLF A. SCHUETZE ET AL . , HANDBUCH DES
SCHIEDSVERFAHRENS, no. 118 (2nd ed. 1987) ; SCHLOSSER, supra
note 132, at no. 555
313 Bundesgerichtshof , id. at 367
314 id. at 366
315 SCHLOSSER, id. at no. 556
316 Sandrock & Hentzen, supra note 45, at 57
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Therefore, parties to an arbitration agreement are well
advised to address this issue expressly in the contract. 317
The U.S. courts' reluctance in recognizing a binding
"Kompetenz-Kompetenz" is surprising in the light of their
general pro-enforcement attitude. The Supreme Court justified
its reluctance by distinguishing the question of
arbitrability from a partial submission to arbitration.
According to the contractual character of arbitration 318 the
Court focussed on the parties' intentions when they sign the
submission agreement. In the case of a partial submission the
parties gave some thoughts to the scope of the agreement
which justifies a broad reading of an arbitration clause. 319
In case of arbitrability the Court relied on the idea to
protect a party that might not have understood the
significance of such a broad power of arbitrators. 320 This
destinction appears artificial. A broad reading of a partial
submission involves also arbitrability questions. The
reasoning of the Supreme Court bears the risk - as emphasized
by the German courts - that a defendant immediately raises
317 id,
318 The arbitration tribunal is created by the parties'
agreement. The state courts' jurisdiction on issues the
parties have submitted to arbitration is very limited.
Accordingly, an arbitrator's decision on those issues can
only be set aside under narrow a circumstances; see First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan and MK Investments, 115
S.Ct. 1920, 1923 (1995)
319 First Options, id. at 1924
320 id. at 1925
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the arbitrability issue to obstruct the arbitration
proceeding. U.S. courts could apply their pro-arbitration
doctrine on arbitrability issues since sufficient control is
safeguarded by a review of the state courts on the
enforcement stage.
Regarding the mentioned advantages of avoiding a time
and money consuming removal to a state court, one German
commentator proposes the following distinction: in absence of
an express statement he wants to assume the parties' will in
favor of a "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" clause if the claimant
initiates proceedings before an arbitration panel;
conversely, he denies the power of a panel to rule on its own
jurisdiction with a binding effect when the claimant starts
a state court action. 321
However, the "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" could not develop any
significant importance in international arbitration. 322
6 . Partial enforcement
Two forms of awards requiring a partial enforcement have
to be distinguished: (a) the infra petita award that decides
that decides less questions than submitted to arbitration,
and (b) the ultra or extra petita award that decides more
than submitted. In both cases distinctions have to be made.
In the former case issues decided by the arbitrators have to
321 Sandrock, supra note 12, at 4 9
322 STEIN/JONAS -SCHLOSSER, supra note 129, at no. 67
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be separated from the ones left undecided, in the latter the
submitted issues from the non- submitted. A partial award is
generally enforceable (if it can be separated) , however, it
should not be enforced if the enforcement is an unreasonable
burden for the defendant. 323
D. Incorrect procedure or composition of the panel
1. Introduction
The forth defense is as follows:
The composition of the arbitral authority or the
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or failing such agreement, was
not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place; ....
The defense deals with the improper composition of the
panel or improper procedure as a ground for refusal. Art. V
(1) (d) has been rarely discussed in courts and the defense
has been always rejected by U.S. and German courts.
2. U.S. court decisions
The first reported Art. V (1) (d) case is Imperial
Ethiopian v. Baruch-Foster. 32 * The written agreement between
Imperial and Baruch-Foster mentioned that the third
arbitrator should "have no connection either directly or
323 STEIN/JONAS -SCHLOSSER, id. at no. 68 (also stating
that an ultra petita award typically involves a due process
infringement) ; VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 321
324 Imperial Ethiopian Gov't v. Baruch-Foster Corp. 535
F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1976)
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indirectly with either Government or BFC...." 325 Six months
after the award the award had been rendered, Baruch-Foster
found out that the president of the panel had drafted the
civil code for the Ethiopian government. They, therefore,
claimed a material connection between arbitrator and one
party. 326 The District Court rejected Baruch' s defense on
grounds that BFC had waived any objection. 327 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision but did not
apply the waiver theory. 328 First, it found that first the
defense was raised belatedly. 329 Secondly, BFC "had brought
forward nothing to show any semblance of substance" 330 that
the earlier engagement disqualified the arbitrator, and
therefore denied any discovery. 331
Interestingly, the Court of Appeals declined to follow
the waiver theory of the District Court. The court's
reasoning using the argument of a belated defense and the
requirement of a "semblance of substance" for discovery
offered a more flexible approach than the relatively rigid
325 id. at 335 note 1
326 id. at 336; Prof. David had on worked for the
Government between 1954-1958, about 16 ( ! ) years before the
arbitration proceedings, id. at 337
327 id. at 335
328 id.
329 six months after notification of the award, id. at 336
330 id. at 337
331 id.
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waiver theory of the District Court that only imposes a time
limit. The latter does not allow any substantive review. The
Court of Appeals keeps a backdoor open to review more closely
a relationship between a party and an arbitrator even a few
months after an award has been rendered if a lack of
impartiality is more likely than in the present case: As
there is no unqualified right to discovery proceedings, a
party will have to bring some other grounds to show that an
alleged lack of impartiality is probable. Otherwise - like
Baruch - the court will assume a lack of good faith and that
a defendant merely wants to delay the enforcement
proceedings. Thus, it is likely to deny any requested
discovery. All in all, the Art. V(l) (d) defense is promising
even after months provided a defendant is able to prove a
possible impartiality.
In Al Haddad v. M/S Agapi an Diakan the parties agreed
upon a panel of two arbitrators - one appointed by each
party. 332 In case the arbitrators did not agree, the
arbitration clause provided for an umpire appointed by the
two arbitrators. 333 Even though Al Haddad had notice of the
arbitration proceedings, it neither nominated an arbitrator
nor presented any defense, or participated somehow in the
332 Al Haddad Bros. Enterprises, Inc. v. M/S Agapi and
Diakan, 635 F.Supp. 205, 207 (D.Del. 1986)
333 see clause 51 as quoted, id,
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proceedings. 334 Diakan, then, asked its arbitrator to serve
as sole arbitrator. He rendered an award in favor of
Diakan. 235 Because the composition of the panel (sole
arbitrator instead of umpire) did not meet the requirements
the parties had agreed upon, Al Haddad challenged the award
on Art. V(l) (d) grounds. 336 Despite the fact that the award
was not rendered in accordance with the parties'
agreement, 337 the court considered the award enforceable
nevertheless. 338 It reasoned that the "Convention allows
recognition of an award which, although not in accord with
the parties' agreement, complied with the laws of the country
where the arbitration occurred." 339 The British arbitration
statute provided for a sole arbitrator if one of the parties
did not appoint an arbitrator and the other called upon him
to do so. 340 The prevailing party fully complied with the
British procedure. Therefore, Art. V(l) (d) could not be
invoked. 341
334 id. at 207
335 id. at 207
336 id.
337 id. at 210
338 id. at 208
339 id. at 210
340 id.
341 id.
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This decision evidences that even though a court looks
primarily at the parties' agreement, it will not hesitate to
apply lex fori secondarily. The underlying rationale is to
avoid obstructive, anti-arbitration tactics. The defendant
shall not retain all evidence and objections until the
enforcement stage to prevent enforcement; in the present case
the plaintiff raised the lack-of -arbitration provision
argument 16 months after the court had originally stayed
litigation to allow arbitration. This was additionally an
unexcusable delay. 342
Consequently, a party to an arbitration agreement is
well advised to participate in the arbitration proceedings.
Mere reliance on the fact that the arbitration proceeding did
not comply with the agreement is likely not succeed before
U.S. courts, if the winning party complies with a procedure
as provided by the lex fori
.
342 id. ; see also Associated Bulk Carrier of Bermuda
(Bermuda) v. Mineral Export of Bucharest (Rumania), no. 79
Civ. 543 9, U.S. District Court, S.D.N.Y. judgment of Jan. 30,
1980, summary in IX YCA ( 1984) 462, 463-465 (deciding a
similar case: the parties had agreed upon a three arbitrator
panel. The defendant did neither appoint an arbitrator nor
attended the hearing. Applying the same reasoning as the
Haddad Court the District Court referred to § 7(b) of the
English Arbitration Act which provides for such a procedure.
Consequently, the court could not find a violation of the
agreement of the Convention.)
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In Societe Nationale v. Shaheen342 the defendant
asserted that a three member panel contravened the
arbitration agreement and ICC Rules. 344 The contractual
arbitration clause, however, provided for one or more
arbitrators according to ICC Rules. These rules leave it to
the ICC Administration to decide whether one or three
arbitrators are appropriate. 345 Additionally, Shaheen claimed
a procedural defect because the award had not been rendered
within the time limit of six months as provided by the ICC
Rules. 346 The court also rejected this defense on two
grounds: The party could have raised this objection before
the panel, and as it did not, it thereby waived its
objection. 347 Secondly, the ICC Rules allow an extension on
the time period by the ICC Court of Arbitration; it appeared
that the ICC Court had complied with its rules. 348 Therefore,
Art. V(l) (d) was no valid defense. 349
343 La Societe Nationale pour la Recherche, la Production,
le Transport, la Transformation et la Commercialisation des
Hydrocarbures v. Shaheen Natural Resources Co., Inc., 585
F.Supp. 57 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1983)
344 id. at 64
345 id. at 65
346 id. at 65
347 id. at 65
348 id. at 65
349 see also American Construction Machinery & Equipment
Corp. Ltd. v. Mechanized Construction of Pakistan Ltd., 659
F.Supp. 426, 428-429 (rejecting an Art. V(l) (d) defense after
the defendant had signed a contract agreeing (a) to have the
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3 . German court decisions
There are only two German court decisions dealing with
an Art. V (1) (d) issue. In the first case the Hamburg Court
of Appeals 350 enforced an award even though the award was
rendered without reasons . According to German law an award
has to be vacated if the arbitrators did not provide the
reasons for an award unless the parties had waived this
right. 351 Referring to the applicable English law the court
could not find a violation of Art. V (1) (d) because under
English law arbitral awards were generally issued without
reasons. 352 If, however, an award is rendered without reasons
contrary to the parties' agreement, this would constitute an
infringement of Art. V(l) (d) . 353
Similarly to the U.S. case in Societe Nationale, the
defendant in SpA Ghezzi v. Jacob Boss35 * invoked Art. V (I)
ICC select the arbitrator's jurisdiction, (b) accepted the
arbitrator's jurisdiction, (c) and Geneva as the place of
arbitration with its procedural rules - the Court apparently
applies the doctrine of an implied waiver)
350 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, judgment of July 27, 1978,
IV YCA (1979) 266
"
351 § 1041 (1) (no. 5) , (2) respectively;
§ 1044 ZPO, the specific provision, for the non-enforcement
of foreign award does not mention the lack of reason as a
ground for a refusal. Accordingly, it cannot be regarded as
a violation of German public policy; SCHLOSSER, supra note
132, at no. 852
352 id. at 267
353 MUEKO-GOTTWALD, supra note 84, Art. V at no. 33
354 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of April 14, 1988, English
language summary in XV YCA (1990) , 4 50
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(d) to oppose enforcement because the arbitration procedure
was allegedly inconsistent with the ICC Arbitration Rules
(Art. 18) . 355 Art. 18(1) of the ICC Rules provides that an
arbitrator shall render an award within six months. The
present award was made about three years after the initiation
of the proceedings. Taking into consideration the language of
Art. 18 (1) ICC Rules the Supreme Court held that this
article does not provide for an automatic extinction if the
six month period is exceeded. 356 On the contrary, the ICC
Rules leave it up to the ICC Court to replace an arbitrator
"if appropriate," or to extend the time limit (Art. 18(2) and
(3)) . The ICC Court extended the time limit several times,
and, consequently, complied with its own rules which excluded
an Art. V(l) (d) violation. 357 Furthermore, the court held
that the protective purpose of the time limit can also be
attained by its extension:
A refusal to extend the time limit would result in the
decision on the merits being deferred to a different
arbitrator. The protection given under Art. V (1) (d) of
the New York Convention, however, does not cover the
mere possibility that the new arbitrator would have
decided differently on the merits. 358
355 id. at 453
356 id. at 4 53; Art. 18(1) ICC rules reads:" The
arbitrator shall make his award within six months..."
357 id. at 452-453 sub [3]
358 id. at 454 sub [5]
96
4
.
Comparison
Art. 18 ICC Rules have been discussed in the U.S. and
Germany - without success for the defendant : The District
Court in Shaheen and the Federal Supreme Court in SpA Ghezzi
refused a stay to enforcement, since the ICC Court extended
the time period to render an award according to the rules.
The U.S. decision in Al Haddad indicates that a U.S. will at
least subsidiarily apply the law of the forum. The question
of impartiality concerns the principle of fundamental justice
of a proceeding. In particular the German jurisdiction
considered proceedings with an impact on the composition of
the panel, such as § 7(b) of the English Arbitration Act and
similar contractual proceedings, primarily under the public
policy defense of Art. V(2) (b) . The U.S. courts also
acknowledge the public policy aspect of the arbitrator's
impartiality, however, less pronounced than the German
courts
.
5. Further theoretical considerations
a) The applicable law
Art. V(l) (d) gives rise to the question of the
relationship between first, the rules concerning the
composition of the panel, secondly, the procedure as set by
the parties' agreement and, thirdly, a - possibly
contravening - law of the country where an award was made.
This is a result of two contravening conceptions during the
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negotiations: one in favor of contractual freedom to create
an independent, supranational arbitral procedure, the other
arguing for a subjection of the panel to the law of the
country of issuance. 359 "The result is in full accordance
with neither position and is capable of two
interpretations." 360 Contrary to Art. V(l)(a) which refers
expressly to a stipulated law, 361 Art. V(l) (d) does not
provide for a choice of law but makes reference only to the
agreement. 362 Conversely, it has been pointed out that Art.
V(l) (d) can be so construed that the parties' choice of law
is limited to that of a particular country. 363 However, the
systematic and wording of Art. V(l) (a) and (d) underline the
broad scope the parties have to formulate an agreement. 364
The parties are not bound by any procedural law, especially
not the lex fori, or arbitration rules of international
359 Quigley, supra note 1, at 1068; Swisher, supra note
11, at 290 (explaining that the ICC regarded as a main defect
of the Geneva Convention that an award had to comply strictly
with the procedure of the country where the arbitration took
place. Therefore, the ICC advocated the idea of an
"international award" that is rendered completely independent
of any national law.); Contini, supra note 39, at 299
(referring to the same problem of the Geneva Convention)
360 West, supra note 103, at 116
361
"the law to which"
362 MUEKO-GOTTWALD, supra note 84, at Art. V no. 29
363 Martinez, supra note 2, at 503; West, id.
364 MUEKO-GOTTWALD, id.
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organizations such as the ICC or the AAA. 365 A court has to
look primarily at the parties' agreement 366 and the
(apparently) chosen law. 367 Key expressions in the language
of paragraph (d) are the express reference to the "agreement
of the parties" and that only "failing such agreement" the
law of the forum shall be applied. Consequently, it cannot be
a successful defense to claim that the panel's composition or
the procedure did not comply with the mandatory domestic
arbitration law even though in accordance with the
agreement. 368 It is, however, generally recognized that the
law of the country where the arbitration took place still
fulfills two functions: the first one results directly from
the wording of the provision: it is applicable if the parties
have provided nothing (subsidiary function); 369 the second
is a complementary function for aspects for which the parties
did not provide any rule. 370
The contractual autonomy of the parties is not unlimited
because if the award violates mandatory domestic law in the
365 MUEKO-GOTTWALD, id.; Quigley, supra note 1, at 1068
366 MUEKO-GOTTWALD, id.
367 STEIN/JONAS -SCHLOSSER, supra note 129, at no. 75
368 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 327; STEIN/JONAS-
SCHLOSSER, id. at no. 76
369 VAN DEN BERG, id. at 325; STEIN/JONAS- SCHLOSSER, id.
370 id. ; in matter of arbitration between InterCarbon
Bermuda Ltd. v. Caltex Trading and Transport Corp., 146
F.R.D. 64, 72 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1993) (applying this function)
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country of its origin, it can be set aside in that country
which leads to a denial of its enforcement according to Art.
V (1) (e) . 371 Freedom of contract it is additionally limited
by Art. V (1) (b) and (2) (b) . 372 If the parties modify the
mandatory law of the country where the proceedings take
place, this may cause the following "unfortunate but
inevitable side-effect." 373 If the arbitrator follows the
mandatory law contrary to the agreement an exequatur court
may deny enforcement on grounds of Art. V (1) (d) ; conversely,
if they follow the rules as provided by the agreement, they
risk that their award may be set aside by a local court due
to a violation of local mandatory law. 374 In the country of
issuance the Convention is not applicable. 375
b) The standard for infringement of procedural rules
After determining the applicable law, one has to
determine what constitutes a violation of this law. Not every
infringement 376 during the proceedings should be deemed a
371 MUEKO-GOTTWALD, supra note 84, at Art. V no . 30
372 id.
373 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 33
374 VAN DEN BERG, id.; MUEKO-GOTTWALD, id.
375 STEIN/JONAS -SCHLOSSER, supra note 129, at no . 74; note
that the problem of appearance of impartiality due to
particular proceedings, like § 7(b) of the English
Arbitration Act, will be discussed under Art. V(2) (b)
376 however, SCHLOSSER, supra note 132, at 819
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violation of the rules 377 because this would probably provoke
dilatory tactics by the losing party in an enforcement court.
Following the systematic of the provision, the standard for
determining whether there is a violation should be set by
applicable procedural law. 378 Therefore, a procedure is
improper within the meaning of Art. V(l) (d) if the award
could be vacated under applicable domestic law. 379 There is
no reason to apply a different procedural, the enforcing
state's, standard for the determination of a violation rather
than for the procedure itself. 380 The reasons for a vacation
under domestic U.S. laws are enumerated in § 10 FAA, for
Germany in § 1041 ZPO.
377 MUEKO-GOTTWALD, supra note 84, at Art. V no. 34/
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Hammermills, Inc. (1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8046 *1, 16 (D.D.C. 1992) . (mentioning the
same standard in the dictum (the court could not find any
violation of procedural rules) : In the light of the "general
pro-enforcement bias" the court only wanted to set aside an
award if a "violation worked substantial prejudice to the
complaining party," (id. at 17) i. e. the court apparently
would have excluded minor infringements; see also in the
matter of arbitration between P.T. Reasuransi Umum Indonesia
v. Evanston Insurance Co., 1992 WL 40073, *1, 1-3 (D.S.D.N.Y.
1992)
378 MUEKO-GOTTWALD, id.
379 id.
380 id,
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E. Binding effect of an award
1. Introduction
The fifth and last affirmative defense is Art. V (1) (e) :
The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or
has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority
of the country in which, or under the law of which, that
award was made
.
Art. V(l) (e) offers two defenses to a potential
defendant : an award
- has not yet become binding or
- has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority.
It reflects the inability of the Conference to agree on
the solution of the 'double exequatur.' No one wanted
the Convention to require judicial proceedings in
confirmation of the award in both the rendering and the
enforcing State. At the same time, an award which had
been set aside by competent authority in the State where
rendered should hardly be granted enforcement in another
State. 381
In both the United States and Germany Art. V (1) (e) gave
rise to many court decisions dealing with all parts of the
defense. "The most troublesome area is the effect of a
pending appeal at the place of arbitration." 382 The following
the court decisions are classified in several parts of
subparagraph (e)
.
381 Quigley, supra note 1, at 1069; Contini, supra note
39, at 303-304 (stating that the exact meaning of the term
"binding" was not clarified during the negotiations and
giving the interpretations as proposed by several
representatives)
382 McClendon, supra note 16, at 66
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2 . Court decisions
a) Binding effect
aa) U.S. court decisions
The first reported case, and still the leading
U.S. authority, is Fertilizer v. JDI383 in which IDI tried to
evade enforcement by referring to Art. V(l) (e) . At that time
the award was under review by an Indian Court. Allegedly any
error of law prevented a binding effect. 384 FCI countered
that following Indian law, ICC Rules and the parties'
agreement, the award is binding and compared the situation
with an appealable, albeit binding District Court
decision. 385 After analyzing Indian jurisdiction in depth the
court found that the award was final and binding, 386 and
additionally referred to a comment by Professor Aksen stating
that a binding effect is only excluded if there is a further
arbitral recourse to prevent obstructing (litigation) tactics
by a losing party trying to avoid enforcement of an award. 387
383 Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc. 517
F.Supp. 948 (D.S.D. Ohio 1981)
384 id. at 956
385 id.
386 id. at 957
387 id. at 958 (referring to Gerald Aksen, American
Arbitration Accession arrives in the Age of Aquarius : United
States implements United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 SW.
U. L. REV. 1, 11 (1971)
)
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This last statement is inconsistent 388 to the further
reasoning of the court. If the test is simply whether there
is an "arbitral appeal," the whole discussion of the legal
background in India was superfluous and irritating. It is
unclear whether a court has to engage in a detailed analysis
of the law of the country of issuance to determine a binding
effect, or whether it simply must determine whether there is
an arbitral recourse. At the end of a very long opinion the
court reaches what appears to be a conclusion, yet the
language is ambiguous. One might argue that Aksen's comment
represents a conclusion of the court or the test to be
applied. Doubts remain. It is often submitted that the
Fertilizer finding has to be "viewed in the light of article
VI." 389 Instead of Art. V(l) (e)
,
the court used the more
flexible provision of Art. VI. According to Art. VI a court
can require a security. 390
Applying the mentioned test, an enforcing U.S. court
will have to look at German law. It will recognize that the
ZPO does not provide for any kind of full review on the
merits. The only possible recourse is the claim for annulment
(§ 1041 ZPO) which allows a vacation of the award - similar
388 Michael H. St rub, Resisting Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards under Article V(l) (e) and Article VI of the
New York Convention: A Proposal for Effective Guidelines, 3
SW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1053 (1971)
389 Martinez, supra note 2, at 506; West, supra note 103,
at 119
390 Fertilizer, id. at 962
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to the U.N. Convention and § 10 FAA. This is used in rather
extreme cases on limited grounds. Such a legal remedy does
not fulfill the standard of ordinary means of recourse.
Therefore, an award rendered under German law can be regarded
as binding.
In Dworkin-Cosell v. Avrahair? 91 the problem of a
"binding" award was discussed from a more formal point of
view: the necessary clarity to determine the extent of the
binding effect of an award. Since in the present case the
award did not specify exactly "whether, and to what extent"
the parties' dispute was decided, 392 it remains unclear to
what extent a binding effect was reached. The court affirmed
that an incomplete, ambiguous or contradictory award would
not be enforced. 393 Therefore, it remanded the award for
further clarification to the arbitration panel. 394 This case
reflects - as mentioned - a more formal aspect of the
problems of interpreting "binding."
bb) German court decisions
The first reported German case on the binding effect of
an award arose between a French and a German party about a
391 Dworkin-Cosell Interair Courier Services, Inc. v
Avraham 727 F . Supp . 156 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1989)
392 id. at 162
393 id.
394 id. at 161
105
transaction in woolen products. The Court of First Instance
in Bremen395 interpreted the word "binding" in the sense that
an "award is not open to arbitral or judicial appeal,
irrespective of the inadmissibility of an action for setting
aside." 396 This definition has been employed by other German
courts since then, including the Federal Supreme Court. The
latter considers an award "binding" when it
can neither be appealed before an arbitration board with
appellate jurisdiction, nor can it be attached in a
state court by means of legal remedies. The possibility
of subsequently setting aside the arbitral award in the
country of rendition by means of legal action similar to
the German action for annulment does not affect its
binding character. 397
This jurisdiction can be summarized in the distinction
between ordinary and extraordinary means of recourse, i. e.
only the further allowing a review on the merits and
hindering a binding effect. 398 American law allows a
challenge of an award only on the mentioned limited grounds
according to § 10 FAA. Section 10 does not provide for a
review on the merits, a vacation of an award can be based
395 Landgericht Bremen, judgment of June 8, 1967, English
language summary in II YCA (1977) 234
396 id,
397 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of May 10, 1988, English
language summary in XV YCA (1990) 450, 452; also
Bundesgerichtshof, judgment of May 10, 1984, English language
summary in X YCA (1985) 427, 427 (stating somewhat shorter
that an award has become binding if "recourse on the merits
to an arbitral appeal tribunal or a court is no longer
available against the award.")
398 Sandrock & Hentzen, supra note 45, at 61
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only on the violation of the mentioned fundamental
principles. This does not meet the requirements of an
ordinary means of recourse. 399 Consequently, once an award
is rendered, it can be considered as binding.
cc) Irritual award and consideration of national law
In both jurisdictions the rather specific question of an
Italian "irrituale award" was discussed. Italian law
distinguishes between two types of arbitration: "arbitrato
rituale" and "arbitrato irrituale." The latter was only
regarded as a contract and, as such, was fully reviewable by
Italian courts, whereas an "arbitrato irrituale" award as a
"real" award could be only challenged on limited grounds. 400
Since those differences do not exist in U.S. or German
arbitration laws the particular value of these decisions in
how far the courts consider the law of the country where the
award was made to determine its binding effect.
In Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica the parties had
presented contrary evidence on this issue to the court. 401
Reviewing the legislative history the court acknowledged the
nature of the Convention as a compromise "between national
399 Sandrock, supra note 12, at 62
400 as explained by the District Court in Spier v
Calzaturificio Tecnica S.p.A., 663 F . Supp . 871, 874 (D
S.D.N.Y. 1987)
401 id.
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interests and international aspirations." 402 Those national
interests are evidently taken into consideration by Art.
V(l) (e) providing for a refusal ground in case of a
successful challenge in the country of issuance. 403 The
permissible scope of a challenge linked with the question of
the nature of an "irrituale" award had to be considered under
Italian law by an Italian court. 404 Although the court
indicated own jurisdiction to decide whether the "arbitrato
irrituale" falls within the Convention, 405 it did not involve
any discussion as to the binding effect under the Convention.
Somewhat differently from the U.S. court, the Hamburg
Court of Appeals 406 started its discussion from the question
whether Italy intended to include this type of award under
the Convention. 407 It observed that - if applicability was
assumed - this would lead to unjustified differences in
enforceability (enforceability only abroad) , and secondly
that the prevailing opinion determined the enforceability
according to the law of the country where the award is made.
402 id. at 875; see Quigley, supra note 385
403 id. at 875
404 id.
405 id. at 875: "That question, although it arises here,
would not seem to arise in Italy, since the award was
rendered in Italy and is challenged in Italian courts."
406 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, judgment of Jan. 18, 1979,
English language summary in VI YCA (1981) 225
407 id. at 226
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Therefore, the court did not assume that Italy intended to
include the "lodo irrituale, " and denied a binding effect on
the parties. 408 These two decisions, both referring to
national law bear the risk that a strong reference to
national law reintroduces a "double exequatur" proceeding.
The problem of the binding effect of this specific
Italian arbitral award raises the more general question how
this effect has to be determined, when an award can be
considered to be "binding" . Two countervailing legal opinions
can be distinguished:
- an award is binding when it is regarded as "binding" under
the law of its origin409 or
- according to a more autonomous interpretation "binding"
simply means that no ordinary means of recourse are
available, because any other interpretation would render Art.
VI meaningless. 410
Underlying rationale for the first interpretation is an
alleged greater certainty of law, 411 whereas the second legal
opinion stresses the danger of a re- introduction of a
"double-exequatur" in case of too much reliance upon national
408 id. at 226-227; Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of Oct.
8, 1981, English language summary in VIII YCA (1983) 366,
368-369
409 SCHLOSSER, supra note 132, at no. 787
410
411
Sanders, supra note 41, at 2 75
MUEKO-GOTTWALD, supra note 84, at Art. V no . 35
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arbitration laws. 412 Unanimously, it has been found that one
of the main goals of the U.N. Convention was eliminate the
"double exequatur" which required a confirming judgment and
an enforcing judgment, a rather impractical procedure,
consuming time and money. 413 However, if the binding effect
has to be determined according to the law of the award's
origin this may lead to the re- introduction of double
exequatur if the domestic law provides for it. Problems
arising out of formal requirements for domestic awards might
create the necessity of introducing exemptions to such a
rule, i. e. exemptions to the national law. 414 Although this
doctrine might claim a higher certainty of the law, the
double exequatur is a consequence that was - after the
negative experiences with the Geneva Conventions - clearly to
be avoided. To avoid problems with domestic formal
requirements exemptions might have to be created against the
rule. 415 The fact that the New York - in contrary to the
Geneva Conventions - employs the term "binding" instead of
"final" 416 favors an independent, autonomous interpretation
412 Sanders, id.
413 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 33 7; Contini, supra
note 39, at 3 04; McClendon, supra note 16, at 66; Strub,
supra note 388, at 1045
414 SCHLOSSER, supra note 132, at no. 787
415 id.
416 finality of an award had in the practice of the Geneva
Convention required a leave for enforcement in the country
where the award was rendered (Sanders, supra note 41, at 272-
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to avoid possible domestic exequatur requirements: 417 the
distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means of
recourse offers such an autonomous interpretation418 and
avoids the difficult determination as to when an award is
binding under the applicable foreign law. 419 However, a
reference to a national law cannot be avoided in order to
determine the legal possibilities of a review on the
merits. 420 Therefore, an award can be deemed "binding" once
it is rendered421 .
Both jurisdictions seem to adhere to the latter,
supranational doctrine. They underline the fact that an award
can be regarded as "binding" if there is no arbitral
recourse. A different interpretation might render Art. VI
meaningless . 422
b) Merger
The problem of a merger of an arbitral award into a
judgment is usually discussed under Art. V(l) (e) even though
273)
417 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 342; Sanders, supra
note 41, at 275
418 id.
419 id. ; see the problems arising out of the distinctions
under Italian law
420 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 34 2
421 VAN DEN BERG, id. at 34 5
422 Sanders, supra note 41, at 2 75
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it does not really fit into these exceptions. With a
confirming court decision an award has in any case binding
effect, but its character as an arbitral award may be
questioned. In many common law countries a confirming
judgment has an absorbing effect according to the merger
doctrine: the award is no longer an award but is treated as
a court decision. 423
This doctrine has been implicitly affirmed by Victrix
Steamship v. Salen Dry Cargo. 424 Even though the court
apparently assumes that a confirming judgment absorbs an
award, it found that "federal courts generally extend comity
whenever the foreign court had proper jurisdiction and
enforcement does not prejudice the rights of United States
citizens or violate domestic public policy." 425 Referring to
Waterside, 426 it is clear that the Convention is not
applicable to foreign judgments confirming foreign arbitral
awards. The court, however, wants to indicate that this
distinction will not cause a great practical difference.
The merger doctrine has been also discussed before
German courts. In one case the Federal Supreme Court had to
423 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 34 6; SCHLOSSER, supra
note 132, at no. 788
424 Victrix Steamship Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B.,
825 F.2d 709 (2nd Cir. 1987)
425 id. at 713
426 Waterside Ocean Navigation Co., Inc. v. Int'l
Navigation Ltd., 737 F.2d 150, 154 (2nd Cir. 1984)
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decide whether an award confirmed by the Supreme Court of the
State of New York could be still enforced as a foreign
award. 427 In this decision the Supreme Court relied upon an
extraterritorial effect of the merger doctrine. Consequently
- as only a judgment was left - this had to be enforced
according to §§ 722 et seq. ZPO. 428
In a more recent decision429 the court modified this
attitude drastically and found that a party has a choice
between the enforcement of the award or the confirming
judgment. The court excluded an extraterritorial effect of a
confirming judgment on the enforcement of the award
(according to § 1044 ZPO) . 430
c) Partial award
The question of the extent of a binding effect 431 has
to be clearly distinguished from the problem of a partial
award that allegedly does not decide the entire award but
427 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of March 27, 1984, English
language summary in X YCA (1983) 426
428 those are the rules for the enforcement of a judgment;
id. at 427
429 Bundesgerichtshof, judgment of May 10, 1984, English
language summary in X YCA (1983) 427
430 id. at 429; SCHLOSSER, supra note 132, at no. 784
(doubting the denial of the extraterritorial effect and
assumes that a confirming judgment does not influence the
independent existence of an award)
431 Dworkin-Cosell Interair Courier Services, Inc. v.
Avraham, 727 F.Supp. 156 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1989)
113
leaves open the possibility of a further arbitration. The
court in Island Territory v. Solitron432 found that the
possibility of another arbitration at some time in the future
does not prevent an actual award from being "final" and
"definite", 433 i. e. enforceable. This dispute was decided
under § 10(d) FAA but arose in an international context, and
can, therefore, be deemed a guideline for the enforcement of
a partial award. Partial awards are enforceable in Germany as
in the U.S. 434
d) Award set aside or suspended and the problem of the
competent authority
Compared to the proceeding of first alternative of Art.
V(l) (e) , there is relatively little jurisdiction about the
setting aside or the suspension of an award by a national
court. There is no reported U.S. case contributing
substantively to the interpretation of the second
alternative
.
In Germany the Supreme Court ruled that the German Court
can only annul an award if it was rendered in an another
432 Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc
356 F.Supp. 1 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1973)
433 id. at 12
434 SCHLOSSER, supra note 132, at no. 770; MUEKO-GOTTWALD,
supra note 84, at Art. V no . 36
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contracting state under German law. 435 This means a German
court can set aside an award rendered in the U.S. as long as
German law was applicable. If an award is rendered under
German procedural law, considered a German award according to
procedural theory. 436
The Court of Appeals in Cologne, 437 although it had
refused to enforce the award, did not set it aside. The court
recognized a justified interest of the German defendant,
however, found that a setting aside would "mean an
impermissible interference with arbitration." 438 The
applicable law in this case was Danish law. Therefore, the
court correctly applied the aforementioned principle of the
Supreme Court
.
439
These decisions reflect the problem of determining the
"competent authority." The language only refers to "the
competent authority of the country in which, or under the law
of which, that award was made." In the context of the
Convention this language is somewhat ambiguous: the plain
meaning seems to create a broad jurisdiction for the court in
the country where or under the law of which the award is
435 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of Feb. 12, 1976, English
language summary in V YCA (1980) 242, 243
436 see also Sanders, supra note 41, at 276
437 Oberlandesgericht Koeln, judgment of June 10, 1976,
English language summary in IV YCA (1979) 258
438 id. at 260
439 see also Sanders, id. (mentioning this principle)
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made; on the other hand, this language might refer (only) to
the different (alternative) designations of an award as
"foreign," either according to the territorial ("country of
which...") or procedural ("or under the law of which...")
doctrine
.
If the discussed sentence has to be interpreted
literally, this would give courts a broad jurisdiction: a
U.S. court could set aside every award rendered in the U.S.
and in addition to those rendered abroad under U.S.
procedural law. It has been argued that Art. V(l) (e)
parallels Art. V(l) (a) in a reverse order of priority because
it mentions "country of which" before "law of country." 440
Although Art. V(l) (a) refers to the same choices of law it
does not establish any order of priority. 441 The formulation
"failing any indication thereof" which creates in (a) such a
priority of the parties' agreement does not exist in (e) .
Art. V(l) (e) uses the equal ranking term "or." It is much
more likely that Art. V(l) (e) refers to the designation of
the nationality of an award (in Art. I(l)) 442 That would
explain the reference to an authority of a country "under the
law of which..." in accordance with the German procedural
440 Strub, supra note 3 88, at 1049; VAN DEN BERG, supra
note 27, at 350
441 however: Strub, id. at 1049 (not taking into
consideration of Art. V(l) (a))
442 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 350; MUEKO-GOTTWALD,
supra note 84, at Art. V no . 4
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theory. Assuming that competent is only an authority of the
country of the award's origin, for the determination of this
origin the two doctrines have to be applied, i. e. a German
court is competent when German procedural law had been
applied, an American court when the award was rendered on
U.S. territory.
A problem arises when a German court has to recognize a
U.S. decision on an award rendered under German law in the
U.S. In this case both courts are competent to set an award
aside. 443 Another problem may arise if after the granting of
enforcement a competent authority sets the award aside. 444
This question should be resolved according to Art. Ill under
the law of the enforcing country: 445 For the U.S. the FAA dos
not provide for an explicit solution, but a reopening of the
confirmation proceedings might be possible; in Germany this
situation would lead to an analogous application of
§§ 1044(4), 1043 ZPO, the provisions governing the annulment
of a domestic arbitral award. 446
443 Quigley, supra note 1, at 1069; MUEKO-GOTTWALD, id,
444 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 3 50
445 id
446 for the U.S.: Landegger v. Bayerische Hypotheken und
Wechsel Bank, 357 F. Supp
. 692, 695-696 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(mentioning this possibility for a similar problem under the
Treaty of Friendship, Navigation and Commerce) ; for Germany:
SCHLOSSER, supra note 13 2, at no. 899; MUEKO-GOTTWALD, supra
note 84, at Art. V no . 43
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It is not clear what the drafters intended with the
"suspension defense" 447 but it is likely that suspension
means a court decision temporarily vacating the binding
effect among the parties. 448 The second part has no practical
relevance
.
F. Adjournment of decision and suitable security
Art . VI provides
:
If an application for setting aside or suspension of the
award has been made to a competent authority referred to
in article V(l) (e) , the authority before which the award
is sought to be relied upon may, if it considers it
proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the
award and may also, on the application of the party
claiming enforcement of the award, order the other party
to give suitable security.
Art. VI is frequently mentioned within the context of
Art. V(l) (e) , it parallels and complements the problems of
Art. V(l) (e) : the problem of two (parallel) court
proceedings, one to enforce an award in the exequatur state,
the other to revoke the foundation of such an enforcement by
contesting the award in the country of issuance.
The mechanics as introduced by the U.N. Convention is
result of the negative experiences with the 1927 Geneva
Convention requiring an award to be final. This was a very
low requirement to delay the enforcement proceedings. 449 The
447 VAN DEN BERG, id. at 351; MUEKO-GOTTWALD, supra note
84, at Art. V no . 45
448 SCHLOSSER, supra note 132, at no. 78 9
449 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 3 53
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New York Convention went a step further and raised the
requirements for an adjournment of enforcement slightly but
effectively: Art. V(l) (e) requires a binding, not necessarily
"final" award, it limits the defense to arbitral recourse, on
the other hand the Convention still takes into account
parallel proceedings in the country of issuance, Art. VI. The
substantial difference to the Geneva Convention results from
the fact that Art. VI leaves it to exequatur court to adjourn
its decision on the enforcement, and provides for a security.
Especially the latter discourages a "let ' s- just-try-it
attempt," an obstructionist tactics. 450
There are only two cases reported in the U.S. In both
cases the defendants successfully relied upon Art. VI and the
court adjourned the decision on the enforceability.
In Fertilizer v. IDI
,
a District Court made a first attempt
to find a standard for its own discretion to adjourn the
proceedings: In a first step it interpreted the language of
Art. VI as giving "unfettered grant of discretion." 451 In
absence of any specific guideline for the standard of
adjournment the court emphasized the general purpose of the
Convention to facilitate the enforcement procedure. It
balanced this purpose against the risk of a vacating decision
and concluded to adjourn enforcement "to avoid the
450 Contini, supra note 39, at 3 04
451 Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc. 517
F.Supp. 948, 961 (D.S.D. Ohio 1981)
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possibility of an inconsistent result." 452 The last step
seems inconsistent with the court's further reasoning; this
reasoning had exactly suggested an opposite result. 453 In the
light of the often-quoted general pro-enforcement bias of the
Convention, the enforcement could have been easily justified.
It would have been more convincing if the court had applied
its argumentation in an opposite order, stating, for example,
that despite the pro-enforcement bias the clear wording
requires a different interpretation.
In Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica* Si a New York
District Court adjourned the decision on enforcement. It
balanced "national interests and international aspirations,
"
and stressed the importance of the possibility to refuse
enforcement if the award has been successfully challenged in
the country of issuance. 455 Apparently the court understood
this provision as expression of respect for another
jurisdiction. Against this background the court concluded
that the question, like the nature of an Italian award, has
to be considered by the competent court of the country where
the award was made. 456 Only in the case of a "transparently
452 id. at 962
453 Strub, supra note 388, at 1055
454 Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica, S.p.A., 663 F.Supp
171 (D. S.D.N.Y. 1987)
455 id. at 875
456 id. at 875
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frivolous" litigation the court would permit enforcement.
Thus, to avoid a different jurisdiction in the country of
issuance and enforcement, the court adjourned its
decision. 457
It may questioned whether this approach better serves
the necessities of the Convention. In fact the court's
reasoning not to enforce an award unless the litigation is
"transparently frivolous" appears to contradict the general
pro-enforcement attitude. The latter would suggest
enforcement unless the litigation is very likely to be
successful. In fact the court "shifted the burden of proof to
Spier to show why the award should be enforced rather than
placing the burden on Tecnica to show why it should not be
enforced. " 458
There is no German case reported which contributes to
the interpretation of Art. VI. Both (U.S.) decisions reflect
the concern of the courts about an inconsistent decisions,
one confirming, another vacating an award. The proposed
standard of a "prima facie" conviction459 evidences its
weakness in the Spier case where both parties offered law
journal articles, expert's opinions and court decisions to
457 id,
458 Strub, supra note 388, at 1054; Parsons & Whittemore
Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de 1' Industrie du
Papier (RAKTA) , 508 F.2d 969, 973 (2nd Cir. 1974); see also:
VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 353; MUEKO-GOTTWALD, supra
note 84, at Art. VI, no. 1
459 VAN DEN BERG, id.; MUEKO-GOTTWALD, id.
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support their positions. 460 With respect to the pro-
enforcement goal, enforcement of the award would have been
preferable. Since arbitral awards are rarely set aside 461 the
court's concern about an opposite decision is not justified.
This is particularly true for both U.S. and German
jurisdiction. The present application of the American courts
bears the risk of an abuse of Art. VI by simply starting
court proceedings in the country of origin without just
cause. This dilatory tactic admittedly loses some part of its
attractivity through possibility of Art. VI to require
"suitable security.
"
II. The public policy defenses of Art. V(2)
Art. V(2) provides:
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may
also be refused if the competent authority in the
country where recognition and enforcement is sought
finds that : . .
.
Systematically different from paragraph (1) a court can
refuse enforcement on public policy grounds without the
request of a party on its own motion. Although the conference
tried to limit the number of defenses, the public policy
defense was inevitable in consideration of domestic public
460 Spier v. Calzaturif icio Tecnica S.p.A. 663 F.Supp. 871
!D.S.D.N.Y. 1987)
461 Strub, supra note 388, at 1054
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policy. 462 The public policy defense bears the risk of
becoming "a major loophole in the Convention's mechanism for
enforcement" unless it is not interpreted narrowly. 463 It
leaves "the ultimate decision on the applicability of the
Convention to the good faith of the contracting
countries. " 464
A. Distinction between a national and international standard
Both jurisdictions distinguish between a domestic and
international public order. For the U.S., in the area of
arbitration, the Supreme Court applied a different standard
to a "truly international agreement" 465 for the first time
in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver in order to comply with the
necessities of international business. This standard has been
affirmed by the same court in the Mitsubishi case where "at
least" in international business an arbitration clause
deciding antitrust matters was enforced. 466 The German
Federal Supreme Court draws the same distinction "in the
462 Sanders, supra note 41, at 2 70; Aksen, supra note 3 87,
at 13
463 Parsons & Whittemore v. Societe Generale de
1' Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) , 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2nd Cir.
1974)
464 Aksen, id.
465 Scherk v. Alberto Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 515 (1974)
466 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985)
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interest of international trade." 467 The courts normally
apply a less stringent standard for international
arbitration.
B. The nonarbitrability defense
1. Introduction
Art. V(2) (a) reads:
The subject matter of the difference in not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that
country; . .
.
Mainly historical reasons lead to the distinction
between the nonarbitrability and the public policy
defense. 468 Arbitrability is already a requirement for the
proceedings, Art. 11(1). An "unfortunate" effect of Art.
V(2) (a) is that arbitration can proceed to the award
enforcement stage, and then the award is held unenforceable
because the subject matter was inarbitrable
.
469 Consequently,
arbitrability has to be tested twice, under the applicable
467 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of May 15, 1986, English
language summary in XII YCA (1987) , 489, 490, and judgment of
Jan. 18, 1990, English language summary in XVII YCA (1992)
503, 505
468 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 3 58
469 Aksen, supra note 387, at 13; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra
note 144, at 146 (stating that in the worst case three
national system can be involved: "The question may fall to be
determined first, under the law governing the arbitration
agreement; secondly under the law of the place of
arbitration; and, thirdly, under the law (or laws) of the
country (or countries) of enforcement")
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law for the proceedings and for the enforcement. 470 Art.
V(2) (a) is widely regarded as a mere subdivision of the
broader public policy defense in Art. V(2) (b) . The latter
overlaps Art. V(2) (a)
.
471 Although Art. V(2) (a) may be deemed
superfluous, 472 it should be distinguished to the degree
possible; 473 a systematic approach in the broad public policy
defense offers the a greater chance of clarity. Art. V(2) (a)
might be regarded as dealing with substantive law
infringements whereas paragraph (2) (b) is focussed more on
procedural defects.
1. U.S. court decisions
The problem in dealing with U.S. court decisions on Art.
V(2) (a) is that they have often avoided a clear distinction
between nonarbitrability and the public policy defense. 474
However, a distinction is preferable for clarity's sake.
470 MUEKO-GOTTWALD, supra note 84, at Art. V no. 4 7 note
86
471 McClendon, supra note 16, at 67; Jay R. Sever, The
Relaxation of Inarbitrability and Public Policy Checks on
U.S. and Foreign Arbitration: Arbitration out of Control?
, 65
TUL. L. REV. 1661, 1663 (1991)
472 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 368; Sanders, supra
note 41, at 270
473 Heather Evans, The nonarbitrability of subject matter
defense to enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the
United States federal courts, 21 N. Y.U.J. INT' L L. & POL. 329,
335 (1989)
474 Evans, id. at 33 5; Pietrowski, supra note 8, at 66
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a) Development
The development toward a pro-arbitrability attitude is
evidenced by several landmark decisions: Wilko v. Swan, 47S
M/S Bremen v. Zapata, 416 Scherk v. Alberto -Culver, 477
Mitsubishi, 478 and Shearson/AmericanExpress v. McMahon. 479
In 1953 the Supreme Court held in Wilko v. Swan480 that
agreements to arbitrate are invalid under § 14 of the 1933
Securities Act for two reasons: 481 first, the court found
that "arbitration lacks the certainty of a suit of law under
the Act to enforce one's rights; 482 and secondly the
Securities Act of 1933 was designed to protect investors. 483
Therefore an agreement to arbitrate was held void under § 14
of the Act. 484
475 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by DeQuijas v.
Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989)
476 407 U.S. 1 (1972)
477 417 U.S. 506 (1974)
478 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler- Plymouth,
Inc. 473 U.S. 473 (1985)
479 Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. v. McMahon, 4 82 U.S.
220 (1987)
480 346 U.S. 427 (1953)
as read by the Court in DeQuijas v.
Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989)
482 id. at 432
483 id. at 435 (referring to 431-432
484 id. at 434-439
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These misgivings changed considerably in the 70 's with
the Supreme Court decision in M/S Bremen. 485 This decision
did not yet involve the U.N. Convention, but already clearly
indicated a willingness to give up domestic legal concepts in
favor of international business:
We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and
international water exclusively on our terms, governed
by our laws, and resolved in our courts. 486
The court stressed the advantages of international
arbitration as "neutral forum with expertise in the subject
matter, " 487 avoiding much uncertainty and great
inconvience
,
488 Shortly after this decision, in 1974 the
Supreme Court again considered arbitration and securities. It
distinguished the facts in Scherk v. Alberto -Culver* 89 to
Wilko because the former was a "truly international
agreement." 490 The court applied a reasoning similar to M/S
Bremen. It acknowledged the necessity of arbitration for
international business as it guarantees orderliness and
predictability in particular with regard to the applicable
law:
485 M/S Bremen v. Zapata, 407 U.S. 1 (1972
486 id. at 9
487 id. at 12
488 id. at 13
489 417 U.S. 506 (1974)
490 id. at 515
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A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to
enforce an international arbitration agreement would not
only frustrate these purposes, but would invite unseemly
and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to
secure tactical litigation advantages. 491
The landmark492 decision providing the direction for the
next years is the 1985 Mitsubishi 492 decision in which the
Supreme Court held antitrust claims were arbitrable.
Antitrust was an area of law traditionally held non-
arbitrable . Relying upon Bremen and Scherk the Court found a
strong presumption in favor of enforcement of freely
negotiated contractual choice-of -forum provisions. 494
It did not regard arbitration as the improper forum, even for
the application of a treble damages provision, at least in an
international setting. 495 In the court's opinion sufficient
control has been guaranteed by a "substantive review at the
award-enforcement stage." 496 The just described trend is
clearly confirmed by the 1989 Supreme Court decision in
491 id. at 516-517
492 Pietrowski, supra note 8, at 61
493 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler- Plymouth,
Inc. 473 U.S. 614 (1985)
494 id. at 631
495 id. at 636
496 id. at 638
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DeQuijas v. Shearson/AmericanExpress* 91 which finally-
overruled Wilko.* 96
Despite the broad pro-arbitration policy, U.S. courts
have traditionally declared certain statutes inarbitrable
because they involved the public interest. 499 Only the most
important statutes for international business are mentioned
in the following. U.S. courts have discussed the following
"categories of law" 500 as non-arbitrable under U.S. law.
b) Foreign policy
The Second Circuit in Parsons501 addressed an Art
.
V(2) (a) defense for the first time. The court found two
contravening policies of U.S. courts: one recognizing the
exclusive competence of the judiciary for certain subject
matters, 502 the other calling for a narrower standard of non-
arbitrability in the international context. 503 Overseas
497 DeQuijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 490 U.S.
477 (1989)
498 id. at 484
499 McClendon, supra note 16, at 68; Pietrowski, supra
note 8, at 59
500 Evans, supra note 4 73, at 332
501 Parson & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale
de 1' Industrie du Paper (RAKTA)
, 508 F.2d 969 (2nd Cir. 1974)
502 id. at 975 (quoting American Safety Equipment Co. v.
J. P. Maguire & Co. 391 F.2d. 821 (2nd Cir. 1968))
503 id. (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506
(1974)
)
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invoked the Art. V(2) (a) defense juxtaposing "United States
foreign policy" and private foreign arbitrators "whose
loyalties are to foreign interests." 504 Although the Second
Circuit agreed with Overseas that a special national interest
may lead to the non-arbitrability of a subject matter505 the
court found that
simply because acts of the United States are somehow
implicated in a case one cannot conclude that the United
States is vitally interested in its outcome. 506
The court refused to apply Art. V(2) (a)
.
c) Nationalization
Similar to Parsons, the LIAMCCf 01 decision on
nationalizations in Libya has also a strong political
background. In a first step the court denied to apply foreign
sovereign immunity in Libya's favor because Libya had waived
its defense by agreeing upon the arbitration clause. 508 In
a second step the court determined that the procedure for the
confirmation of the award was set by U.N. Convention. Subject
matter of the difference between LIAMCO and Libya was the
504 id.
505 id. (referring to American Safety, id. at 826-827)
506 id.
507 Libyan American Oil v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamarhirya, 482 F.Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980)
508 id. at 1178
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nationalization of LIAMCO' s assets 509 which the court found
a classic example of an act of state. 510 Such an sovereign
act is not justiciable under Art. V(2) (a) . 511
The decision's precedential value is doubtful. It was
vacated during the course of appeal when the parties
settled. 512 Apparently in this decision the court confuses
the rights to nationalize and a method of dispute
settlement. 513 The court's argumentation is inconsistent
because on the one hand it recognized a binding effect of the
arbitration clause, and denied on the other hand such an
effect of the award. This allows a state to unilaterally
revoke its contractual obligation to arbitrate. 514
d) Antitrust and punitive damages
Antitrust law was described by the Supreme Court as the
"Magna Charta of Free Enterprise." 515 It reflects a strong
public policy. Until 1985 this was the underlying rationale
509 id.
510 id. at 1179
511 id.
512 McClendon, supra note 16, at 69
513 VAN DEN BERG, supra note 27, at 3 72
514 id,
515 United States v. Topco Assoc, 405 U.S. 596, 610
(1972)
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of the leading decision, American Safety. 516 The court had
introduced a four-pronged rationale for the non-arbitrability
of antitrust claims: national interest; the unlike intention
of Congress to promote contracts of adhesion; the complexity
of antitrust issues; and the lack of expertise of arbitrators
to decide issues of great public interest. 517
Starting from a "strong presumption in favor of
enforcement of freely negotiated contractual choice-of -forum
provisions" 518 in the Mitsubishi decision, the Supreme Court
rejected the American Safety doctrine. As to the risk of
contracts of adhesion the court found that "the mere
appearance of an antitrust dispute does not alone warrant
invalidation of the selected forum." 519 The Court required
instead some showing of fraud or comparable reasons showing
a deprivation of due process rights. 520 The Court did not
adopt the complexity concerns of the Second Circuit because
arbitrators are typically experts in their fields. 521 It
declined to assume an "innate hostility" by the arbitrators
516 American Safety Co. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d
821 (2nd Cir. 1968)
517 id. at 427
518 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler- Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985)
519 id. at 632
520 id.
521 id. at 633
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to business constraints like antitrust. 522 In a last step the
Court turned to "the core of the American Safety doctrine -
the fundamental importance to American democratic capitalism
of the regime of the antitrust laws." 523 High national public
interest and the penal character the Antitrust Laws call into
question the application of the antitrust statutes by private
persons. The inconsistency, however, is established by the
legal construction of antitrust laws themselves.
A private party acts not only on its own behalf, but
similar to "a private attorney-general who protects the
public's interest." 524 Chief tool in the enforcement is the
treble damages provision. Despite its penalizing character
for the violator, the Supreme Court concluded that the treble
damages provision was primarily construed as a private remedy
for the individual providing a strong incentive for the
injured competitor. 525 The character as a private cause is
underlined by the fact that there is no obligation to bring
an antitrust suit. 526 Consequently, the prospective litigant
must be allowed to refer a future dispute to arbitration to
522 id. at 634
523 id.
524 id. at 635 (quoting American Safety Co. v. J.P
Maguire & Co. 391 F.2d 821, 826 (1968))
525 id. at 635-636
526 id. at 636
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avoid unnecessary uncertainty in the international cast. 527
In the opinion of the Court a review on the enforcement stage
sufficiently safeguarded legitimate interest in the
enforcement of antitrust laws and does not unduly obstruct
the efficacy of arbitration. 528 The Court did not regard
arbitration as an improper forum because if the parties had
agreed upon the applicability of U.S. law, the panel is bound
to apply U.S. law and recognize statutory remedies. 529 If it
fails to do so the court announced "little hesitation" 530 to
refuse enforcement of the award as against public policy. 531
By these means the court tried to cut the ground for concerns
about foreign arbitrators "who are charged with the execution
of no public trust and whose loyalties are to foreign
interests." 532 Applying the less stringent international
standard, the Court indicated that for domestic antitrust the
outcome might have been different. 533
527 id.
528 id. at 638
529 id. at 636-637
530 id. at 637 note 19
531 id.
532 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale
de 1' Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 975 (2nd. Cir. 1974)
(where the appellant expressed such an concern; it appears
equally applicable here)
533
"at least", Mitsubishi, id. at 636; GKB Caribe v.
Nokia Mobira, XVI YCA (1991) 635, 640 (applying the same
reasoning for the arbitrability of domestic antitrust claims)
134
The Mitsubishi case is widely regarded as a landmark
decision in favor of arbitration, greatly impacting the
arbitrability of other areas of law. It clearly acknowledged
the competence of an arbitral tribunal to award punitive
damages, but also emphasizes that an arbitration clause
interpreted as an implied waiver of such statutory remedies
such as punitive damages would be contrary to public
policy. 534
e) Securities laws
There are two principal securities laws in the U.S. : the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 . The interpretation of those laws with respect to
arbitrability provide an excellent example to describe the
development of the jurisdiction.
Originally held nonarbitrable in Wilko, the Court
finally overruled its decision in DeQuijas : S3S The Supreme
Court had earlier ruled that predispute agreements to
arbitrate under § 29 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act are
arbitrable. 536 Section 29(a) declares "any condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive
534 Mitsubishi, id. at 637 Fn. 19; Evans, supra note 473,
at 340
535 DeQuijas v. Shearson/AmericanExpress, 4 90 U.S. 4 77,
484 (1989)
536 Shearson/AmericanExpress v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228
(1987)
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compliance with any provision..." void. 537 The "provision"
in the arbitrability context is § 27 (15 U.S.C. § 78aa)
providing exclusive jurisdiction of the District Courts.
Limiting the § 29(a) prohibition on "substantive
obligations," the Court could conclude that § 29(a) is not
applicable on (the procedural rule of) § 27. 538 The two years
after, in a decision on the arbitrability of claims under
§ 12(2) of the Securities Act, the Court stressed that the
two acts "should be construed harmoniously because they
'constitute interrelated components of the federal regulatory
scheme governing transactions in securities.'" 539 The
Securities Act contains in § 14 a provision parallel to § 29
of the Securities Exchange Act. Therefore, the court
concluded that it made little sense to allow arbitration only
under one Act, since the claims and the facts are similar and
arose within a single federal regulatory scheme. 540 Wilko was
overruled and the Court held claims under § 12(2) of the
Securities Act arbitrable. 541
537 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a)
538 Shearson, id. at 228
539 DeQuijas, id. at 484-485 (referring to Ernst & Ernst
von Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976)
540 id. at 485
541 id.
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f) RICO
RICO, the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations
statute, - like antitrust - allows a recovery of treble
damages and litigation expenses. 542 The Supreme Court,
relying upon its reasoning in Mitsubishi , allowed arbitration
of RICO claims. 543 It expressly stated that even the criminal
character does "not preclude arbitration of bona fide civil
actions brought under § 1964 (c) . " 544
g) Patent Law
The same development is true for patent law. Originally
held inarbitrable, now after an amendment of U.S. patent law,
arbitrators can decide the validity of patents and
infringement issues (35 U.S.C. § 294(a) 545 (1982)).
h) Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy is another area of a high public concern.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit (however under Art. V(2) (b)
,
542 18 U.S.C. § 1964
543 Shearson/AmericanExpress Inc. v. McMahon, 4 82 U.S.
220, 242 (1987)
544 id. at 24 0; Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Chemtex Fibers Inc., 617 F.Supp. 55, 57 (D. S.D.N.Y. 1985)
and Genesco, Inc. v. Kakiuchi & Co. 815 F.2d 840, 851 (2nd
Cir. 1987) (for RICO claims in international setting)
545
§ 294(a) reads: "A contract involving a patent or any
right under a patent may contain a provision requiring
arbitration of any dispute relating to patent validity or
infringement arising under the contract...."
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held in favor of arbitration if the arbitration proceedings
had started before the bankruptcy proceedings. 546 The Court
of Appeals of New York, the highest state court, reached a
different result. According to Art. II of the U.N.
Convention, it referred its discussion of arbitrability to
the domestic law and stated that the Superintendent of
Insurance as liquidator has never been granted the authority
to engage in arbitration. 547 Therefore it held that the
bankruptcy proceedings were not capable of settlement by
arbitration in the meaning of Art. II, V(2) (a) . 548 Public
policy justified the exclusive jurisdiction of the state
courts. 549 The court did not consider the case under a less
stringent international standard. The bankrupt company was
owned by New York citizens and the court assumed an intention
of the owners to circumvent mandatory domestic law by
incorporating a foreign company. 550
i) Labor Law
Special attention must given to labor arbitration. The
Federal sector is generally governed by Title VII of the
546 Fotochrome v. Copal 517 F.2d 512, 517 (2nd Cir. 1975)
547 Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co. 77 N.Y.2d 225, 232
(Ct. App. 1990)
548 id. at 233
549 id.
550 id. at 234
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Civil Service Reform Act (1978)
.
551 In the private sector the
Supreme Court's decision in Barrentine v. Arkansas -Best
Freight552 gives an overview of the arbitrability of labor
law disputes. Section 173(d) of the Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) provides
final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties
is declared to be to the desirable method for settlement
of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining
agreement
.
In principle this opens the way for arbitration of most labor
law disputes arising out of the application of the bargaining
agreement. The Supreme Court had recognized only a very few
limited functions of the courts when the parties have
submitted all questions out of the contract to
arbitration
.
553
In Barrentine the Court distinguished between two sorts
of claims distinguishing between statutory and non-statutory
rights. Arbitrable are claims arising out of the collective
bargaining agreement. "Different considerations apply where
the employee's claim is based on rights out of a statute
designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to
551 William 0. Ashkraft & Robert L. Woods, Trying your
first labor arbitration - what you should know, 35 A.F. L.
REV. 215 (1991) ; note that the scope of application of the
Convention is broader than the one of the FAA (Swisher, supra
note 48)
552 Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. 450
U.S. 728 (1981)
>53 id. at 736; United Steelworkers of America v. American
Manufacturing Co. 363 U.S. 564, 567-568
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individual workers." 554 The Court, thereby, excluded
arbitration of Fair Labor Standard Act claims whose purpose
is "to protect all covered workers from substandard wages and
oppressive working hours." 555 The arbitrator "'has no general
authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the
bargain between the parties.' 556 His task is limited to
construing the meaning of the collective-bargaining agreement
so as to effectuate the collective intent of the parties." 557
All in all, labor disputes are generally arbitrable unless
they involve the interpretation of public protective
legislation.
3 . German court decisions
The only decision reported that directly deals with Art.
V(2) (a) is a decision of the Court of Appeals in Hamm. 558 It
states that
for the question of arbitrability of the subject matter
(Art. V(2) (a) U.N. Convention) the law of the State
where the enforcement is sought is decisive. Under
German law a commercial matter is judiciable, because
the parties can settle it by agreement, § 1025 ZPO. 559
554 id. at 737
555 id. at 739
556 id. at 744 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974)
)
557 id
558 Oberlandesgericht Hamm, judgment of Nov. 2, 1983,
English language summary in XIV YCA (1989) , 629
559 id. at 631
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That means that arbitrability is determined by the
ability of a party to resolve a dispute by amicable
settlement. 560
a) Industrial property and patent law
In the area of industrial property German law does not
recognize any limitations of arbitrability. 561 As to patents,
§ 81 German Patent Law excludes certain patent law matters
from arbitration: the proceedings for a declaration of
nullity, for withdrawal of a patent, or for the grant of a
compulsory license, § 81(1) of the law. Disputes on those
matters have to be pursued in state courts.
b) Antitrust
Generally, an arbitration panel also is competent to
decide the validity of contracts under antitrust aspects. 562
The arbitrability of antitrust matters is governed by § 91
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschraekungen. 563 In general, it
provides for the voidness regarding future legal disputes of
certain restrictive trade practices unless they do not
560 Sandrock & Hentzen, supra note 45, at 63
561 Sandrock, supra note 12, at 41
562 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of Oct. 25, 1966, 46 BGHZ
365, 368
563 [GWB] [German Act against the Restraints of
Competition] (Martin Heidenhain & Hannes Schneider trans.,
4th ed. 1991)
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exclude the right of a contracting party to bring the dispute
before an ordinary court instead of the arbitration tribunal.
The "certain restrictive trade practices" are §§ 1 through
5(c), 7, 8, 20 and 21, 564 29, 99(1) (no. 2), 100, 102, 102a
and 103, and claims within the meaning of § 35 of the Act
against Restraints of Competition. They are encompassed under
the heading
- "Cartel Agreements and Cartel Resolutions" (§§ 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 5(a), 5(b), 5(c), 7 and § 8), under
- "Competition Rules" (§ 29) , under
- "Scope of application" (§ 99(1) (no. 2), § 100, § 102, §
102 (a) , § 103) , and
- eventually, § 35 dealing with the rights of third parties
who suffered a damage by violation of the Act. European
Antitrust Laws, Art. 85 et seq. EC Treaty, are also
nonarbitrable
.
56B
c) Securities
The Federal Supreme Court held an arbitration clause
dealing with commodity futures (Warentermingeschaef t)
564 Bundesgerichtshof , id. at 367-368
565 MUEKO-GOTTWALD, supra note 84, at Art. V no. 58;
REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 144, at 141 (explaining that
only the European Commission is competent to grant exemptions
from European Antitrust Law; an arbitrator, however, has the
power to rule that an agreement fits within a block
exemption. If the arbitrator finds an infringement of
European Law, he can adjourn the arbitration and allow the
parties to apply for an exemption from the European
Commission.
)
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generally valid. 566 The court considered the action for
annulment of an award (Aufhebungsklage) , § 1041(2) ZPO, as a
sufficient safeguard of German public policy. 567 In an
earlier judgment the court had, however, excluded disputes on
commodity futures if they lead to an exclusion of certain
German protective legislation (§§ 61, 53 Boersengesetz 568
,
764, 762 (1) BGB) . 569
d) Labor Law
Arbitration and arbitrability of labor law disputes is
governed by §§ 101 to 110 ArbGG. 570 The application of the
general rules for arbitration (and arbitrability) as provided
by the ZPO are expressly excluded, § 101(3) ArbGG. If the
parties agree upon arbitration of a labor dispute according
to the ZPO this clause is void. Private law matters of labor
law are arbitrable between the trade unions and employers,
and employers and a very narrow group of employees (certain
groups of artists and seamen), § 101(1), (2). "The bulk of
566 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of June 6, 1991, 44 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW [ 2215, 2216 (1991)
567 id.
568 [German Stock Exchange Act]
569 Bundesgerichtshof, judgment of June 15, 1987, 40 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 3193, 3194 (1987);
ADOLF BAUMBACH ET AL . , supra note 73, § 1025 no. 36 (for
further non-arbitrable subject matters)
570 Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz [Code of Procedure for Labor Law
Courts]
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private labor disputes thus are foreclosed from private
arbitration. " 571
All in all, German law can be said to be generally open-
minded to arbitrability of business disputes. 572
4 . Comparison
Both legal systems provide for a broad arbitrability of
subject matter. In the U.S., the non-arbitrability defense
seems to be extremely narrowly defined. 573 In securities law,
the German Supreme Court upheld the non-arbitrability defense
if arbitration included the waiver of certain protective
provisions. In patent law, German law also recognizes certain
exemptions; the same is true for antitrust. A striking
difference is labor law. In Germany the bulk of disputes has
to be brought before the Labor Courts whereas in the U.S.
labor law disputes are principally arbitrable. Accordingly,
it is unlikely that a party will seek enforcement of a German
labor arbitration award in the U.S. Since § 1 FAA that
excludes the application of the FAA on labor arbitration is
superseded by the more general definition of commercial
matters in § 202 FAA, enforcement of a labor arbitration
award seems possible. In contrast to the United States, in
Germany the majority of labor disputes is nonarbitrable;
571 Sandrock, supra note 12, at 41
572 id.
573 see Sever, supra note 465 (pleading for caution)
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confirmation of an award on an arbitrable labor law subject
matter, however, is likely. Bankruptcy claims do not seem to
influence arbitration if they have started after the
arbitration proceedings. Regarding to the facts in Corcoran
v. Ardra this decision's precedential value is relatively
small
.
B. The public policy defense
1. Introduction
Art. V(2) (b) provides:
The recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of that country.
2. U.S. court decisions
Parsons & Whittemore is still the leading authority and
most quoted decision concerning the public policy defense.
The core of the decision are the following two conclusions:
first, that "the public policy defense should be construed
narrowly,
"
574 and consequently on this basis enforcement can
only be denied where it
would violate the forum state's most basic notions of
morality and justice. 575
574 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale
de 1' Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2nd Cir.
1974)
575 id.
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Although this standard hardly gives a clear
definition576 it has been consistently applied by the
courts. 577 The Parsons court reached this conclusion by
referring to the history of the Convention as a whole. In
contrary to the Geneva Convention it determined for the New
York Convention a general pro-enforcement bias which requires
a narrow reading of the public policy defense as an exception
to the rule. 578 This is systematically and logically
consistent because
an expansive construction of this defense would vitiate
the Convention's basic effort to remove preexisting
obstacles to enforcement. 579
The following discussion will deal with the particular
possible elements of the public policy defense discussed in
U.S. courts in a systematical, not necessarily in a
chronological order:
576 Martinez, supra note 2, at 510
577 Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2nd
Cir. 1975; Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens S.A. v.
Southwire, 484 F . Supp
. 1063, 1068 (D.N.D.Ga 1980); Waterside
Ocean Navigation Co. v. Int'l Navigation Ltd., 737 F.2d 150,
152 (2nd Cir. 1984)
578 id. at 973
579 id.
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a) National policy as an element of public policy
The Parsons decision dealt with national policy580 as
a possible element of U.S. public policy. The court refused
to equate national policy with public policy. It did not
acknowledge international politics as a stable standard to be
part of a public policy581 and held that a different
parochial - decision would seriously undermine the U.N.
Convention's utility. The court, thereby, implicitly relies
upon the underlying rationale of the Scherk decision. 582
Two more decisions are reported in which the defendants
raised (inter) national policy considerations to invoke Art.
V(2) (b) : In National Oil v. Libyan Sun Oil, 5 * 3 a case decided
against a similar political background, 584 the defendant
argued that enforcement would penalize it "'for obeying and
supporting the directives and foreign policy objectives of
its government and would be inconsistent with U.S.
antiterrorism policy. '
"
585 The court relied heavily on the
580 DUring the political tensions before and during the
Arab- Israeli Six Day War the majority of the Overseas crew
had left Egypt, id. at 972
581 id. at 974 ("...not meant to enshrine the vagaries of
international politics . . . "
)
582 id.
583 National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil, 733 F.Supp. 800
(D.Del. 1990)
584 Embargo against Libya banning oil imports and
restricting export
585 id. at 819
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reasoning in Parsons and found no substantial differences in
the factual background. "The policy objectives at issue in
Parsons differ, at most, in degree and not in kind." 586
Although the court recognized that Sun Oil was justified in
suspending performance, it refused to replace the award
because Sun Oil could present all of its arguments to the
arbitral panel. 587 Since Libya had special governmental
permission to proceed before U.S. courts, the District Court
did not find a violation of public policy. 588
Conversely in ANTCO Shipping v. Sidermar, b69 ANTCO
invoked anti-restrictive trade policy of the U.S., as
expressed by the Export Administration Act of 1969, 590 to
justify a public policy exception. The contract between ANTCO
and Sidermar excluded Israel form Mediterranean loading
ports. 591 In the light of this Act Antco claimed that a
586 id. at 820 (even the (reciprocity) argument that a
U.S. company probably would not be able to enforce an award
in Libya did not persuade the court)
587 id.
588 id.
sea antco Shipping Co. v. Sidermar 417 F.Supp. 207
(D.S.D.N.Y. 1976); see also Schlosser, Verfahrensintegritaet,
supra note 205, at 456 (stating that American courts tend to
interpret public policy not as a defense against enforcement
but an obligation to enforce a foreign arbitral award)
590 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2413; § 2402(5) in particular
provides that "it is the policy of the United States (A) to
oppose restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or
imposed by foreign countries friendly to the United
States, ..."
591 id. at 211
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clause "excluding Israel" was illegal and unenforceable as
contravening U.S. public policy. 592 The court held applying
a de minimis argument that the contract did not sufficiently
involve U.S. exports as to invoke an export statute. 593 It
rejected to extent the statute's meaning by declaring it a
general (trade) public policy against Congress' limitation on
exports
.
594
The closely related question of national security was
discussed in McDonell Douglas- v. Kingdom of Denmark: 595
national security. The District Court referred the parties to
arbitration arguing that the public policy defense was
premature because security concerns may be taken into
consideration by limiting evidence. 596
b) Fraud, duress, and inconsistent testimony
The following decisions may be summarized under the
heading "fraud." The first reported case dealing with fraud
and its implications on Art. V(2) (a) defense is Biotronik. 591
Biotronik had allegedly withheld evidence and engaged in a
592 id.
593 id. at 213
594 id,
595 McDonnell Douglas v. Kingdom of Denmark, 607 F.Supp.
1016 (D.E.D. Miss. 1985)
596 id. at 1020
597 Biotronik Mess- und Therapiegeraete v. Medford Medical
Instrument Co., 415 F.Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976)
149
calculated attempt to mislead arbitrators. 598 Accordingly,
the respondent, Medford, claimed constituted fraud and as
such a violation of § 10(a) FAA or Art. V(2) (b)
.
The court rejected the question insofar the alleged
fraud may justify the § 10(a) defense for two reasons:
Medford had the opportunity to discover the alleged fraud and
to invoke it during the arbitration/ 599 as a consequence of
an "adversary system of justice" 600 Medford could not expect
the opposing party to present favorable evidence to Medford' s
position when it "failed to offer such evidence itself." 601
Turning to the international aspect, the court underlined the
narrow standard of the public policy defense; 602 as the court
did not accept Medford' s fraud allegation under domestic law,
it could not in an a fortiori argumentation also reject the
narrower public policy defense. 603
Fraud was also discussed in Waterside v. International
Navigation, 604 this time under the aspect of "inconsistent
598 id. at 137
599 id. at 138
600 id. at 137
601 id. at 138
602 id. at 139
603 id. at 140
604 Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. International
Navigation Ltd. 737 F.2d 150 (2nd Cir. 1984)
150
testimony" 605 : A witness had changed his testimony during the
hearing upon which the arbitrators apparently based their
award. 606 Focussing on the purpose of the Convention, i. e.
to remove obstacles to confirmation, the court found that
recognition of an alleged inconsistent testimony as a public
policy infringement bears the risk that the mere claim of
such an inconsistency would force the courts to an extensive
review. "This would render an allegedly simple and speedy
remedy of arbitration a mockery. " 607 An allegedly
inconsistent testimony, therefore, does rise to the level of
a public policy infringement.
In National Oil 606 the court affirmed that
"intentionally giving false testimony in an arbitration
proceeding would constitute fraud. 609 A mere misunderstanding
and "ample opportunity to cross-examine" the witness in order
to inform the tribunal did not meet the requirements of fraud
definition. 610 Even if a statement is in fact inaccurate,
intention to mislead has to be shown. 611 The courts
605 note that it was not claimed that Waterside knowingly
presented perjured testimony, id. at 152
606 id. at 152
607 id. at 153
608 National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F . Supp
.
800 (D. Del. 1990)
609 id. at 814
610 id. at 814-815
611 id. at 815
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reaffirmed the principle that the opportunity to present an
objection to the arbitral tribunal excluded consideration by
a state court. 612
A similar situation arises in cases of duress. In
principle the District Court in Transmarine recognized duress
as a public policy violation. 613 Since the defendant could
not prove duress, this statement remains mere dictum.
c) Manifest disregard of the law
Originating in Wilko v. Swan, 614 the doctrine of
"manifest disregard of the law" has been invoked without
success several times before U.S. courts to prevent
enforcement of arbitral awards. Without any decision as the
general validity of the theory itself, the court in Parsons
& Whi ttemore615 turned directly to the intended purpose of
the doctrine, namely a review of the arbitral proceedings for
errors, but rejected the defendant's intention. 616 The court
was apparently concerned that an extensive judicial review
would contradict the goal of arbitration: a speedy and less
612 id,
613 Transmarine Seaways Corp. of Monrovia v. Marc Rich &
Co. A.G., 480 F.Supp. 352, 358 (1979)
614 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953); see generally Marta B.
Varela, Arbitration and the Doctrine of Manifest Disregard,
49 J. DISP. RESOL. 64 (1994)
615 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale
de 1' Industrie du Paper (RAKTA) , 508 F.2d 969 (2nd Cir. 1974)
616 id. at 977
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expensive means of dispute of resolution. 617 Despite this
rejection manifest disregard of the law has been invoked at
least twice more.
To serve as a refusal ground, however, the Convention
requires that manifest disregard can be raised to the level
of public policy. 618 After reviewing precedents the court
found that the courts not receptive toward the manifest
disregard doctrine. 619 The court in Brandeis v. Calabrian
refused to apply it and supported its reasoning by looking at
the precedents that unanimously applied a narrower definition
of public policy. 620 The court also added that in the
international context the doctrine would oblige an American
court to review an award based on the applicable foreign law,
i. e. the judge has to apply a law he is not familiar
with. 621
In American Construction622 an arbitral award was set
aside by a national Pakistani court. This judgment was
617 id.
618 Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chemicals Corp., 656
F.Supp. 160, 163 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1987); International Standard
Electric Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera,
Industrial y Comercial, 745 F.Supp. 172, 181 (D.S.D.N.Y.
1990) (applying the same reasoning)
619 Brandeis, id. at 165
620 id. at 167
621 id,
622 American Construction Machinery & Equipment Corp. v
Mechanised Construction of Pakistan Ltd., 659 F.Supp. 426 (D
S.D.N.Y. 1987)
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characterized by "omissions and positive misstatements." 623
Since the respondent had agreed upon arbitration,
participated in the proceedings, the court regarded
initiation of the Pakistani proceeding as circumvention
tactics and concluded that not enforcement, but non-
enforcement would be contrary to public policy. 624 Although
the rationale of the court is apparent, i. e. not to
recognize an unfair judgment, its reasoning is doubtful. Mere
participation in the proceedings is no reason to deprive a
respondent of his defenses according to Art. V.
d) Impartiality
The problem of impartiality was issue in at least three
decisions: Transmarine Seaways v. Marc Rich, Fertilizer v.
IDI and Brandeis v. Calabrian Chemicals . "An appearance of
bias" of one arbitrator was ground for the defendant in
Transmarine625 to invoke the public policy defense of Art.
V(2) (b) . Reviewing the precedents the court found that the
justices had primarily focussed on an "incoming-producing"
relationship between an arbitrator and a party." 626 In the
present case the arbitrator's company represented another
623 id. at 429
624 id. ; see Schlosser, supra note 205 (commenting the
U.S. courts' interpretation of "public policy")
625 xransmar ine seaways Corp. of Monrovia v. Marc Rich &
Co. AG, 480 F.Supp. 352 (D. S.D.N.Y. 1979)
626 id. at 357
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company that had pursued claims against the defendant, 627 a
relationship "far too tenuous" to require disqualification,
if the Supreme Court had not set a very low standard: "even
the appearance of bias" must be avoided. 628 Consequently,
such a broad bias theory is that it might lead to the
exclusion of a majority of members of small, interrelated
business societies. Therefore, the Supreme Court added a
corrective requirement that a person has to be thought
reasonably biased. 629 On this ground the court decided that
an unrelated litigation in the total absence of a financial
relationship between arbitrator and party is too remote to
justify replacement of an arbitrator. 630
In contrast to Transmarine, in Fertilizer631 a financial
relationship existed between an arbitrator, Mr. Sen, and a
party. Although the court expressed its strong believe "that
full disclosure of any possible interest or bias is the
better rule," 632 the court, nevertheless, upheld the award.
With regard to the unanimous vote there was no showing of
627 id. at 358
628 id. at 3 58; Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental
Casualty Co. 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968)
629 id.
630 Transmarine, id. at 358
631 Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517
F.Supp. 948 (1981)
632 id. at 954
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actual bias that could have influenced the outcome. 633 It
distinguished the facts from Commonwealth Coatings as to that
Mr. Sen was not the third, the "supposedly neutral
member." 634 Referring to the narrow definition introduced by
the Parsons decision, the court refused the public policy
defense. 635
The problem of a small business society and alleged
partiality were also discussed in the Brandeis Intsel v.
Calabrian626 decision on an arbitration award of the London
Metal Exchange (LME) . Brandeis was an LME member, Calabrian
had no connection with LME. The court did not accept
Calabrian' s argument that an "old boy network" 637 has the
appearance of bias; it emphasized instead the advantages of
such organizations being able to produce highly skilled and
experienced arbitrators out of its members. 638 The mere fact
that "the wakes of the members often cross" 639 was not
regarded sufficient for a vacation.
633 id. at 955
634 id. (referring to Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v.
Continental Casualty Co. 393 U.S. 145, 146 (1968)
635 id,
636 Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chemicals Corp., 656
F.Supp. 160 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1987)
637 id. at 168
638 id. at 169
639 id.
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e) Bankruptcy
The bankruptcy of one party to arbitration is an issue
still relatively unclear under U.S. jurisdiction. In
Fotochrome v. Copal 640 the Second Circuit avoided a statement
as to whether the Bankruptcy Act involves public policy. 641
Finding no statutory answer to the relation between
bankruptcy and arbitration proceedings, the court turned to
§ 63a(5) 642
that requires the Bankruptcy Court to accept as a final
adjudication of a claim 'provable debts reduced to
judgments after the filing of the petition and before
the consideration of the bankrupt's application for a
discharge. . . ' 643
The court did not consider an award as a judgment. 644
However, because an award is a binding adjudication on the
merits, 645 the court equated both as to the impact on an
bankruptcy proceeding: an
arbitral award rendered after the filing of a Chapter XI
petition in a United States Bankruptcy Court in an
arbitration proceeding commenced prior to such filing is
a valid determination on the merits and is unreviewable
by the Bankruptcy Court. 646
640 Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir
1975)
641 id. at 516
642 11 U.S.C. § 103 (a) (5)
643 Fotochrome, id. at 517
644 It did not want to deprive a party of the due process
right to contest an award, id. at 517
645 id.
646 id.
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Consequently, the court enforced the award.
While the Fotochrome court preferred a more systematic
national approach, the New York Supreme Court in Corcoran v.
AIG647 stressed the importance of international comity
prevailing domestic public policy as involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding. 648
Strong policy concerns of international comity were
explicitly recognized by the Court of Appeals, the highest
New York state court, in Corcoran v. Ardra Insurances , 649
Nevertheless, it refused to enforce an agreement to arbitrate
because "the underlying concerns of the Convention are not
implicated here." 650 Apparently the court had the impression
that New York residents incorporated a foreign company with
the only purpose to circumvent mandatory New York insurance
law which foreseeably did not allow arbitration. Under these
circumstances the court declined to recognize the bankrupt
company as a foreign company unfamiliar with the judicial
proceedings
.
651
647 Corcoran v. AIG Multi-Line Syndicate, Inc. 143 Misc. 2d
62 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1989)
648 id. at 71
649 Corcoran v. Ardra Ins., 566 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579
(Ct. App. 1990)
650 id. at 579/ see § 202 FAA (lack of reasonable
relationship with a foreign state)
651 Corcoran, id.
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f) Interest rates
Another element discussed before U.S. courts under the
aspect of public policy were interest rates. The Laminoirs652
decision is the only example for a successful public policy
defense in the U.S. In this case the parties had agreed upon
"the laws of Georgia insofar as these laws are in accordance
with French laws." 653 The defendant contested the French
interest rates to which the award referred. The interest rate
was 9.5 or 10.5% compared to the Georgia legal rate of 7%.
The defendant challenged the awarded French interest rates as
"usurious and against public policy" compared to the Georgia
legal rate of 7%. 654 Requirement for such a challenge is that
the interest rate can be characterized as "odious, illegal,
and immoral." 655 Since the GA code (§§ 57-101), does not set
a limit to interest rates and merely requires a written
agreement for higher interest rates, 656 the court declined
to follow the defendant's argumentation. However, it
distinguished the additional 5% interest due after two months
from the date of the award. 657 With this distinction the
652 Laminoirs -Tref ileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v.
Southwire Co., 484 F.Supp. 1063 (D.N.D. Ga 1980)
653 id. at 1065
654 id. at 1068
655 id.
656 id.
657 id. at 1069
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court referred to two enforcement principles that a foreign
law will not be enforced
- "if it is penal only" and
- if an agreement to pay fixed sums as damages plainly is
without reasonable relation to any probable damage which may
follow. 658 The court found a penal character to the statute
because it punished for "omitting to do something that is
required to be done" and "bears no reasonable relation to any
damage resulting from delay in recovery of the sums
awarded." 659 In fact until now Laminoirs is the only case in
which a U.S. court (partially!) refused to enforce an foreign
arbitral award on grounds of public policy.
After the Laminoirs decision several other courts
addressed the problem of interest rates. They unanimously
enforced the awards, however, explicitly discussing a penal
character. In International Standard, 660 another case dealing
with post -award interest, the District Court reached the same
conclusion. First, it found that a 12% interest rate was not
penal. 661 As to the rate of interest itself the court found
658 id.
659 id.
660 International Standard Electric Corp. v. Bridas
Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial y Comercial, 745
F.Supp. 172 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1990)
661 id. at 182 (referring to Am. Construction Machinery
Sc Equipment Corp. v. Mechanised Construction of Pakistan
Ltd., 659 F.Supp. 426, 428 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1987) (interest rate:
17%), Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chemicals Corp. 656
F.Supp. 160, 170 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1987) (interest rate: 11.25%))
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that 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), a provision providing for interest
only from the date of entry to the judgment, is not
applicable to awards but only to "any money judgment." 662
Enforcing an arbitral award is of a different nature, "rather
in the nature of a post- judgment enforcement proceeding." 663
The earlier Brandeis Intsel v. Calabrian66 * decision
sheds some light on pre-award interest. The court regarded as
decisive the question whether the interest rate of 11.25%
could be regarded as penal under the applicable (English)
law. 665 Thus, a reference to domestic law666 was precluded.
In absence of a showing of a penal nature under foreign law
enforcement was granted. 667
3 . German court decisions
a) Introduction
As in the U.S., the public policy defense has been
invoked many times before German courts, with some success.
A German court is not bound by the factual or legal findings
662 id.
663 id. (referring to Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI
Management Inc., 517 F.Supp. 948, 963 (D.S.D. Ohio 1981)
664 Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chemicals Corp., 656
F.Supp. 160 (D. S.D.N.Y. 1987)
665 id. at 170
666 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) providing for interest from the
date of entry of the judgment.
667 Brandeis, id.
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of the arbitration panel on public policy; it has to consider
the public policy issue independently. 668 An extensive review
on the notion of public policy gave the Federal Supreme Court
in its decision of May 15, 1986. 669 The court affirmed the
distinction between ordre public interne and ordre public
international, the latter leaving only narrow limits for the
German public policy. It reasoned that
from a viewpoint of German procedural public policy, the
recognition of a foreign arbitral award can therefore
only be denied if the arbitral procedure suffers from a
grave defect that touches the foundation of the State
and economic functions. 670
More specifically the Court of Appeals in Hamburg added that
public policy is infringed upon when recognition leads
to a result which is manifestly irreconcilable with a
fundamental principle of German law, and particularly
with a basic right (Grundrechte) . ... Furthermore such
infringements must be 'manifest', i. e. any expert on
the subject, who knows the facts, must agree as to their
existence . 671
The court included fundamental principles of political and
economical life as well as German concepts of justice in its
definition of public policy. 672
668 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of May 5, 1972, 25 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2180, 2181 (1972)
669 Bundesgerichtshof, judgment of May 15, 1986, English
language summary in XII YCA (1987) 489
670 id. at 490
671 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, judgment of Jan 26, 1989,
English language summary in XVII YCA (1992) 491, 494
672 id,
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b) Section 1025 (2) ZPO
The narrow definition is evidenced by the Supreme Court
in 1969. Section 1025(2) ZPO provides for the voidness of an
arbitration agreement in case of pressure of the dominant
economic, or social position of the other party. The Supreme
Court generally considered this section as part of German
public policy. 673 Without any statement as to the substance,
the court refused to apply § 1025 ZPO for procedural reasons.
There was no similar provision under the applicable
Czechoslovak law what the German respondent could have taken
into account when they agreed upon the arbitration. In
addition to that the respondent already could have raised
this objection during the arbitral proceedings. 674 This
argument appears doubtful because the mandatory protective
provision typically should be applied when a (supposedly
weaker) party did not realize the consequences of contract
and a choice-of-law clause. It might be that - contrary to
the court's explicit statement - the second argument
prevailed.
In a more recent decision the Hamburg Court of
Appeals 675 took a closer look at § 1025 ZPO in a case between
a German and a Japanese party on an arbitration in Japan.
673 id. at 236
674 id.
5 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, judgment of Feb. 17, 1989,
XV YCA (1990) 455
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Like the German Federal Supreme Court it referred to the
applicable Japanese law and found out that the Japanese Civil
Code of Procedure does not contain a provision comparable to
§ 1025(2) ZPO. Then the court scrutinized a possible dominant
position under the aspect of the seat of tribunal and the
country where the arbitration takes place. For the German
party the tribunal in Tokyo brought the disadvantages of
great distance, language problems and foreign culture. On the
other hand, the Japanese party had the advantage of being on
his homeground
.
676 The situation would be the same if the
situation were reversed. Since the seat has to be somewhere,
the court found that the forum did not prove a party'
s
superiority. 677 As to the seat in a country of which one
party is a citizen, the court enumerated the risks involved:
the chairman is typically a citizen of the country where the
arbitration takes place; together with the arbitrator of the
Japanese party, this results in a national preponderance in
the panel and the judicial control is exercised by one
party's national courts. 678 Although the Court of Appeals did
not believe foreign judges to be partial, it realized a bias
as to legal culture, interests and way of thinking. 679
Arbitration regularly seeks to avoid these problems by
676 id. at 459
677 id.
678 id.
679 id. at 460
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choosing a neutral third country. 680 This is the prevailing
practice, however no general belief such a necessity has been
formed yet. 681 Since the German party had put nothing forward
to question its legal protection the court enforced the
arbitration clause. 682
c) Due process violations
Several German court decisions dealt with alleged
violations of certain procedural aspects. Due process
aspects, typically dealt with in Art. V(l) (b) lead the
Hamburg Court of Appeals to deny enforcement, however, under
the bilateral 1954 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation [FCN] . The court held this case violated the
principle of a fair hearing. 683 The broad public policy
provision encompasses the due process rights protected by
Art. V(l) (b)
.
The Court of First Instance in Munich cited "serious
procedural violations" contrary to public policy. 684 The
arbitration panel had not engaged in a proper examination of
its own competence. Signed sales confirmations presented to
680 id. at 459
681 id. at 460
682 id. at 461
683 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, judgment of April 3, 1975,
English language summary in II YCA (1977) 241
684 Landgericht Muenchen, judgment of June 20, 1978,
English language summary in V YCA (1980) 260
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the panel were not enough evidence that in fact an
arbitration agreement was concluded. 685 Competence might have
lacked because time limits set by the applicable arbitration
rules had expired. 686 Additionally, the arbitral tribunal
only dealt with 200 transactions in question as a whole
"without distinguishing between the legal aspects of each of
the 200 cases. " 687
In a case involving a bankruptcy proceeding, the Court
of Appeals in Hamm held that "not every violation of the
right to fair hearing represents a conflict with German
public policy." 688 That a short period of time during the
bankruptcy proceedings due representation was doubtful, did
not raise to a substantial limitation of possibilities. 689
The court concluded that the respondent did not raise these
objections during the arbitration and was duly
represented. 690 Public policy was not violated.
The Federal Supreme Court had already held that an
enforcement would be contrary to public policy if a valid
685 id. at 261
686 id. at 262
687 id,
688 Oberlandesgericht Hamm, judgment of Nov. 2, 1983,
English language summary in XIV YCA (1989) 629, 632
(referring to Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of Oct. 21, 1971,
25 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 449, 450 (1972))
689 id. at 632
690 id. at 632-633
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agreement to arbitrate is missing. The defendant is, however,
no longer allowed to raise this defense if the invalidity of
the award grounds on a claim of invalidity in the country of
origin and the time limits for this claim have expired. 691
d) Impartiality
Impartiality or alleged bias of the arbitrators gave
reason for various court decisions on Art. V(2) (b) . With
regard to a decision of the Court of Appeals in Cologne 692
this is not surprising. The court stated - that the
impartiality of a judge and of an arbitrator performing the
same functions as a judge (§§ 1025(1), 1032 ZPO) , is regarded
as a fundamental principle of the German and international
legal system. 693
The outstanding importance of independence and
impartiality requires sufficient safeguards by procedural
means, particularly in the area of arbitration where business
contacts and economic interests bear a higher risk of a
biased arbitrator. 694 If the challenge of an arbitrator, the
most efficient procedural safeguard is excluded, this
691 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of March 6, 196 9, II YCA
(1977) 235
692 Oberlandesgericht Koeln, judgment of June 10, 1976,
IV YCA (1979) 258
693 id. at 260
694 id.
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represents a violation of German public order. 695 In the case
before the court only the name of the president was disclosed
preventing thereby an efficient control of a panel.
In a case similar to Brandeis, on an arbitration between
a member and a non-member of a trade association, the Federal
Supreme Court came to a different conclusion than the U.S.
court. The court did not follow the Court of Appeals'
reasoning that had balanced the expertise of the panel
members against the appearance of bias. 696 The court was not
convinced that any appearance of bias could be excluded. 697
The high requirements for establishing partiality are
again evidenced by a decision of the Court of First Instance
in Hamburg. The court did not regard a panel composed
dominantly or exclusively of Members of a trade association
as sufficiently impartial to decide a dispute between a
member and a non-member. 698 Additionally, the court held that
German public policy was violated because the arbitration by
the association did not give equal rights to the parties in
appointing the arbitrators. 699
695 id.
696 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of Dec. 19, 1968, 51 BGHZ
255, 259-260
697 id.
698 Landgericht Hamburg, judgments of Dec. 10 and 30,
1985, English language summary in XII YCA (1987) 487, 488;
Bundesgerichtshof, judgment of Dec. 19, 1968, 51 BGHZ 255,
259
699 id. at 488-489
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Two years later the Supreme Court rendered a judgment on
a clause similar to § 7(b) of the English Arbitration Act. It
provided for two arbitrators. If the arbitrators could not
agree, they had to select a third person as umpire. If one
party failed to appoint its arbitrator, the other party's
arbitrator was allowed to serve as sole arbitrator. 700 Again,
the Supreme Court reasoned that such a procedure may give the
impression that one party might be placed at a
disadvantage
.
701
This very strict standard on equal right to appoint an
arbitrator to the panel has been relaxed by a more recent
decision of the Federal Supreme Court on the validity of an
award made pursuant § 7 (b) of the English Arbitration Act
(1950). 702 Under express reference to the different
international public policy standard, the court narrowly this
standard:
only those violations of the duty of neutrality that are
absolutely incompatible with the principle of judicial
office, will lead to the refusal of recognition of the
foreign award. 703
700 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of Nov. 5, 1970, 54 BGHZ
392, 393
701 id. at 397
702 Bundesgerichtshof, judgment of May 15, 1986, English
language summary in XII YCA (1987) 489; § 7(b) provides that
in case of a reference to two arbitrators and the respondent
does not appoint an arbitrator, the claimant may appoint his
arbitrator as sole arbitrator.
703 id. at 490
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The court required "a real impact on the
proceedings," 704 i. e. a causal connection between bias and
award. The § 7(b) procedure " gives both parties at the
outset have equal rights of nomination, so that there does
not exist an initial domination...." 705 A violation of the
arbitrator's duty of neutrality was not shown and, therefore,
the court enforced the award. 706
With regard to "a less stringent international regime"
the Supreme Court found that the participation of a legal
consultant did not infringe the principle of impartiality. 707
Again applying a strict standard the Supreme Court refused to
stay enforcement because of the participation of a legal
consultant "who allegedly took the floor." 708 His
participation did not rise to the level of a serious
shortcoming
.
709
e) Incorrect testimony
The very same decision dealt with the misjudgment of the
tribunal after an incorrect testimony. The court refused to
704 id.
705 id. at 491
706 id,
707 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of Jan. 18, 1990, XVII YCA
(1992) 503, 505-506
708 id. at 505
709 id.
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regard that situation as a "serious shortcoming" sufficient
enough for the narrow requirements of a proceeding of
revocation under § 580 ZPO. 710 Since the facts underlying the
ground for revocation could have been invoked before the
arbitrators § 580 was not applicable in the present case. 711
f) Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy was discussed under the aspect of due process
representation during the arbitral proceedings. 712 At that
time the Italian respondent company was under the regime of
a special administration (commissario giudiziale) because of
financial difficulties, 713 as a special form of the
bankruptcy procedure. The respondent therefore claimed that
it was not duly represented during the arbitral proceedings.
The court, however, pointed out that under domestic law a
bankruptcy proceeding has no influence on arbitral
proceedings. Arbitration is not bound by the procedural rules
of the ZPO. Section 240 ZPO suspending court proceedings in
710 § 580 ZPO sets out the grounds for the revocation of
a judgment, which may be summarized as (a) perjury, (b)
criminal actions on the part of the opposite party or
representative of one of the parties, (c) judicial
misconduct, or (d) the annulment of an underlying decision or
deed, (summarized in XVII YCA (1992) 506)
711 Bundesgerichtshof , id. at 507-508
712 Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeals] Hamm, judgment
of Nov. 2, 1983, English language summary in XIV YCA (1989)
629
713 id. at 629
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case of the institution of a bankruptcy did, therefore, not
apply. 714 Additionally, § 237 KO715 states explicitly that
bankruptcy proceedings in a foreign country do not hinder
domestic execution proceedings. 716
g) Punitive damages
In most U.S. states an arbitrator may render a punitive
damage award. The U.S. Supreme Court explicitly recognized
such an arbitrator's competence in its Mitsubishi decision.
Arbitrators are competent to decide antitrust issues by
applying antitrust statutes. They are also competent to
render punitive damage awards because the treble damages
provision is an important part of U.S. antitrust law. 717 This
leads to the question of whether an arbitral award, including
punitive damages, would be enforceable in Germany.
In 1992 the German Federal Supreme Court rendered its
first decision on the enforceability of a punitive damages
judgment. 718 Since the public policy concerns are the same
for the enforcement of a punitive damage award and a
714 id. at 632
715 Konkursordnung [German Bankruptcy Code]
716 id. at 632
717 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler- Plymouth,
Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 636-637 (1985)
718 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of June 4, 1992, 118 BGHZ
312; Wolfgang Kuehn, Rico Claims in International Arbitration
and their Recognition in Germany, 11 J. INT'L ARB . 37 (19 94)
(discussing recognition of Rico awards in Germany)
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judgment, it is very likely that the Federal Supreme Court
would apply the same reasoning on the enforcement of an
award. In short, the Federal Supreme Court held that the
present punitive damage judgment was not enforceable:
A foreign punitive damage judgment rendering a
considerable amount of money, exceeding the compensation
rendered for material and immaterial damages, always
cannot be declared (entirely) as enforceable in
Germany. 719
The decision is characterized by a strict logic. First
the court defined the term punitive damage and found the
ideas behind this legal remedy; second the court attempted to
integrate punitive damages into German tort law systematic
and found narrow exceptions under which a judgment may be
enforceable. In a third step, however, it concluded that
enforceability additionally required that the punitive damage
award pass a proportionality control. The court adopted the
definition that a punitive damage is an amount of money added
to purely compensatory damages; 720 it recognized mainly three
ideas behind the legal remedy of a punitive damage: a penal
and a (private and public) social character.
An offender shall be punished for his misconduct.
Punitive damages are the means whereby the deterrent effect
of a punishment can be safeguarded in cases where the mere
719 id. at 334
720 id. at 335
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compensatory damage does not sufficiently guarantee this
effect. 721
Apart from this penal character, the court distinguished
a social element : a victim is rewarded for his private law
enforcement in the public's interest and the punitive damage
guarantees a fair compensation that might not be obtained by
compensatory damages. 722
The court found that punitive damages are a specific
form of damages, and as such are a matter of private law and
enforceable. 723 The German ordre public, however, prevents
enforcement 724 because the German tort law (§§ 249 BGB) only
provides for compensation but not for an enrichment, 725 or
a penal or deterrent function. 726 Herefrom the court
distinguished punitive damages serving a different function,
to compensate with a lump sum residual disadvantages not
already specifically settled or difficult to prove or to
skim off the profits made by the offender through the
tort. 727
721 id.
722 id.
723 id. at 337
724 id. at 338
725 id.
726 id. at 339
727 id. at 340
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These "nonpunitive" 728 parts have to be clearly indicated by
the U.S. court. 729 "Due to the prohibited revision au fond
principle, the German court may not second guess the implicit
motives of the U.S. court;" 730 it is however, competent to
determine the prior function (Schwerpunkt) of a punitive
damage. 731 Enforceability of this nonpunitive part requires
additionally that the award passes the test of
proportionality (Verhaeltnismaessigkeit) , a constitutional
standard. 732 The only accepted legitimate end is the
compensation of the victim, 733 any form of punishment can
only be exercised by the State. 734
All in all, German decisions reflect the very narrow
standard of the public policy defense and also the
willingness of the German courts to refuse enforcement if
this narrow standard is infringed.
728 Hartwin Bungert, Enforcing U.S. excessive and punitive
damages awards in Germany, 27 INT'L LAW. 1075, 1082 (1993)
729 Bundesgerichtshof , id. at 341
730 id. at 342 (summarized by Bungert, id. at 1082)
731 Bundesgerichtshof, id. at 342
732 Bungert, supra note 728, at 1084 ("The principle of
proportionality has three principles: a means must be (1)
appropriate (geeignet) , (2) have the least restrictive effect
(erforderlich) to achieve the legitimate end, and (3) bear a
reasonable relationship to the ends (verhaeltnismaessig im
engeren Sinne) ")
733 id. at 344
734 id.
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4 . Comparison
National policy was not substantially discussed by a
German court, a case involving an embargo was decided not on
public policy grounds but missing evidence. 735 Similarly in
both jurisdictions a number of cases discussed the issue of
impartiality: the German cases deal mainly with an alleged
bias of one arbitrator as a member of a trade association,
the U.S. cases with alleged business contacts between an
arbitrator and a party. 736 The most striking difference
results from the U.S. Brandeis (and also the Fertilizer)
decision and the decision of the Hamburg Court of Appeals.
Both decisions deal with an award rendered by a tribunal of
a trade association. The U.S. court did not find the
appearance of bias, the German court did.
The rather broad appearance of bias doctrine of the
Hamburg Court has been relaxed in the international context
by more recent Supreme Court decisions. In the opinion of the
Supreme Court the mere possibility of bias is not sufficient
to stay enforcement. In the international context the Supreme
Court required a real impact of the impartiality on the
result of proceedings. The court explicitly stated that "the
finding that a party had a predominant weight in constituting
735 Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeals] Hamburg, judgment
of Jan. 26, 1989, XVII YCA (1992) 491, 495
736 Schlosser, Verfahrensintegritaet, supra note 2 05, at
458
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the tribunal is therefore not sufficient" 737 and hereby
implicitly limited the Court of Appeals' reasoning. Both
jurisdictions seem to adhere to a "rule of reason" standard.
Bankruptcy proceedings initiated after the arbitration
proceedings follow a similar line. They do not hinder the
enforcement of the arbitral award. The decision in Corcoran
v. Ardra738is a rare exception.
In both jurisdictions the influence of false testimony
has been discussed with the same result: if the defendant
(could have) invoked this objection during the proceedings,
this will exclude any further consideration by state courts.
It is very likely that despite any explicit statement by the
U.S. or German courts, they will refuse enforcement if duress
influenced the agreement under the consistently applied
narrow standard.
As to the enforcement of awards with a penal effect
(interest rates or punitive damages), U.S. and German
jurisdictions surprisingly agree in their statements and
logical reasoning not to enforce any such award.
737 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of May 15, 1986, XII YCA
(1987) 489, 490
738 Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. 77 N.Y.2d 225 (Ct. App . 1990)
Chapter 4 : Conclusion
" [There is] a strong presumption in favor of freely
negotiated choice-of -forum provisions." 739 This statement
that could serve as a conclusion has been provided by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler- Plymouth.
The application of the New York Convention is left to the
good faith of the contracting states due to the inevitable
public policy defense. The U.S. and German courts did not
create a loophole to circumvent the Convention by a broad
interpretation of the public policy. They refer instead to
the pro-enforcement bias of the Convention and its purpose to
promote and facilitate enforcement. This pro-enforcement
purpose logically requires a narrow interpretation of the
defenses to safeguard the mentioned purpose. 740 The U.S. and
German courts adopt this purpose by extending the number of
arbitrable subject matters 741 and limiting the public policy
739 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler- Plymouth,
Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985)
740 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale
de 1' Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) , 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2nd Cir.
1974)
741 see supra Art. V(2) (a)
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defense to the "most basic notions of morality and justice" 742
or "a grave defect that touches the foundation of the State
and the economic functions." 743
The courts are evidently concerned about dilatory
tactics of losing parties that invoke an Art. V defense by
merely asserting inconsistencies in the proceedings. To
distinguish dilatory tactics from an enforcement barring
violation, the courts developed several criteria:
At first a party claiming a violation of its rights must
bring some evidence, some semblance of substance. 744 If the
defendant is not able to support his assertation with some
evidence, a court is likely to assume lack of good faith. 745
However, an evident infringement of the defendant's
procedural rights will not necessarily lead to a stay of
enforcement . Courts of both countries emphasized several
times that not every infringement fulfills the standard for
a stay of enforcement. 746 Additionally, a causal connection
has been required: the mere violation is not enough, it must
742 Parsons, id. at 974
743 Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of May, 15, 1986, English
language summary in XII YCA (1987) 489
744 Imperial Ethiopian Gov't v. Baruch-Foster Corp. 535
F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1976)
745 Imperial, id.
746 e.g. Oberlandesgericht Hamm, judgment of Nov. 2, 1983,
English language summary in XIV YCA (1989) 629, 632;
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Hammermills, Inc., 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8046, *1, 16 (D.D.C. May 29, 1992)
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have had some impact, material consequences on the award. 747
There must be at least some probability that the award would
have been different. 748
For two reasons a defendant may be estopped to invoke an
infringement: if he could have raised his objections already
before the arbitral panel, courts assume that he has
impliedly waived his right. 749 Accordingly, it has been held
that an unexcusable delay to oppose the award may have the
same effect. 750 The underlying rationale is to force full
participation of the parties in the arbitration proceedings
to guarantee the effectiveness of arbitration: "[he] cannot
remain silent, raising no objection during the arbitration
proceedings, and when an award adverse to him has been handed
down complain of a situation of which he had knowledge from
the first." 751 A party is, therefore, badly advised not to
attend the arbitration proceedings and pursuing a state court
action instead. U.S. and German courts did not recognize a
747 Audi NSU Auto Union v. Overseas Motors, U.S. District
Court, E.D. Mich., judgment of March 15, 1986, English
language summary in XII YCA (1987) 489, 490
748 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, judgment of April 3, 1975,
English language summary in II YCA (1977) 241
749
e. g. Biotronik Mess- und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co.
v. Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415 F.Supp. 133, 138
(D.N.J. 1976) ; Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of March 6, 1969,
English language summary in II YCA (1977) 235, 236
750 Al Haddad Bros. Enter., Inc. v. M/S Agapi and Diakan,
635 F.Supp. 205, 209 (D.Del. 1986)
751 Cook Indus, v. C. Itoh & Co., 449 F.2d 106, 107-108
(2nd Cir. 1971)
180
parallel state court action for an alleged invalidity of the
agreement as a sufficient justification of a non-
participation. 752 Parallel court proceedings may, however,
be promising and bar the enforcement when they concern the
vacation of an award in the country of its origin. Here, U.S.
courts are less reluctant to stay enforcement to avoid
inconsistencies between the two parallel proceedings. 753 As
Art. VI allows the court to require suitable security such a
tactics is only advisable if the court proceedings are likely
to be successful.
Eventually, courts draw a distinction between a national
and international standard. 754 An infringement that on a
domestic level would hinder enforceability, may not have the
same effect in the international cast because comity concerns
require a less stringent standard. 755
752 Geotech Lizenz A.G. v. Evergreen Systems, Inc., 697
F.Supp. 1248, 1253 (D.E.D.N.Y. 1988); Landgericht
Zweibruecken, judgment of Jan. 11, 1978, English language
summary in IV YCA (1979) 262
753 Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517
F.Supp. 948, 962 (D.S.D. Ohio 1981); Spier v. Calzaturificio
Tecnica, S.p.A., 663 F.Supp. 871,875 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1987); see
also DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 13, at §
45:03 (concurring with these decisions)
754
e. g. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985); Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of Jan. 18, 1990, English language summary in XVII
(1992) 503, 505
755 Pietrowski, supra note 8, at 92
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The U.S. courts decline to review the merits by second-
guessing the arbitrators' decision. 756 They recognize a broad
discretion of the panel generally presuming that the panel
acted within its competence, in particular if there is a
broad arbitration clause. 757 Only a clear abuse of its powers
or a completely irrational award may cause a refusal of
confirmation
.
758
Against this background it can be concluded that the
courts in fact interpret the refusal grounds narrowly and,
thereby, safeguard the application of the Convention by a
uniform method for the enforcement of a foreign award. The
Convention can, therefore, be regarded as an efficient means
to enforce an award in another contracting state.
756 Parson & Whittemore Overseas v. Societe Generale de
1' Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) 508 F.2d 969, 976; but see
Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of May 31, 1972, 25 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2180, 2181 (denying such a
binding effect on the jurisdiction for public policy)
757 Bundesgerichtshof, judgment of Feb. 27, 1970, 53 BGHZ
315, 320 (interpreting the clause "...any dispute arising out
of this contract..." broadly in favor of the arbitrators'
competence)
758 Laminoirs-Tref ileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v.
Southwire Co., 484 F.Supp. 1063, 1067 (D.N.D.Ga. 1980);
National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F.Supp. 800,
817 (D.Del. 1990)
Chapter 5 : Further means of enforcement
I . Introduction
Apart from the enforcement under the Convention, the
undoubtedly most important procedure, other enforcement
mechanisms need to be mentioned: The 1961 European Convention
on International Arbitration759 does not offer an alternative
structure for the enforcement of foreign awards; according to
its Art. 1(1) (a) its application is limited to "persons
having . . . their habitual place of residence or their seat in
different Contracting States." The United States did not
accede this treaty. The 1965 multilateral Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (ICSID) , however, is applicable.
ICSID will not be discussed here because has not given rise
to practice in the U.S. -German relation. This is evidenced by
the fact that there is no U.S. -German ICSID proceeding
reported. 760 Another procedure for the enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards is the 1954 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation between the United States and Germany. 761
759 1964 BGB1. II 425
760 Sandrock, supra note 12, at 3
761 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593
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Of course, a prevailing party might think of a double
exequatur strategy; i. e. seek a confirming court decision in
the country of issuance, and then enforcement of this
judgment. In general such a strategy is not advisable because
there is still no treaty on the reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments; 762 the enforcement is usually based on
comity763 only. Normally the double-exequatur will be more
time and money consuming, not very surprising with regard to
an additional court proceeding. It may, however, be
preferable if the prevailing party has already obtained a
confirming judgment, e. g. because it had sought enforcement
already in another country. 764
II. The Treaty of Friendship, Navigation and Commerce 765
The Treaty of Friendship, Navigation and Commerce [FCN]
between the United States and Germany is another possible
basis for the enforcement of an arbitral award, albeit,
762 Westin, supra note 17, at 327 (mentioning that the
enforcement of a foreign money judgment is a matter of the
individual states. There is, however, the Uniform Money
Judgment Recognition Act, §§ 1-11, 13, U.L.A. 261 (1986)
which has been enacted only by several states.) ; for Germany
there are two procedures: the procedures according to § 1044
ZPO or §§ 328, 723 ZPO
763 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-203 (1895)
764 Sandrock & Hentzen, supra note 45, at 85 and 87
(giving an extensive comparison between the enforcement
procedures)
765 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No 3593
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"modest in scope and limited in their usefulness." 766 It
follows the concept of "national treatment" 767 to avoid
discrimination of a foreign award. 768
1. General Applicability
It is unclear in how far the later U.N. Convention and
the implementing legislation supersedes the earlier FCN as a
lex posterior. Two arguments speak for a continuous
applicability of the Treaty: Art. VII (1) of the U.N.
Convention expressly provides that the "Convention shall not
affect the validity of multilateral or bilateral agreements
concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards
entered into by the contracting States. ..." Additionally, the
purpose of the Convention (and the implementing legislation)
is to facilitate the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
More lenient requirements of the Friendship Treaty,
therefore, would meet the Convention's purpose. 769
766 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 13, at §
45:02
767 Quigley, supra note 1, at 1053
768 Aksen, supra note 3 87, at 6
769 Aksen, id. at 14; Schlosser, Verfahrensintegritaet
,
supra note 205, at 457; Swisher, supra note 11, at 488;
Westin, supra note 17, at 355
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2 . The particular requirements
Contrary to the multinational U.N. Convention the
bilateral Friendship Treaty is only applicable to
agreements/awards between the nationals of the two countries.
The language of the Treaty, 770 however, does not suggest a
limitation to the awards rendered on the territory or by
nationals of one of the contracting parties.
The FCN does not make any reference to any law for the
determination of the validity of the arbitration agreement,
only for finality and enforceability with regard to the "laws
of the place where rendered. " Logically finality and
enforceability in this place require validity of the
agreement under the same (domestic) law. That means that for
the determination of the validity of the agreement the law of
the country of issuance should be applied. 771 Since this
770 The Treaty provides in its relevant part (Art. VI (2) )
:
"Contract entered into between nationals or companies of
either Party and nationals or companies of the other Party,
that provide for the settlement by arbitration of
controversies shall not be deemed unenforceable within the
territories of such other Party merely on the grounds that
the place designated for the arbitration proceedings is
outside such territories or that the nationality of one or
more of the arbitrators is not that of such other Party.
Awards duly rendered pursuant to any such contracts, which
are final and enforceable under the laws of the place where
rendered, shall be deemed conclusive in enforcement
proceedings brought before the courts of competent
jurisdiction of either Party, and shall be entitled to be
declared enforceable by such courts, except where found
contrary to public policy.
771 Sandrock & Hentzen, supra note 45, at 68
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parallels the U.N. Convention it can be referred to the
relevant chapter above. 772
3 . Finality and enforceability of the award
The procedure of enforcement under the FCN has only two
requirements
:
- the award has to be "final and enforceable under the laws
at the place where award rendered, " and
- it should not be "contrary to public policy."
The two reported New York cases on the enforcement of a
German award evidence that the courts enforce awards under
the FCN like foreign judgments. 773
In Engelbrechten v. Galvoni & Bros, a German party
sought enforcement of a final, but not certified, award.
Certification by a German court is a requirement for the
execution in Germany, § 1042 ZPO. The court did not read the
Treaty provision prohibiting the enforcement of an
unenforceable award. In the light of the mandate of the
Treaty the court recognized its discretion to give effect to
German awards to extend "broader recognition to foreign
adjudications required by the treaty...." 774 In Landegger v.
Bayerische Hypotheken und Wechsel Bank the District Court
772 id.
773 McClendon, supra note 16, at 70
774 Engelbrechten v. Galvanoni & Nevy Bros. 59 Misc. 2d
721, 723-724 (N.Y. Civ.Ct. 1969)
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held that simultaneous court proceedings in Germany to vacate
the award do not hinder enforceability in the U.S. In case of
a vacation of an award, reopening might be possible. 775
Similarly in Germany an arbitral award is "'final and
enforceable' once it has been rendered in the form required
by the law of the country in which the proceedings took place
and, from that moment on, when any ordinary means of recourse
are no longer available against it." 776 It is submitted that
there is a tendency in Anglo-American Treaties to duplicate
certain elements to prevent a disregard by the courts. 777
Accordingly, a "double -exequatur" may be deemed superfluous.
The second requirement is that the award should not be
"found contrary to public policy." Public policy "includes
(most matters of) due process as well as arbitrability of the
subject matter." 778
' Landegger v. Bayerische Hypotheken und Wechsel Bank,
357 F.Supp. 692, 695-696 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1972)
776 Sandrock & Hentzen, id. at 69 (referring to
Bundesgerichtshof
,
judgment of Oct. 21, 1971, 57 BGHZ 153,
157)
777 Sandrock & Hentzen, id. at 70
Sandrock & Hentzen, id. at 70; Oberlandesgericht
Hamburg, April 3, 1975, II YCA (1977) 241 (for an example of
a public policy decision under the FCN)
Conclusion
Arbitration offers a number of advantages over
litigation. Those advantages gain even more weight in
international business than in domestic disputes. The review
of court decisions is evidence that arbitration in the
international cast is a reliable method of dispute
resolution. This is a result in particular of the U.N.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards and its application by U.S. and German
courts. If a party to arbitration tries to enforce an award
under the Convention or the FCN the issue of enforcement
abroad no longer seems to be critical. In the majority of
cases courts grant enforcement.
The Convention provides for broader applicability than
the bilateral FCN. The procedure of the Convention cannot
only be used for awards rendered in bilateral U.S. German
relations but also for an award rendered in favor of a U.S.
or German party before a panel in another (for the U.S.:
contracting) country.
The refusal of arbitration as an alternative method of
dispute resolution might be described once again by using the
words of the Supreme Court in Scherk v. Alberto- Culver:
188
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"... the dicey atmosphere of such a legal no-man's-land [if
arbitration as a choice of forum were not recognized] would
surely damage the fabric of international commerce and trade,
and imperil the willingness and the ability of businessmen to
enter into international commercial agreements." 779 The
possibility of a fast and predictable dispute resolution in
a neutral forum and the enforceability of an award rendered
by an arbitration tribunal help overcome businesspeople'
s
reluctance to trade internationally.
779 417 U.S. 506, 517 (1974)
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